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Many public research and technology organizations (RTOs) in Nigeria have been 
considered ineffective in improving the socioeconomic status of their citizens. Effective 
management of RTOs will improve research activities, such as development of new 
technologies and processes, which are crucial for national development and wealth 
creation. Since boards are the organ of governance in public RTOs in Nigeria, their 
impact should be enhanced. Several studies have examined the role of public governing 
boards, but the perceptions of stakeholders regarding their impact on RTOs in Nigeria has 
yet to be studied. The agency and stewardship theories served as frameworks to examine 
effect of boards on public RTOs’ outcomes in Nigeria. Data were obtained from semi 
structured interviews with 16 respondents from 6 public RTOs in the Federal Ministry of 
Science and Technology in Nigeria. Secondary data were obtained from public 
documents. Findings revealed that the impact of public RTO boards in Nigeria was not 
recognized and not deemed important for Nigeria’s welfare. Although professional and 
empowered boards were found to be beneficial to public RTOs in Nigeria, the RTO 
boards’ disregard for best governance practices diminished their impact and relevance. A 
recommendation from the study is for a governance structure suitable for RTOs and an 
international monitoring and evaluation process to enhance good governance practices in 
RTOs. It is hoped that the outcome of this research will be used by leaders and 
policymakers to create governance reforms in Nigerian RTOs, improve public RTO 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Nigeria has been struggling to attain global relevance in technological 
development since its independence in 1960, and despite its obvious large status in 
Africa, the country is still far behind in terms of economic development. The country has 
dropped from being the third fastest growing world economy in 2014/2015 after China 
and Qatar (Elias, 2016) to 15th with a real GDP of -1.7 in 2016 and projected gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth of 0.6% in 2017 (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 
2016), its worst since democracy stabilized in 1999 (Jerven, 2015). Despite many 
government-owned organizations which were established purposely to help Nigeria 
overcome its many developmental problems through research and development activities, 
the nation is fraught with decaying public infrastructure and low capital growth. Nigeria 
is ranked 152 out of 188 and has a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.514 (United 
Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2016).  Nigeria also ranked 36 out of 54 
African countries assessed for good governance, according to the Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance (IIAG) ranking.  
The nation’s earnings are gradually reducing because of the last global recession 
which ended in 2009 (Fapohunda, 2013) and the Nigerian recession which began in 2016 
and lasted for a year. Public funds are being channeled towards developing research and 
technological organizations (RTOs) in Nigeria as a means of stimulating economic 
growth. The Nigerian government is thus focusing on other factors that could make 
Nigeria’s public RTOs more profitable and advantageous to economic growth, apart from 
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employee competences and expertise. One such determinant of performance is the way 
these organizations are being administered. Following the near-collapse of the global 
banking sector with financial scandals of entities like Enron and Worldcom in the US and 
Parmalat in Europe, strict and uniform regulation of corporate practices has become 
necessary. As a consequence, nations have responded by passing regulatory laws and 
developing governance principles to guide public governance.  
Good governance principles are designed primarily to support boards and assist 
them with isolating and establishing best practices for organizational effectiveness. 
According to the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 2013), good governance 
is premised on adherence to principles of integrity, openness and stakeholder 
engagement, transparent reporting processes, effective risk management, and capacity 
development. These principles stand as terms of reference for governing entities and are 
similar to one another when compared across organizations in the public sector.  
Since the Enron scandal in 2001, some major Nigerian public corporations have 
also suffered major setbacks which resulted in collapses of their organizations as a 
consequence of agency issues and poor governance structures. Banks were the worst hit 
and the banking sector suffered a massive restructuring (Chinaedu, 2011). The 
restructuring was aimed at repositioning the banking sector (Ezeoha, 2011). The 
necessity for more effective boards has become more apparent so that value delivery can 
be guaranteed for stakeholders (Pradhan, Afshan, & Chhetri, 2011). Nigerian public RTO 
boards need reliable information that will enable them to understand factors preventing 
the effectiveness of their organizations and therefore prevent the collapse of the sector. 
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This study therefore focused on discovering the perceptions of chief executives and 
public board members about good governance practices in public RTOs in Nigeria so that 
good and ethical practices could be suggested for improving the performance of those 
organizations and achieving goals set for them.  
Statement of the Problem 
Science and technology (S&T) drives socioeconomic development (Bamiro, 
Mikailu, Obiaga, & Nyagba, 2008; Cavdar & Aydin, 2015) and are applied by most 
governments to promote economic and infrastructural development, especially when 
combined with research and development (Wu & Zou, 2012). Despite having embraced 
research and development (R&D) in its quest for economic and infrastructural 
development, Nigeria was still ranked 127 out of 144 competitive economies in the world 
(Schwab, 2014). This poor ranking may have been due to lack of key R&D inputs and 
weak institutions which resulted in Nigeria’s low GDP (Siyanbola et al., 2011, p. 3). 
According to Wu and Zou (2012), R&D activities can influence economic development, 
when researchers combine innovative and managerial skills with technical expertise. This 
feat was accomplished in China (Wu & Zou, 2012). Berle and Means (1932) said that an 
effective governing board guarantees the effectiveness of public organizations and 
protection of stakeholders’ interests. Effective boards have been proven to have a 
significant impact on organizational performance and are thus able to enhance promotion 
of R&D investments. No study has been able to link effective boards with the 
performance and development of a solid institutional framework involving public RTOs 
in a developing economy like Nigeria. This gap has limited the understanding of policy 
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makers about how to build solid governance structures in order to make public RTOs 
more functional. This study, therefore, intends to fill this gap in understanding by 
focusing specifically on the perceptions of stakeholders in the R&D sector in Nigeria 
regarding the role of governing boards in terms of improving the performance of public 
organizations in this sector and setting priorities for the nation’s future. 
Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following questions: 
RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D 
sector? 
  RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in 
Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness?  
RQ3: How do these perceptions of board members and executive directors 
regarding the impact of boards on Nigeria’s R&D sector affect the performance of these 
organizations? 
Conceptual Framework 
Since the intent of this study was to discover how governing boards could 
improve the management of organizations to enable them to respond to increasing 
societal demands, the conceptual framework used for this study was the agency theory. 
This theory came into public and academic awareness in the 1930s through the ideas 
shared by Berle & Means (1932), where they analyzed that separation of ownership from 
control in public organizations would result in governance problems. The principle in the 
agency theory involves the relationship between the principal, in this case the boards 
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which represent the stakeholders, and the agents, who are the who are the executives 
tasked with running the organizations. tasked with running the organizations. This 
principal-agent structure sometimes results in disputes because the interest of the 
principal, who often delegates decision making powers to the agent, may not be captured 
in the activities of the agent. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the agency theory 
perspective is useful in understanding such issues that are associated with the principal-
agent structure. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the agency theory could be 
applied to eliminate opportunistic behaviors which arise from conflicts of interest in the 
governance of public organizations. Raelin and Bondy (2013) recommended that boards 
should be appointed to manage governance conflicts and serve the interest of the 
principal (stakeholder). Sharpe (2012) asserted that the theory had exerted great influence 
in regulating board-organizations relationships thereby reducing principal-agent issues in 
organizations. Therefore, no study on corporate governance (CG) is complete without 
reference to the agency approach because the theory increases understanding of the 
principal-agent relationship. The agency theory has been widely used in such studies to 
understand the behavior of governing boards and how these have aided the development 
of board practices in organizations. It also helped to determine the method of inquiry for 
this study. 
Research Design 
 This study is qualitative by design because it sought an understanding of a case 
being studied based on the perceptions of participants. Creswell (2007) recommended the 
qualitative design for studies that required in-depth exploration in order to better 
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understand the lived experiences of the participants. The data for this study were obtained 
from personal semi-structured interviews with 16 respondents from six public RTOs. The 
respondents were comprised of seven former chief executive officers (FCEOs) of public 
RTOs in Nigeria, four present chief executive officers (PCEOs), and five former board 
members (FBMs). All respondents were purposively selected. Secondary data were 
obtained from existing official documents and mandates using the qualitative data 
collection approach.  The data were analyzed to determine themes that emerged, and 
these were used to address the research questions. The themes that emerged were 
compared with existing data and records and triangulated for validity. An appropriate 
evidence-based conclusion was drawn from the findings to address the research problem.  
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the governance role 
played by successive board members in determining the effectiveness of public RTOs in 
Nigeria. This role was understood from the perspective of CEOs and FBMs. This study 
also sought to describe exceptional CG practices of public RTO boards in Nigeria that 
would be appropriate for public RTOs in Nigeria. This study explored the importance of 
good governance practices in terms of RTOs’ effectiveness in the Nigerian public sector 
by interviewing CEOs of selected public RTOs as well as past and present board 
members. The purpose of this was to gain in-depth knowledge about the importance of 
public RTO boards and the effects of decisions, risks, policies, and activities of those 
boards before 2016. Highly effective RTOs are required in Nigeria to develop the 
infrastructure of the country. Therefore, the intent of this study was to offer reliable 
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information to researchers and practitioners regarding governance behaviors that 
enhanced organizational performance of public RTOs. Through this study, valuable 
recommendations which will enhance governance of public RTOs and lead to 
technological advancement of Nigeria will be made available. When boards are 
performing well, their organizations will be effective and their immediate society will 
feel their impact. This study will inspire discussions amongst policymakers and 
researchers regarding improving governing boards’ performance in Nigeria’s public 
organizations.  
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study is qualitative using an interpretive case-study approach. 
This approach was selected because it relies on the experiences of participants within 
their social contexts and since this dissertation had to do with the perceptions of 
governance issues in public RTOs, it was an appropriate research paradigm to use. With 
the application of the qualitative approach, therefore, I strove to understand the 
governance behaviors of public RTOs through the perceptions of governing bodies. The 
qualitative approach was more appropriate in this study compared to a quantitative or 
mixed methods approach because a quantitative approach would involve establishing a 
link between effective boards and performance of public RTOs in Nigeria and could not 
have probed deeper into meanings given to phenomena according to participants. 
Quantitative methods often involve establishing cause and effect relationships among 
variables using empirical data, while the mixed methods approach combines both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches and still involves statistical deduction of the 
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phenomenon rather than induction (Creswell, 2012, 2009). This allowed an in-depth 
analysis of data collected from methods such as interviews, observations, and secondary 
sources to gain a deeper understanding of the case.   
Background of the Study 
Governments establish public organizations purposely to offer public services 
(Bowman, 2016). Public RTOs in Nigeria should strengthen the rapid industrialization of 
the country and increase the social satisfaction of the citizens through their activities. 
However, these realities are not visible (Siyanbola et al., 2011) because these 
organizations are performing below expectations (Muanya, 2019). Despite the apparent 
failures of these public RTOs to deliver expected outcomes, the Nigerian government has 
yet to initiate intuitive and decisive strategies to tackle emerging challenges in the sector. 
Unless more attention is paid to governance of these organizations, they will continue to 
waste public funds, and this will further impoverish the nation. CG has thus become 
imperative to ensure that organizations achieve the mandates which were designed for 
them by the government. Good governance also creates an enabling environment for 
foreign investment, thereby promoting economic growth (Aina, 2013). The role and 
importance of public governing boards was thus one of the important considerations in 
this study.  
The agency theory was selected as the foundation for this study. The agency 
theory involves the separation of ownership from direct control and running of 
organizations in order to enhance efficiency (Berle & Means, 1932; Raelin & Bondy, 
2013). This recommendation was, however, discovered to have led to the pursuit of self-
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interests by executives, especially in Nigeria where corruption is endemic in public 
service (Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003). Agency problems must be eliminated before 
they waste the efforts and investments of shareholders. 
Achebe (1998) said leaders must be more ethical for the economy of Nigeria to 
grow. Many corporate failures experienced in Nigeria have been attributed to poor 
institutional frameworks and governance behavior of leaders (Aina & Adejugbe, 2015). 
This underscored the importance of adherence to the principles of good governance as a 
panacea for agency issues and ineffectiveness in organizations. Siyanbola et al. (2011) 
encouraged improved funding of RTOs in order to improve performance, but Kaplan, 
Samuels, and Cohen (2015) said that if public boards supervised CEOs more, 
organizations would become more effective. Palmberg (2015) focused on Swedish firms’ 
performance under independent boards and concluded that independent boards were able 
to positively influence the financial performance of Swedish organizations by monitoring 
the activities of executives. 
Additionally, many studies have been conducted regarding CG issues in 
developing countries involving annual reports of organizations, information about 
popular standards of governance principles such as board composition, qualification, 
separation of ownership, and risk management posture of boards. However, this study 
involved perceptions of respondents concerning the impact of public boards, and these 
were obtained through personal interviews and questionnaires. Other secondary data were 
only used to corroborate the primary data. The findings are expected to improve public 
board effectiveness, thereby resulting in high-performing organizations and 
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infrastructural development in Nigeria. More details about these issues appear in Chapter 
2.  
Assumptions, Limitations, Scope, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
  According to Rouleau-Carroll (2014), assumptions are things believed to be 
certain based on speculations by the researcher, but have not been sufficiently proven. 
There were several assumptions in this study. One assumption was that there would be no 
objections from the Ministry of Science and Technology about interviewing participants 
or accessing existing documents in the RTOs.  The second assumption was that the 
criteria for including participants in this study were appropriate for the sample such that 
all participants have had the same experience with boards. My third assumption was the 
participants in this study would be honest and offer valid information needed to answer 
the research questions. My fourth and last assumption in this study was that the 
participants would consent to participate in this research because of their interest in 
improving the effectiveness of public organizations in Nigeria rather than their personal 
motives and interests.  
Limitations 
  The main limitation of this study was the absence of prior studies on governance 
in public RTOs in Nigeria. This limited the study because there was little foundation 
upon which an understanding of my research could be based except for the studies on 
governance that involved organizations in other sectors in the country, like the banking 
sector. A major limitation of this study was the fact that the data obtained from the 
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interviews and questionnaires could not be verified since they were opinions and 
perceptions of participants. There was, therefore, the possibility of respondents’ bias. I, 
however, overcame this limitation by independently triangulating the data in order to 
ascertain the validity of the data obtained from the respondents. By triangulating data, the 
information obtained can be compared and verified for consistency.   
Scope and Delimitations 
 This study was limited to RTOs in the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Science and 
Technology. In addition, participants were limited to serving managing directors (MDs)/ 
CEOs of selected parastatals and agencies in the RTO sector, former chief executives of 
these parastatals,  as well as former members of public governing boards in the 
parastatals. Samples were drawn from board members who had served before public 
boards were dissolved in Nigeria in 2015 by the president.  
  Since one study cannot adequately cover every aspect of governance, this study 
was restricted to governance in Nigerian public organizations (with emphasis on RTOs) 
from the perspective of those involved or who have been involved in governance. The 
study included participants’ perceptions through interviews to gain rich information from 
their experiences.  
  Delimitations are those issues that can be manipulated by the researcher in the 
study (Rouleau-Carroll, 2014). The choice of only MDs and board members as 
participants in this study rather than including directors and other government officials 
was deliberate. The choice was informed by my belief that the selected participants were 
directly involved in the governance of these organizations. I also deliberately restricted 
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the search area to Nigeria because ethical practices in governance were still in the infancy 
stage in the country. Governance in Nigeria thus needed reliable studies that could assist 
practices to thrive and achieve desired impacts. 
Definitions of Terms 
 Uncommon terms used in a study should be defined to give readers an 
understanding of their meanings. Uncommon terms used in this study include: 
 Agency problems: These are problems associated with incompatibilities in 
management and shareholders’ interests which lead to conflicts (Boshkoska, 2015).  
Asian Tigers: This refers to the four Asian countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea & Taiwan) which, though lacking in natural resources, transformed their 
economies between the mid-60s and 1990s through growth and development strategies 
that made them international trading hubs (Hai, Tsui, & Zhang, 2013).  
 Code of Ethics: This is a spelled-out statement detailing expected behavior of 
employees in an organization or profession. 
Conflict of Interest: This is a crisis situation that arises when the separate goals 
and needs of owners of organizations and managers are at variance with one another 
(Tafel-Viia & Alas, 2015).  
  Corporate Governance: This refers to the measures put in place by organizations 




Ethical behavior: These are desirable and right actions or decisions that are 
required of individuals in conformity with organizational values and beliefs and in 
demonstration of commitment to moral rules.  
Organizational Effectiveness: This refers to the ability of an organization to 
efficiently achieve planned outcomes that lead to competitive advantage (Zoogah, Peng, 
& Woldu, 2015). 
Oversight functions: These are governance functions that include the review and 
monitoring of federal organizations, their activities, and the implementation of strategic 
policies (Kaplan, Samuels, & Cohen, 2015). 
Ownership dispersal: This involves the separation of ownership from 
organizational control (Berle & Means, 2012). 
Parastatals: These are autonomous public organizations or agencies that are 
owned by government and were established to serve some specific and specialized 
purposes. 
Public boards: These are the governing boards of public and not for profit 
organizations. 
Public sector: These are government-owned organizations, institutions, or 
industries set up to provide services specific to the public (United Nations [UN], 2007). 
Risk management: This is the series of actions employed to minimize potential 
threats to organizational goals by identifying and maximizing opportunities (Drennan, 
McConnell, & Stark, 2014). 
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Shareholders: These are the persons categorized as owners of an organization 
either through investment of stocks in the company or family inheritance (Sur, Lvina, & 
Magnan, 2013). 
Stakeholders: These are persons who have stake in the performance or output of 
an organization and whom the organization is obligated to satisfy or serve (Harrison & 
Wicks, 2013; Phillips, 2003). 
Triangulation: This is a research method which aims at ensuring data validity by 
gathering data from multiple sources in a single study (Creswell, 2009). 
Value delivery: This means making products or services available to clients at 
minimum cost and maximum quality such that reliable performance is guaranteed 
(Lindgreen, Hingley, Grant, & Morgan, 2012). 
Possible Types and Sources of Data 
  Data for this study were obtained from multiple existing sources. These sources 
include surveys on boards’ activities in public organizations in Nigeria, and secondary 
sources such as government records that explain the characteristics and performance of 
public organizations in Nigeria. This enabled the triangulation of data and enhanced the 
quality of the study. Other sources of data include documentary review of laws that spelt 
out the mandates of governing boards and public organizations, internet sources (for data 
on public organizations involved in R&D in Nigeria), and annual reports of such public 
organizations. The third source of data for this study were the interviews with MDs, 
former CEOs, and board members of public RTOs.  
The three data sources were combined as a means of gaining different 
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perspectives from participants, official records, personal interpretations, and direct 
experiences with the research institutions. 
Significance of the Study 
Research organizations in Nigeria are increasingly faced with the need to develop 
financial capabilities. This would enable them to run independent of government and 
would be a great relief to these organizations, given Nigeria’s present economic 
downturn. Government grants to these R&D organizations were not sufficiently 
meaningful or regular enough to sustain their growth, development, and activities, so 
knowledge gained from this research will be valuable to local and international 
researchers in the field of governance, managers of RTOs, policymakers, and 
practitioners who are interested in learning how to improve issues associated with boards 
and organizational performance. Through this study, they will have access to data that 
will reveal how corporate boards in the research sector can influence organizational 
performance. 
Since one of the aims of CG is to pursue shareholders’ value, this research 
provides a framework for the development of management strategies and a performance 
assessment chart to ensure these boards behave in ways that ensure their organizations 
will satisfy stakeholders’ needs and conform to global governance practices. Thus, with 
the knowledge obtained from this study, boards in the research sector will be able to 
improve their worth to their organizations. Efficient boards will influence their 
organizations to be effective. The economy and personal worth of individuals in Nigeria 
will thus be improved because the efficiency of the research sector will proliferate 
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technology in the country. 
Summary 
 Studies are often conducted to confirm existing theories or affect changes and 
improvement. Chapter 1 discussed the background and problem statement of this study. 
The role to be played by me was also clearly stated so that actions to be taken were 
clearly defined from the beginning of the study. This chapter also explained the extent of 
the inquiry in this research. Because governance is a broad topic, the inquiry was limited 
to public RTOs in Nigeria and their boards. Research questions were formulated to assist 
me in proffering recommendations to eliminate or reduce the identified problem of 
organizational performance.  
Some of the limitations to this study included absence of prior studies on 
governance in public RTOs in Nigeria and the possibility of respondents’ bias. I 
employed the use of triangulation to mitigate some of these perceived limitations. My 
major assumption in this study was that the inclusion criteria for my samples were 
adequate enough to select the appropriate participants.  
 The literature that is pertinent to this study is reviewed in Chapter 2. Various 
concepts that are related to governance, governance principles, the Nigerian public sector, 
and public boards are objectively and extensively examined. The intent of the study was 
to determine the importance of good governance in attaining organizational effectiveness 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The appointment of public governing boards is backed by acts of legislation in 
most countries (Leisner, 2005). Public board members are appointed through political 
selection and their activities are determined by the mandates specified in their bylaws 
(Osamwonyi & Tafamel, 2013). These boards are sometimes called boards of trustees, 
governing boards, or boards of governors, and they can perform executive or supervisory 
functions.  
Boards have been receiving attention since the global financial crises in Asia and 
Europe. It is common knowledge that these financial crises were exacerbated by the poor 
quality of corporate management practices, which resulted in bad investment decisions 
and caused the near-collapse of the world’s finances. This suggested that boards were 
essential to the financial survival of organizations. CG thus involves more than daily 
routine decision-making in organizations, but also involves developing strategic plans 
that will enhance organizations’ value and stimulate and sustain growth. According to 
Aina (2013), investors are more attracted to countries that are guided by strategic 
governance practices, because they are assured that efforts are in place by governments of 
such countries, to prevent corporate failures. 
 With growing concerns by governments regarding how organizations could be 
more effective and considering the widespread clamor by practitioners and scholars for 
more understanding of the role of boards beyond their legalistic functions, this research is 
timely in providing possible solutions. This study, therefore, tracked the approaches of 
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boards of public RTOs towards addressing the development needs of Nigeria and also 
focused on the increasingly vital roles of these public RTOs towards achieving lasting 
economic stability for Nigeria.  
This chapter discusses previous research that addressed the effectiveness of 
corporate boards’ activities in organizations. This helped to identify gaps between the 
theories on management of public RTOs and actual practice. This literature review 
involves an overview of global governance practices and theories, the governing board of 
public organizations, trends in the development of technological RTOs, measurement of 
boards’ impact on organizational effectiveness, conceptual framework and methods, gap 
in literature, and a conclusion. 
  A review of the literature regarding corporate boards of RTO public organizations 
was done with a critical evaluation of the management of the technological R&D industry 
in Nigeria. This included an analysis of the impact of R&D and technological 
development on the Nigerian economy as well as the role of effective organizational 
leadership on RTO effectiveness in Nigeria. This is followed by literature on methods 
which previous research employed to measure the impact of boards on the effectiveness 
of public organizations, with particular emphasis on public RTOs.  
Overview of Global Governance Practices and Theories 
Governance 
Cornforth (2003) said governance was “the systems by which organizations are 
directed, controlled and accountable” (p. 17). Huther and Shah (2005) said that 
governance was an attempt by governments to effectively manage their resources through 
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defined institutions, while Aina (2013) viewed governance as the activities of boards that 
prevent collapse of organizations. Fukuyuma (2013) suggested that the quality of 
governance in states should be measured by the output, procedures, and capacities of 
such governing entities. Governance can be explained as governments’ efforts to manage 
public organizations through appointed actors to ensure organizational and ultimately 
state wellbeing. CG is therefore not about the day-to-day operational management of the 
company for managers and executives but involves the overall strategic plan to move 
both the organization and country forward. Governance involves the execution of 
deliberate and defined actions which are intended to guarantee that stakeholders’ 
expectations are met. According to the OECD (2015), CG is also not an end but a means 
to achieve “economic efficiency, sustainable growth, and financial stability” (p. 9), which 
will promote improved financial investments and economic growth. 
There is growing interest in governance practices by governments who are 
interested in gaining economic competitive advantage. In order to boost efficiency of 
public organizations, owners require a dependable monitoring framework such as boards 
to ensure that their businesses are run transparently and efficiently.  
According to Akingunola et al. (2013), globalization and its attendant 
innovations, especially in information and communication technologies (ICT), ensure 
that businesses can be transacted beyond geographical boundaries. For such businesses to 
survive in an increasingly changing global economic terrain, they must engage in 
internationally acceptable best practices. Governments have, therefore, remained 
committed to creating work environment that would encourage governance best practices 
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(Tagotra, 2016). According to Abor (2007), effective governance structures positively 
influence firm performance and growth. Abor arrived at this conclusion from studying 
how having effective capital structures positively influenced decisions of listed firms in 
Ghana. Olubukunola (2013) asserted that good governance drastically reduces conflicts 
of interests in public organization.  
Another reason why democratic governments have growing interest in 
governance is because of the global financial crisis which resulted in the collapse of giant 
corporations in Europe and Asia such as Johnson Matheys Bank (JMB), Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International, Enron Incorporation, as well as Ahold and Parmalat in 
Europe (Akingunola, Adekunle, & Adedipe, 2013; Nadler & Nadler, 2006; Yip, 2015). 
These business failures resulted in the lack of faith in boards (Elias, 2016; Yip, 2015) and 
prompted the formulation of laws to regulate CG. The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Law of 
2002, an act which protects consumers by eliminating conflict of interests and ensuring 
accounting reforms in public organizations was one of such laws. These laws guided CG 
and stressed the importance of transparent systems of operation.  
Governance of public organizations is important to Nigeria’s wellbeing. This 
informed the many steps taken to develop codes of governance practices in the country so 
that organizations could be responsibly and transparently administered and corporate 
failures could be prevented. Aina and Adejugbe (2015) said that a review and update of 
existing governance codes would be beneficial to public organizatons because it would 
ensure that the best practices in governance are applied to Nigeria’s public sector. 
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Governance Best Practices 
Larcker and Tayan (2011) said that it was difficult to identify business practices 
that produced good governance in public organizations. The need to regulate increasing 
trade partnerships between multinationals and conglomerates in developed and 
developing economies has increased the clamor for a global standard for good 
governance in the corporate world (Robertson, Diyab, & Al-Kahtani, 2013). According to 
Cooper and Edgett (2012), the reason for pursuing best practices is to improve 
organizational performance and effectiveness because it stimulates innovation. 
Researchers and practitioners differ on what governance best practices are. Most 
researchers believe that when practitioners use common, good, and appropriate 
management practices to improve quality and efficiency of organizations, such 
constitutes best practices (Bardach, 2012).  
Keehley, Medlin, Longmire, and MacBride (1997) observed that governance is 
said to have conformed to best practices when it (a) is effective for an extended period (b) 
possesses measurable impact (c) is result oriented (d) is replicable in different 
organizations (e) is widely applicable, and (f) is generalizable. These good governance 
criteria have however not been fully met by any particular governance strategy (Herman 
& Renz, 2008). 
Cooper and Edgett (2012) believed that what constitutes best practices were 
subject to change once these practices became the acceptable norm in most organizations. 
According to Cooper and Edgett, these supposed best practices will eventually be 
jettisoned over time by organizations which desire to gain competitive advantage over 
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others. Besides, a governance practice that worked in one organization may fail woefully 
in another. Governance in countries with emerging markets may be fraught with cultural-
related challenges and this will influence the governance outcome (Robertson, Diyab, & 
Al-Kahtani, 2013). As such, governance structures that are widely used in developed 
nations may not be applicable in such circumstances.  
The IFAC (2013) said that standard governance practices were not static but 
dynamic because organizations metamorphosed periodically. Metamorphosis, such as 
these, would necessarily require major changes in and renewal of their structures to 
conform to current realities. This assertion was further corroborated at the meeting of 
G20 Leaders’ Summit when they observed the fact that though governance best practices 
in most countries had significantly become more widespread, many were still contending 
with various challenges hindering global acceptance of governance practices. Some of 
these challenges were identified as the changes in stock investments and trading rules, as 
well as entrance of new players into the corporate world, which altered previous 
assumptions and necessitated a need to review present practices (OECD, 2015). Herman 
and Renz (2008) therefore recommended that rather than obsess about adhering to 
common governance practices and procedures to achieve effectiveness, serious 
organizations should instead search for those values and goals that defined their 
organizations.  Herman and Renz further advised these organizations to develop practices 
and procedures which were consistent with these values, as well as the expectation of its 
operating environment, and shareholders’ interests. 
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According to Akingunola et al. (2013), the attitudes and values of people should 
determine their governance principle. Zoogah, Peng, and Woldu (2015) confirmed that 
African values and traditions influence the effectiveness of organizations in Africa. 
Consequently, their ideologies may differ from that of the western world. These 
ideological differences may, however, hinder successful market entry and growth of 
developed economies. Strange et al. (2009) therefore suggested that these ideologies on 
CG must become standardized to prevent global conflicts in strategic, operational 
decisions and activities. Having good governance practices in place in the public sector is 
therefore essential because it reduces hindrances to market expansion and growth 
(Deininger & Feder, 1998; Ozen & Kusku, 2008), promotes accountability and equity, 
and also assists developing economies to grow (Kodila-Tedika, Rindermann, & 
Christainsen, 2014). In general, organizations that are openly and honestly administered 
have incorporated good governance (Sanusi, 2003). Some of the hallmarks of good CG 
include honest and transparent transactions, adherence to extant rules and regulations, 
and existence of a detailed, precise, and effective reporting system (Larker & Tayan, 
2015).  
Principles of Good Corporate Governance  
Following financial scandals in the US and Europe, the imperative of strict and 
uniform regulation of corporate practices has become glaring. As a consequence, nations 
responded to this by passing regulatory laws and developing governance principles to 
guide public governance. These regulatory laws clearly state rules of governance and 
consequences to be faced by organizations that violated those rules. 
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Good governance principles were designed primarily to support boards and assist 
them with identifying and establishing best practices for organizational effectiveness. 
According to the IFAC (2013), good governance is premised on adherence to certain 
principles, which more or less stand as terms of reference for governing entities and are 
similar to one another when compared across organizations in the public sector.  
Good governance can be determined by how reliable, accountable, and 
predictable a management process is (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 2012; World Bank, 1992). 
The more reliable an organizational process, the more trust and business it attracts and 
the more prosperous that organization will become. Organizations are well-governed 
when their performance yields predictably positive results over time and when they are 
found accountable and reliable enough to safeguard the economies of their countries from 
instability and failure (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016; Tricker, 2015). These 
performance indices often result in the growth and development of the home countries of 
such organizations. In other words, when public organizations are effective, reliable and 
accountable, they contribute to the wealth of their countries (Kodila-Tedika et al., 2014). 
Ott (2010) proved a strong correlation between the happiness of an average citizen in 130 
nations and the quality of governance practices in those nations. Ott thereafter concluded 
that the happiness of nations is dependent upon good governance. He also suggested that 
good governance was one of the conditions that must be met by developing countries to 
grow (Ott, 2010). Rindermann, Kodila-Tedika, and Christainsen (2015) supported this 
suggestion so long as these governance principles occasioned changes in economic 
structures and performances.   
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The earliest forms of governance principles were the UK Cadbury Report of 
1992, which introduced independent non-executive directors and shaped CG practice 
globally, as well as the principles of CG developed in 1997 by the US Business 
Roundtable (Tricker, 2015). According to Haxhi and Aguilera (2015), the Cadbury Code 
has been replicated in several countries and more than ninety nations have also developed 
governance codes for listed companies in line with the recommendations of the Cadbury 
Report.  
Globalization opened up new markets, and the need to expand trade into these 
emerging markets prompted developed economies to seek the development of global 
governance best practices to regulate the conduct of international business. This spurred 
the transnational OECD to develop a set of working principles on CG in 1999. This 
document was revised and ratified in 2004 and all members of the OECD adopted the 
policies as acceptable governance guidelines in their nations.  These principles were 
eventually updated and endorsed in 2015. 
The OECD governance principles are six in number with sub-principles. They 
were initially developed as a means of creating a global platform for equitable and fair 
treatment of investors and stakeholders (OECD, 2015). The six OECD governance 
principles stated: (a) The rights of shareholders, (b) The equitable treatment of 
shareholders, (c) The role of stakeholders, (d) Disclosure and transparency, and (e) The 
responsibilities of the board (OECD, 2004). 
However, non-OECD members’ countries, especially developing countries, may 
not have existing OECD governance policies and strategies in place (Young et al., 2006) 
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especially because these principles were primarily designed for the economies of 
developed countries (Robertson, Diyab, & Al-Kahtani, 2013) and may not be culturally 
sensitive to the needs of emerging economies. Therefore, their perception of truly 
acceptable governance practices may not be consistent with that of their counterparts in 
the western world. Peng (2003) asserted that though developing economies may seem to 
share and establish standard governance attributes in their organizations, they still 
grappled with cultural governance challenges and ownership ideologies. These challenges 
and ideologies greatly influenced their strategies and decisions.  
Regulatory frameworks have been instituted in nations to ensure market and trade 
efficiency and also enforce adherence to governance codes. Robertson et al. (2013) 
observed that when nations enact regulatory governance laws that conform to global 
principles, the way organizations conduct their business activities will improve. The US, 
for instance, has a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the 
governance of listed companies while its Nigerian counterpart does the same. In 2003, 
following some unethical activities of some unscrupulous CEOs, the Nigerian SEC 
authorized a Committee; led by Atedo Peterside, to develop codes that would reform 
governance practice in Nigeria. Thus, the 2003 SEC Code on CG came into existence in 
Nigeria and was subsequently revised in 2011 to conform to international best practices. 
Only 40% of publicly quoted firms on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) were found to 
have developed governance codes ethics for their business practice (Wilson, 2006).  
Another regulatory framework in Nigeria is the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) of 1990, which provides legal guidelines for monitoring compliance, 
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disclosures, and penalties and financial report processes in organizations (ROSC, 2004). 
Other codes in Nigeria include the 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code to regulate 
financial institutions and systems, the 2008 Nigerian Pension Commission (PENCOM) 
Code, and the 2009 National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) Code.  With these 
codes, institutions such as the SEC, CBN, and Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) 
were empowered as regulatory bodies to ensure and enforce adherence to these 
governance codes. Many of these codes were fashioned after the OECD governance 
principles (Wilson, 2006). 
Developing codes or principles of governance is however not the ultimate; efforts 
must be in place to ensure compliance with governance best practices. Sometimes also, 
adherence to identified governance standards does not necessarily result in good 
governance. According to Larcker and Tayan (2011), Enron complied with governance 
structures prescribed by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) yet the organization still 
collapsed because of other issues bordering on ethics and misrepresentation of accounts. 
These sabotaged Enron’s wellbeing. If leaders ignore governance practices, laws and 
regulations, they should be penalized for non-conformity so that they will learn to behave 
responsibly and ethically. Only then can projected outcomes be guaranteed. Haxhi and 
Aguilera (2015) observed that though the SOX Act of 2002 was a response to correct 
governance failures such as that of Enron, it has not achieved desirable levels of 
effectiveness in the governance of organizations. However, it has made corporate leaders 
less reckless because of the penalties approved by the law against errant leaders.  
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Theories of Governance 
The conceptual foundations upon which this study was based were the agency and 
stewardship theories. The agency theory is commonly used to explain modern 
governance practices and according to Sharpe (2012), it has helped to define, determine, 
and regulate boards’ best practices in organizations. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the 
agency theory offers “ a unique, realistic, and empirically testable perspective on 
problems of cooperative efforts” (p. 72) that arise between the principal and an agent, 
both of whom need to work together for the good of the organization but who also have 
to contend with their different interests and opinions on how to accomplish tasks. 
Accordingly, Jensen (1983) suggested that the elimination of opportunistic behaviors, 
engendered by conflicts of interest in the governance of organizations, was possible 
through the application of the agency theory.  
While Raelin and Bondy (2013) reconsidered the usefulness of the agency theory 
to determination of good governance, Adegbite (2015) proposed consideration of an 
African context to global theories of good CG because of certain peculiarities of 
developed countries, which may not be present in developing countries such as Nigeria 
and may thus make application of institutionalized global theories ineffective in such 
developing countries. To corroborate this, Minichilli et al. (2012) submitted that boards 
performed and operated differently in different contexts while Okeahalam and Akinboade 
(2003) offered proof by analyzing CG in Africa through the lens of separation of 
ownership from management. The authors provided useful suggestions on methodologies 
that could be used to assess the challenges and peculiarities of governance in Africa.  
29 
 
The agency theory assumes that shareholders are the principal in an organization 
while the CEO and management are agents who expectedly pursue self-centered goals 
that will guarantee their job security and entitlements. It is assumed that these agents may 
not necessarily be routing for the shareholders’ interests (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois 
& Jegers, 2016). According to Eisenhardt (1989), this attitude of agents may render them 
uncontrollable. As a consequence, proponents of the agency theory recommended that 
shareholders must take responsible actions that would ensure that managers only pursued 
actions that could be verified and which would yield maximum profit to shareholders. 
The principals, therefore, require an entity, such as boards, to monitor and control the 
activities of these agents so that their excesses and opportunistic behaviors are curbed and 
shareholders’ satisfaction is guaranteed (Cornforth, 2003).  With boards of directors 
acting in the interest of shareholders, the organization’s responsibility to the society and 
individuals would be limited to that which is required for long-term growth of the 
organization, managers would be forced to comply with organization’s goals and 
procedures, and shareholders’ profit-making agenda would be assured (Hung, 1998; 
Waldman & Siegel, 2008). This implies that management is fiducially accountable to 
maximize profit for the principal (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).  
The principals’ need to control agents’ activities is one of the points of divergence 
between the agency and stewardship theories. For instance, while the agency theorists 
assumed that managers were not committed to organizational goals or owners’ interests 
but would always act subversively to achieve their personal goals, the stewardship theory 
believed that both the owners and managers were stakeholders in the organization (Davis, 
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Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). The stewardship theorists 
thus believed that both principals and agents had the interest of the organization at heart 
(Muth & Donaldson, 1998). They also believe that boards should not be used as 
monitoring or controlling agents in organizations but should rather collaborate with 
managers within the organization (Cornforth, 2003).  
According to the stewardship theory of governance, the issue of trust is sacrosanct 
and if managers are well motivated, they would identify with the organization’s goals and 
effectively respond to opportunities that would advance these goals and yield enough 
profit to satisfy the needs of the owners (Davis et al., 1997; Deci, 1972). To the 
stewardship researcher, the negative portrayal of the manager as a self-seeking 
opportunist in the agency’s theory of governance is impractical. Studies on governance 
therefore need to consider and respect the managers’ need for self-actualization. These 
studies should also understand that managers are committed to considering other groups 
of external stakeholders because they could be affected by the actions of the manager 
(Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013; Waldman & Galvin, 2008). Besides, according to Van 
Puyvelde et al. (2016), it is irrational to blank out the reasons behind the behavior of 
managers as this action could demotivate and reduce their performance and consequently 
that of the organization. These researchers were able to prove that unless managerial 
objectives were understood and aligned with the organizational goals set by owners or 
shareholders, the desired performance might be elusive. Whereas Perrow (1986) observed 
that agency theory could not be used to analyze governance in organizations, Eisenhardt 
(1989) believed that agency theory contributed greatly to the development of perspectives 
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in organizations because it related to relationships and management of self-interests in the 
workplace. Though the agency theory has valid views on organizational structure and 
control, its partial view could be complimented by other equally relevant theories and 
perspectives that will give a broader overview of organizational complexities. Hirsch, 
Michaels, and Friedman (1987) said that research into organizations would yield more 
realistic views when multiple theories are combined, as this will strengthen 
organizational research. 
The agency theory has also failed to account for institutional differences in 
countries that are less developed. So, the issues of ownership dispersal and competition 
amongst businesses may not be operable in a country like Nigeria, which has an 
indigenous market set-up (Adegbite, 2015). These criticisms of the agency theory have 
led to divergent opinions on its importance to the study of governance. Perrow (1986), for 
instance, viewed the scope of the agency theory as being too narrow to interpret human 
behavior in organizations because it was more concerned with profit maximization than 
responsible leadership. Davidson (1990) condemned its negative portrayal of CEOs and 
management as corrupt and self-centered in organizational economics. The sharp 
criticisms have thus reduced the importance placed on the agency theory as a traditional 
basis for the study of boards’ dynamics. These criticisms also suggest the need for a new 
perspective to explain the many roles of boards in organizations aside acting as 
controlling agents. In response, Pless, Maak, and Waldman (2012) recommended the 
integrator leadership model which advocated that managers could be more accountable 
by “actively integrating, goals across constituent or stakeholder groups” (p. 58). 
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Donaldson and Preston (1995); Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004); and Scherer et al. 
(2013) believed that the narrow scope of the agency theory could be widened with an 
increase in stakeholder groups as this would guarantee the survival of the organization on 
the long run.  
Other theorists (Barney, 1990; Jones, 1995) have suggested that rather than 
enforce economic control over agents as proposed by the agency theorists, a more 
cooperative model of interaction would engender more trust and ensure a mutually 
beneficial relationship within the organization. This implies that the agency theory would 
be more efficient when combined with other theories to bring completeness to the study 
of governance. This view was supported by Van Puyvelde et al. (2016), who observed 
after their study of the managerial choices of executives of public and nonprofit nursing 
homes in Belgium, that certain situations may warrant that boards would both control and 
collaborate with managers in their organizations. Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) 
however cautioned against leaning towards either end of the two extremes because it 
would either reduce motivation of managers or increase their opportunistic behaviors. 
Van Puyvelde et al. (2016) conducted a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to determine 
whether managers preferred using control or collaboration tools to administer selected 
nursing homes in Belgium. They discovered that board members sometimes combined 
the controlling and collaborative methods in their relationship with managers of the 
homes.  
Other scholarly studies have also recommended combining both agency and 
stewardship theories in analyzing governance in organizations. For instance, Jobome 
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(2006) discovered that internal controls did not threaten managers in non-profit 
organizations because they received adequate remuneration and incentives. Van Puyvelde 
et al. (2016) found that the agency and stewardship theories could be combined to 
develop a governance framework for Not-for-Profit schools. Marvel and Marvel (2009) 
also corroborated this position when they successfully examined local governments’ 
reward and management practices from the agency and stewardship angle. These 
experiments and conclusions lend credence to the possibility of a successful combination 
of the agency and stewardship theories to investigate governance issues. 
The Public Sector 
 The public sector refers to the arm of a nation’s business which is charged with 
the provision of essential goods and services for the general public which the private 
sector may not easily provide at a reasonable and affordable cost (Broadbent & Guthrie, 
1992). The public sector comprises companies, organizations, higher institutions, and 
RTOs established by federal, state, and local governments for the sole purpose of 
ensuring that these goods and services are provided and equitably distributed efficiently 
and effectively (Anyim, Elegbede, & Gbajumo-Sheriff, 2011; Ball, Grubnic, & Birchall, 
2014; Karazijiene, 2015). This means that the services provided by these organizations 
are expected to be accessible to all members of the society, irrespective of status or 
income. Public organizations are thus created to meet public needs through the provision 
and proliferation of these goods and services (Baruch & Ramalho, 2006). Public sector 
companies can be monetary, educational, welfare, health, or security organizations, 
which provide basic public services on behalf of governments.  
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 The act of providing services for the public began in the 19th Century when 
municipal governments in developed countries like Britain provided good road, water, 
healthcare, and electricity services for their citizens (Ashton & Young, 2013). This was 
mainly a political agenda because leaders secure their people’s interests and votes when 
they engage in sustainable welfare practices and institutionalize these practices through 
acts of legislation. Masses often assess the quality of political decisions made by their 
leaders through the public services that are provided (Rothstein, 2010). Given the 
increasing quantum of services being provided therefore, governments have become the 
largest employer of labor in most countries, especially the US and Nigeria (Anyim et al., 
2011; Naff, Riccucci, & Freyss, 2013). Thus, the language of most governments has 
changed from “government” to “governance” (Naff, et al., 2013, p. xv). These facts 
underscore the importance of the public sector to society and explain the increased 
attention being paid to it.  
Characteristics of the Public Sector 
The major goal of the public sector is to achieve public wellness so that political 
and economic objectives may be fulfilled (Laegreid & Christensen, 2013). To fit into this 
role, the public sector has typical features that distinguish it from other entities. It must be 
noted however that public organizations differ one from another in terms of their roles 
and structure but they nevertheless all share similar features.  
In the first instance, the public sector is not profit-oriented but is more focused on 
outcomes. IFAC (2013) posited that this was the reason more attention was paid to equity 
and fairness in the provision of social services rather than profit generation. Raelin and 
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Bondy (2013) mentioned that owners of organizations ought to “be given the duty to seek 
out societal expectations and protect societal rights actively. . . before striving to 
maximize their firm’s value” (p. 427). Consequently, public organizations are more 
responsive to political rather than economic pressures. Public services can either be 
jointly or directly provided by governments or private investors and such public services 
include electricity, education, healthcare, peacekeeping and law enforcement, housing, 
transportation, and other social services (Christensen, Olesen, & Kjaer, 2005). 
In general, the services provided by the public sector are usually specialized in 
nature, and so public sector organizations operate in environments almost devoid of 
competition (Choi & Chandler, 2015). Because public sector organizations have a 
monopoly over the services they provide, private players are rarely involved. Where such 
players are found, their services are expensive. This is simply because while the costs of 
production by public organizations are borne by the government, private investors have 
to spread their cost unto consumers to bear. Citizens, therefore, have no other option but 
to depend on these public services.  
Because most of their services are highly subsidized, public organizations are thus 
not under pressure to make profit or generate funds (Quah, 2010). The funds being 
released by the government to fund these organizations may thus be insufficient to 
sustain them, and this could, in one way or the other, affect value. Appropriate 
performance evaluation is therefore difficult to undertake because of the lack of 
competition. Therefore, it is imperative for stakeholders to monitor, through CG, the 
effective delivery of these outcomes. Public organizations lack a competitive pressure, 
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which prevents them from appropriately evaluating their current performance, and this 
can lead to their underestimating the need for, impact, and value of innovating. 
Inappropriately evaluating performance and insufficiently assessing the value and costs 
of a change can lead to both excessive exploration and exploitation.  
A wide range of economic, cultural, and political considerations also influence the 
public sector, and these factors combine to place demands on organizations in these 
sectors. These factors eventually affect the governance, performance, and outcomes of 
the public organizations. This is largely because they are creations of government, and 
they are required to implement policies of the government. 
National, state, local governments, and agencies often partially fund public 
organizations through the taxes paid by citizens and from other earnings of government 
(Rainey, 2009). Because organizations depend on governments for survival, they are 
sometimes used to achieve political goals (Cordella & Willcocks, 2010). Choi and 
Chandler (2015), however, posited that public organizations could be pressured to 
perform if enough political, rather than economic, pressure was exerted. Governments, 
therefore, have the administrative and legal powers to determine the operational 
procedures and expected output of public entities. This they exercised through their 
insistence on adherence to formal rules, regulations, and constitutional provisions. Public 
organizations are thus accountable to the people through their elected leaders. 
Governance in the Public Sector 
 All organizations, whether public or private, need to be administered to achieve 
projected outcomes. CG came into the business subconscious in the 80s as a control 
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measure to mitigate agency costs and achieve economic efficiency (Aziri, 2014; Larcker 
& Tayan, 2011; Tricker, 2015). According to Bolton, Becht, and Roell (2002), the clamor 
for CG practices began, following the emergence of privatization of companies in some 
nations like the UK, so that “shareholder democracy” could be offered to shareholders. 
The introduction of the European integrated world market through the European Union 
(EU) has further fueled the agitation for common governance practices (Aziri, 2014).  
Although there is no specific definition of public sector governance, its 
application varies according to nations, values, and goals. However, since governance has 
been universally agreed to be the execution of a set of principles targeted at achieving 
stakeholders’ defined outcomes, public sector governance can, therefore, be understood 
as the application of power and governance practices in the public sector, albeit with 
adherence to international or local frameworks. It refers to the relationship and 
interactions between boards, managers, and stakeholders and is not another term for the 
management of public organizations.  
The ultimate aim of good governance in the public sector can be viewed from 
both the shareholders and stakeholders’ expectations. While shareholders expect to 
maximize gains and values, stakeholders believe in the obligation of public organizations 
to deliver improved services that would reduce unemployment and increase the standard 
of living for the masses (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  Because of these two points of view, 
CG can, therefore, be said to be effective when the decision-making process of managers 
goes beyond ensuring shareholders’ gains to improving community gains. Public entities 
are consequently said to practice good governance that would serve all interests when 
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they exhibit a commitment to integrity, act in the interest of the public and within the rule 
of law, and fulfill stakeholders defined and established goals (IFAC, 2013). 
The Governing Board of Public Organizations 
Governments thrive and grow when their public sector is reliable (Public Sector 
Commission, 2017) and this reliability is developed over time from the consistently 
credible and reliable structures that have been put in place to safeguard the economy and 
promote investments in the economy (Bartels, Napolitano, & Tissi, 2014). Viable and 
dependable public boards are an integral part of such reliable structures (Adams et al., 
2010). This enabling environment attracts investments and, consequently, development. 
Public boards are, therefore, the eyes and ears of government in public organizations and 
their positions in public organizations are often held in trust.  
It has been established that the provision of public services is unreliable in 
developing nations and it is safe to assume that this situation could be linked to 
governance failures in these countries (Collier & Venables, 2016; Hove, Ngwerume & 
Muchemwa, 2013; Kwon & Kim, 2014; World Bank, 1992). Effective governing boards 
are therefore critical to the survival of public organizations. This explains the reason they 
are more preferred in most public quoted or government-owned companies and in most 
developed and developing economies. Empirical research has confirmed that effective 
boards are commonly known to have a significant impact on the performance of their 
organizations (Brown, 2005; Herman & Renz, 2008; Mwenja, 2009; Okike, 2007) and 
they equally make R&D investments of RTOs more rewarding (Hillier et al., 2011). As 
such, Aina (2013) concluded that for organizations to be continually successful, they 
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need to be managed by boards that are effective and who do not shy away from taking 
strategic decisions. The quality of boards will determine their effectiveness and the 
ensuing success of their organizations.   
Certain conditions determine the impact of boards. According to Oxelheim, 
Gregorič, Randøy, and Thomsen (2013), the efficient constitution of boards enables them 
to perform their oversight functions effectively. The leadership structure of public boards 
is critical to organizational performance (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Dalton & 
Dalton, 2010; Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Ujunwa, 2012). Krause and Semadeni (2013) 
recommended that separating board chair and CEO roles can stimulate organizational 
performance while Monks and Minow (2008) considered the separation of offices as a 
governance best practice.  
Board structure has implications on outcomes and particular attention should be 
paid to determining which structure would be appropriate for organizations so that 
stakeholders’ expectations can be met (Pindado et al., 2015). Although IFAC (2013) 
insisted that there was no generic board structure which, when applied at all times, 
guaranteed organizational success, it has been discovered that specific board 
compositions are more viable in comparison with others. For instance, it is proven, from 
the agency point of view, that monitoring and controlling of management activities is 
more effective with independent boards because they will be more objective in their 
assessment of executives’ performance since they are not financially dependent upon the 
organizations or CEOs (Cheng & Courtenay 2006). This enhances the separation of 
powers between the executive and non-executive members, minimizes conflicts of 
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interests, and promotes good governance (IFAC, 2013). Miletkov, Poulsen, and Wintoki 
(2014) thus advocated board independence because they discovered through their study 
that independent boards practiced good governance and attracted more foreign investors 
thereby leading to economic development. According to Jizi, Salama, Dixon, and 
Stratling (2014), shareholders’ and stakeholders’ needs are easily met when boards are 
independent. The SOX legislation of 2002 offered legal backing to board independence 
and other studies, such as those conducted by Dahya and McConnell (2007) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), advocated independence for outside board members to 
guarantee performance. Adams and Ferreira (2009), Ahern and Dittmar (2012), and Liu 
et al. (2014) suggested that gender diversity of boards enhanced board and organizational 
performance and growth. Joseph, Ocasio, and Mcdonnell (2014) said that the CEO-only 
board structure (where the CEO is the only representative of the organization on the 
board) enhanced CEO performance because it gave them job security that was immune to 
threats from internal contenders’ who were eyeing their positions. This inadvertently 
encouraged commitment.  
If public boards are to perform their oversight functions effectively, they must be 
well constituted. According to Ujunwa (2012), the educational and professional 
qualifications of board members and CEOs indicate the quality of such boards and their 
adherence to good governance principles. In essence, a responsible board should have 
respectable qualifications and competences, else, effective governance and positive 
outcomes will be unrealistic (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). When 
board members lack this important basic quality, they easily exhibit poor governance 
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behaviors that could increase the cost of operation and ultimately reduce performance 
(Sanda et al., 2011). 
Boards leadership structure can be unitary or two-tiered (Belot, Ginglinger, 
Slovin, & Sushka, 2014;). The choice of board structure is dependent upon the level of 
government that exercises control over the entity (Boone et al., 2007) and the operational 
mandate of the organization (Pindado et al., 2015). While some boards are comprised of a 
mix of independent and non-independent directors who oversee managers, other boards 
solely consist of independent and non-executive members and their roles are thus 
separated from that of the executive (Khan & Awan, 2012; Palmberg, 2015). Fama and 
Jensen (1983) openly opposed CEO duality because they believed it would erode the 
powers of the board to monitor the activities of management effectively and will 
consequently escalate agency cost. But Sridharam and Marsinko (1997), from their study, 
focused on the Paper and Forest Resources Industry, discovered that CEO duality might 
not be averse to organizational performance if the leader is dynamic and strong and this 
may actually reduce agency and administrative costs.  
Khan and Awan (2012) however recommended that boards be composed of 
dependent and independent directors to have a mix of skills and improve their 
performance. He assumed that the autonomous structure of the board would encourage 
boards to exert control, as needed, thereby encouraging board independence and 
eliminating performance issues. Board independence alone does not, however, guarantee 
organizational effectiveness (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). The 1992 Cadbury Report also 
supported the separation of powers in governance such that one person does not occupy 
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the office of CEO and board chair at the same time. Charan (1998) however believed that 
the separation of powers would critically worsen conflict of interest issues in governance.  
According to Aina (2013), a good board must be diverse in composition in terms 
of the skills and experience needed to function and take unbiased decisions. Aina also 
said that the size of a good board must be manageable. Leisner (2005) and Jhunjhunwala 
(2012) observed that members of public boards were notable for the diversity in their 
composition because they often represented different constituencies. As a consequence, 
they face pressures from these constituencies. Public governing boards thus have to be 
innovative to surmount these pressures and strategically project their organizations’ 
goals. Aina (2013) confirmed this feature of board diversity by citing Principle A3 of the 
Combined Code states in England. This Principle insists that executive directors and non-
executive directors must be equally represented on boards so that minorities or single 
individuals would not easily hijack board decision.  
Therefore, a balance of experience, skill, and knowledge is needed to keep board 
decisions professional and in the interest of all stakeholders. A typical public board is 
made up of a board chair that oversees the board affairs and takes responsibilities for 
boards’ decisions, and board members whose responsibilities include supporting the 
board chair to chart strategic policies, paths, and priorities for the organization. 
Membership of boards in Nigeria cannot be less than five and they are mainly composed 




Board size also matters in achieving organizational goals. Boards that are smaller 
in size enjoy excellent communication among each other and are thus able to 
communicate efficiently with CEOs and effectively coordinate their activities (Dey, 
2008). Also, small boards can leverage their skills and expertise to make informed 
decisions effortlessly (Guest, 2008). The monitoring abilities of small boards could, 
however, be hindered if the organization is large and the tasks to be accomplished are 
much (John & Senbet, 1998).  Ch`en and Al-Najjar (2012) however, concluded, from 
their study of Chinese firms, that the size of an organization informed the structure of its 
board while the regulations in nations mostly informed board independence. Ujunwa 
(2012) also discovered that in Nigeria, board gender increased only as board size 
increased. Another board feature that influences board performance is the incentives that 
members and employees have access to (Fapohunda, 2013; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Role of Boards of Public Organizations 
Boards do not perform the same function as managers or CEOs in organizations. 
The business of CEOs is to run the organization and pursue its strategic goals and 
policies while boards are responsible for giving CEOs focus and as well as monitor them 
to be able to achieve those goals efficiently and effectively (Tricker, 2015). In the opinion 
of Charan (1998), boards are monitoring bodies who “help management prevent 
problems, seize opportunities, and make the corporation perform better than it otherwise 
would” (p. 5). According to Tihanyi, Graffin, and George (2014), boards’ activities and 
values definition explain CG in detail. According to Van Essen, Van Oosterhout, and 
Carney (2012) also, boards are important CG tools needed to overcome agency issues in 
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listed companies. A more efficient management system is required for organizations to be 
more profitably administered and responsive to societal needs. One determinant of such 
an efficient management system in organizations is an effective board and most nations 
of the world have adopted them as an instrument of CG. Boards are good governance 
determinants in organizations.  
Board functions are basic in principle, across organizations. The effective 
execution of these functions is however determined by some factors which boards have to 
contend with, such as board members’ age, organizational dynamics, CEO duality, 
gender, and educational qualifications of members (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Berger, 
Kick, & Schaeck, 2014; Carter et al., 2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; 
Sanda, Garba, & Mikailu, 2011; Sridharan & Marsinko, 1997; Ujunwa, 2012). Larcker 
and Tayan (2011) suggested that irrespective of the uncontrollable factors of market 
efficiency and society’s values, which could affect governance structures, boards can 
develop additional methods to enforce control in organizations. Charan (1998) suggested 
that boards could add value to shareholders through the creation of competitive 
advantage, rather than just protect existing shareholder value. 
Berle and Means (1932) said that the role of governing boards includes ensuring 
that public organizations are accountable, effective, and operate in ways that would 
protect the interest of stakeholders. The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) code of CG concurred with this opinion by stating that boards were supposed to 
assume responsibility for the efficient and effective management of their organizations in 
accordance with best governance practices and organizational goals (SEC, 2016). This 
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makes them vital organizational monitors. Aina (2013) remarked that boards were 
important management organs that were responsible for adopting good governance 
policies and practices in organizations. Because boards are responsible for strategic 
decision making in public organizations, Hung (1998) viewed them as the connector 
between the organization and its operating environment. 
Board roles vary and are dependent on national perception (Li, 1994; Ujunwa, 
2012). However, generally speaking, boards are expected to set the organization’s 
strategic goals, ensure that management activities are geared in pursuit of those goals to 
ensure long-term relevance of organizations (Cornforth, 2003). Boards’ roles can also be 
divided into making policies, formation of strategies to actualize the policies, and 
oversight functions. One of their important responsibilities is also that they must be able 
to give periodic performance reports to shareholders to account for their activities and the 
performance of their organizations (The Cadbury Report, 1992). This is an important 
responsibility because it serves to check board excesses and prevent unnecessary risks 
that could endanger the organization.   
Public boards can provide strategic direction, oversee, and guarantee effective 
service delivery in their organizations through the quality of financial and other decisions 
they make. These decisions, Nadler (2006) identified as corporate strategies, which were 
essential to board engagement. Through their activities, public boards champion the 
organization’s goals and protect investors’ interests by strengthening relationships and 
building on the strengths of the organizations. Generally, public boards must guarantee 
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good governance by taking adequate steps to establish correct structures and processes 
and ensuring the reliability of such structures in the public sector (PSC, 2014).   
Apart from risk management, other governance responsibilities of public boards 
include monitoring of CEOs and their compliance with regulatory provisions, provision 
of information that is necessary for organizational operations, and establishment of 
external linkages for operational efficiency (Monks & Minow, 2004). Optimal board 
performance is however only obtainable through diligent pursuit of clearly defined and 
mutually acceptable strategic goals rather than personal policies (Ujunwa, 2012).  Boards 
also need access to and diffusion of trustworthy information, without which they may be 
unable to meaningfully give strategic direction to organizations (IFAC, 2013; Ujunwa, 
2012). 
Role of Public Board Chair and Members 
The board chair coordinates the activities of the board and keeps it focused on its 
strategic goals so that the board could be adjudged as trustworthy and reliable (PSC, 
2014). The chair, therefore, needs to be conversant with public business activities and 
stakeholders’ interests.  
Other roles of the board chair include serving as intermediary between the CEO 
and the relevant government stakeholders (in this case, the owners) in the delivery of 
corporate plans and goals (Tricker, 2015; Withers & Fitza, 2017), demonstrating 
exemplary leadership in the decision-making process (van Essen, van Oosterhout, & 
Carney, 2012), ensuring cordiality with CEOs (Adegbite, 2015), risk management 
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(Abdul-Aziz, 2013; Tricker, 2015) and, preparation of firm’s annual reports in 
conjunction with CEOs.  
Public board members are expected to be conversant with their oversight 
responsibilities and conform to their legal authorities. They ought to have more than a 
passing knowledge of the dynamics of the public sector and the imperative of 
accountability and public interest. Members are also expected to offer necessary support 
to the chair, pursue the achievement of the firm’s strategic goals, and maintain civility 
and cordiality with other members and CEOs (PSC, 2014). They are expected to refrain 
from disloyalty, self-interest, and financial recklessness, which are behaviors linked to 
bad governance (Sanda et al., 2011; Ujunwa, 2012).  
Competing Priorities of Public Boards 
Governments throughout the world have multiple priorities and they depend on 
public boards to effectively manage competing organizational priorities. The dynamic 
nature of organizations and their external environment often necessitates a periodic 
review of operating strategies and organizational priorities so that the long-term goals of 
these organizations can be attainable.  
Organizations often contend with external issues such as the dynamism of market 
trends, conformity with operational regulations, adherence to legal prescriptions, as well 
as ever-evolving technologies. If these issues are not well balanced and countered with 
effective strategies, they could affect sustenance of the organizations in the long-run. 
Owing to these unpredictable factors in the operational environment of organizations, 
boards also have to prioritize their functions and activities. This must be done within the 
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limits of limited resources, in accordance with governments’ and stakeholders’ 
expectations, and the quest for value delivery. These prioritizations require thorough 
assessments of the environment to determine the positive risks that could be taken in the 
interest of the organizations (Lam, 2014). According to IFAC (2013), risk-taking opens 
up opportunities and good governance must necessarily involve risk management so that 
expected outcomes can be achieved in a legal, ethical, and effective manner.  
Board priorities include risk mitigation, identification of opportunities for 
improving organizational performance, achieving a strong financial base, and ensuring 
compliance with acceptable standards. According to Mador, Kornas, Simard, and Haroun 
(2016), priority setting requires strategic considerations and the process ought to follow 
certain guidelines. Carter et al. (2014) also remarked that priorities could only be 
effectively determined after due consideration of the cost, impact, equity, and importance 
of the activity had been carried out and weighed alongside other competing priorities. 
Conflicts on the fair placement of priorities may also arise due to competing public needs 
and political influence (Hunter et al., 2016; Weale et al. 2016). Boards, therefore, have to 
determine which activity will do the most common good when balanced side by side with 
other activities. These considerations must also be weighed against available resources 
and political acceptance. Decisions on priorities are therefore dependent on the choices, 
which board members consider as critical to their organization’s success.  
According to Nuhu (2014), good leadership is important to set priorities in 
organizations. He also said that the quality of board composition will determine the 
quality of decisions that emanate from the boards rather than their size or structure. It is 
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thus important for public boards to leverage on personal and group competencies to set 
priorities in the right order so that their activities can be fully optimized and better 
aligned to current realities (Ujunwa, 2012). 
Determinants of Boards’ Impact on Organizational Effectiveness 
According to Morck and Steier (2005), CG influences the financial growth of 
organizations and with growing demands for accountability in public organizations, 
stakeholders have beamed their searchlight on the management strategies employed by 
these organizations. The general assumption, therefore, is that boards cause organizations 
to be effective (Jackson & Holland, 2008).  
However, Adams et al. (2010) and Veronesi and Keasey (2012) observed that the 
actual activity of boards that determine the effectiveness of their organizations has yet 
been unconfirmed. According to Aina (2013), an organization’s effectiveness reflects the 
quality of the board. A combination of board structure, expertise, and size can determine 
performance of organizations. Sanda et al. (2011) discovered that boards that were small 
in size were relatively more effective while Morck and Steier (2005) demonstrated that 
boards, whose shareholders did not exert ubiquitous influence over them, outperformed 
others significantly. Preston and Brown (2004) also linked the emotional dedication and 
time put in by board members to their effectiveness in organizations while Brown (2007) 
asserted that the competence of board members would determine their performance. All 
these differing opinions about board impact led Adams et al. (2010) and Veronesi and 
Keasey (2012) to conclude that the definite activity or function of boards that actually 
determined the effectiveness of their organization was yet to be detected. Determining 
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board impact on organizational effectiveness has been most challenging because 
according to Herman and Renz (2008), board effectiveness is a social construct and the 
opinion of stakeholders determines what constitutes effectiveness in their organizations. 
The writers, therefore, recommended the need to assess non-profits' effectiveness 
according to their type so that the results obtained could be credible.  
Findings by Herman, Renz, and Heimovics (1997) suggested that boards that 
assigned roles to themselves through the use of committees and boards, which had a 
thorough process of self-evaluation often performed above average. Recent studies such 
as that of Filatotchev and Nakajima (2014) suggested that globalization forced 
organizations to be more accountable in their strategies and this drove them to acquire 
more skills and competences. These new skills undoubtedly influence the quality and 
quantity of their decisions. The effectiveness of RTOs, as summed up by Siyanbola et al. 
(2011), is also determined by effective management practices. 
Trends in the Management of RTOs in Nigeria 
The level of technology that a nation possesses determines the quality and 
quantity of its products and consequently, its power and development as a nation 
(Siyanbola et al., 2011). The economic growth experienced by the Asian Tigers has been 
attributed to the innovations in R&D that resulted in rapid industrialization in these 
nations (Igietseme, 2015). Technology, which is an important driver of a nation’s 
economy, is borne out of successful research activities carried out by RTOs (Odia & 
Omofonmwan, 2013).  
RTOs are often empowered by the governments to engage in R&D activities that 
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would result in innovations and stimulate future growth. Being that we live in a dynamic 
world however, technology undergoes rapid change and innovation. RTOs that desire to 
remain competitively relevant must therefore be able to manage these processes of 
change (Onuoha, 2012).  Ukwuoma, Amade, and Moghalu (2013) confirmed that there 
were problems with the diffusion of R&D outcomes. Siyanbola et al. (2011) emphasized 
that these problems may not be due to the process of conducting scientific R&D but 
rather, ineffective management practices. The scholars observed that effective 
management of S&T indicators enhances wealth creation and according to the National 
Innovation System (NIS), there must be effective research, development of research 
findings, and diffusion of the products before R&D can yield any benefit. To ensure that 
S&T achieved this developmental goal for the nation, Siyanbola et al. (2016) 
recommended a synergy between policies made and national interest such that 
policymakers would develop strategic S&T indicators that could be linked to 
developmental priorities of the nation.    
In Nigeria, the federal government made efforts to commence economic activities, 
which could improve the living standard of the people by initiating R&D activities 
formally. This began with the establishment of the National Council for Science and 
Technology (NCST) in 1970 for the coordination of activities in basic and applied 
research. Other research councils such as the Agricultural Research Council, the 
Industrial Research Council, the Medical Research Council, and the Natural Science 
Research Council; followed in quick succession. The NCST later metamorphosed into the 
Federal Ministry of Science and Technology (FMST) in 1993 and was saddled with the 
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responsibility of, among others, translating scientific research into economic 
development in Nigeria.  The FMST consists of seventeen agencies, fourteen (14) of 
which are charged with R&D functions and the remaining three were established to 
manage growth and manpower training needs for Nigerian technology. Bamiro et al. 
(2008) categorized technological RTOs in Nigeria into research institutes (private and 
government agencies) and higher institutions with the capacity to conduct research and 
develop products. The activities of these RTOs are expected to result in the development 
of new products and further development of existing ones through applied research as is 
obtainable in advanced countries, where RTOs midwife governmental innovations 
through activities that are adequately funded. 
The Nigerian technological R&D sector is however not experiencing much 
growth and the dream of the country to attain the status of being one of the foremost 
twenty developed nations of the world is gradually becoming a mirage unless very drastic 
measures and sound strategic steps are taken so that the results of research activities can 
be transformed into economic gains (Siyanbola et al., 2011). According to Onuoha 
(2012), the economic development of Nigeria is being threatened by the stifling 
environment in which RTOs operate such as inconsistent and unfavorable government 
policies on importation, which results in a high cost of production and low patronage of 
local products (Abe, 2016). Other challenges faced by public RTOs include poor funding, 
a dearth of modern equipment for production, and deterioration of existing ones and these 
have rendered the operational environment unsuitable for research (Odia & 
Omofonmwan, 2013). The economic recession that was faced by the country between 
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2016 and 2018 also paralyzed activities in the RTOs because these challenges became 
exacerbated. 
Although the crisis and constant instability being experienced in the financial 
sector in Nigeria is majorly attributable to poor CG (Akingunola, 2013), performance in 
other sectors, such as RTOs, could also be affected by poor governance behaviors.  
Challenges of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
 According to Creed, Dejordy, & Lok (2011), institutional and cultural issues 
influence the practice of good CG in developing countries. These issues then determine 
the national perception of the role of public organizations and public boards (Davies, 
2005) and may weaken the governance institutions in these countries. This gives rise to 
questions on how public organizations can successfully perform under such hostile and 
unwholesome conditions (Adegbite, 2015). This situation also discourages the ideals of 
self-regulation, market pressures, and legal frameworks for good governance (Yakassai, 
2001). 
Since Nigeria’s independence, the business practice has been influenced by the 
federalist system where governments are in the majority as owners of businesses more 
than individuals in an indigenized governance structure, and where ownership dispersal is 
just an ideal to be desired (Adegbite, 2015; Nmehielle & Nwauche, 2004). Business was 
basically centered on oil and the federal government was the main actor in the state-
controlled economy. As a consequence of the immature state of the business sector in the 
early years after independence and the obvious absence of governance standards, 
Adegbite et al. (2012) observed that corruption grew and later became endemic in most 
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public organizations. Corporate failures have been prevalent in the country since then 
because Nigeria has been unable to stem the rising tide of corruption and the enforcement 
institutions have been considerably weakened (Kaufmann et al., 2008). Wilson (2006) 
attributes these rising spate of failures to poor governance. The banking sector has 
witnessed more of these corporate failures in the country. In 2009 alone, eight bank 
CEOs were sacked for bad governance behavior (Oghojafor, Olayemi, Okonji, & Okolie, 
2010). All the board members and management of another bank, SKYE, were summarily 
dismissed and replaced in June 2016 because of poor risk and assets management 
abilities and because they approved unsecured loans for themselves (Egwuatu, 2016). 
Other public corporations that have collapsed include the Nigerian Railways Corporation 
(NRC), established in 1955 through a parliamentary act, but collapsed irrevocably in 
2002 although operations on some of the routes have resumed; the Nigerian Airways, 
established in 1958 but collapsed and ceased to operate in 2003 (Echenim, 2015). NITEL 
(made up of Department of Posts and Telecommunications [P&T] and the Nigerian 
External Communication Limited [NET]) was birthed in 1985 and commercialized in 
1992 (Chidozie, Odunayo, & Olutosin, 2015). All these corporations were owned by the 
federal government, which served as the major shareholder. Many of these corporate 
failures were ascribed to constant government interference and poor governance 
behaviors (Echenim, 2015). 
According to Kaufmann et al. (2008), the ability to overcome corruption is one of 
the parameters used by the World Bank to determine good governance. But 
unfortunately, the Transparency International’s ranking of corruption in 2013 placed 
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Nigeria in the 144th position out 177 countries thereby confirming Nigeria as one of the 
foremost corrupt nations of the world (Adegbite, 2015). This ranking implied that Nigeria 
lacked good governance. Ujunwa (2012) confirmed that “business culture in Nigeria is 
among the worst in the world” (p. 656). According to Ujunwa, this observation was 
largely due to political interference, inconsistent government policies, corruption, and 
lack of legal frameworks to enforce good governance principles.  
According to the World Bank's Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC), effective CG is assessed by the ability of institutions to self-regulate, comply 
with, and enforce acceptable governance standards (Okike, 2007). The absence of this 
capability has been confirmed by Adegbite (2012) since the Nigerian corporate world is 
noted for corruption in its governance mechanisms, which proves the institutional 
deficiencies in Nigeria. According to Sanda et al. (2011), countries with weak business 
cultures, such as Nigeria, often found such weaknesses an encouragement to appoint 
public boards for reasons other than good governance of government-controlled 
organizations. This situation, according to Sanda et al., gave leverage to such boards to 
act with impunity and in pursuit of self-interests. As a consequence of these poor 
governance behaviors, governance structures are destroyed and organizational 
effectiveness, as well as shareholders’ interests, is compromised (Ponnu, 2008). 
 According to Larcker and Tayan (2011), governance structures are often 
influenced by cultures and values. Because Nigeria cherishes the family values and 
traditions, it is not unusual for private owners and family members to retain control over 
boards and also manage the companies (Adegbite et al., 2013; Lin, 2004). CEO duality is 
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thus prevalent in Nigeria’s private governance structure because most thriving private 
organizations are family-owned, except for companies owned by foreigners. However, 
the board structure of most public organizations in Nigeria is patterned after the British-
American system but with local outlook. While attempts are being made to incorporate 
global governance principles such as were prescribed by the Cadbury Report and OECD 
by appointing governing boards over public entities to standardized governance, the 
impact of boards are yet to be fully recognized and appreciated. Reasons adduced to this 
conclusion included continual evidences of corporate failure in the country.   
Measuring Board Effectiveness 
Most public organizations are continually employing measures that can help 
evaluate their performance. The simple reason for this is to determine their effectiveness 
and prove the same to the stakeholders (Light, 2002). Although Gordon (2000) posited 
that there were no standard performance measuring designs for nonprofits, up until the 
era of corporate failure, there have been acceptable measurement for determining board 
performance. But with the devastating collapse of business and financial empires, these 
governance measures have become grossly inadequate because of their perceived 
shortcomings such as source bias which distorted the research (Meier & O’Toole, 2013). 
Anderson (2012) therefore recommended that more attention be paid to outcomes rather 
than performance. Performance measurement is dynamic and changes constantly as a 
result of advances in technology and globalization and these changes influence 
governance structures and practices (Bititci et al., 2011).  
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Models for Measuring Board Effectiveness 
Several factors have inhibited the successful measurement of board impact on 
organizational effectiveness. These factors include the perception of organizations and 
owners on what effectiveness means for their respective organizations (Chen & Al-
Najjar, 2012). The successful measurement of board impact is often impaired by board 
diversity, unnecessary board interference, and the absence of a consistent standard best 
practice, which could stand as a yardstick for determining performance (Gordon, 2000).  
Most studies employed the quantitative methods of inquiry, such as surveys and 
questionnaires to assess boards (Gordon, 2000) while some relied on less reliable tools 
like self-assessment and program evaluation (Babbie, 2004; McNamara, 2003).  One of 
the ways by which managers could be measured; according to Coetzee, Viviers, & Visser 
(2006), is by using scales such as the Sense of Coherence Scale (SOC) developed by 
Antonovsky (1987) to measure certain traits in an individual that can contribute to his 
performance. Some other governance measurement tools include the Policy Governance 
Model (PGM), the Cooperative Board Model, and the Advisory Board Model (Gordon, 
2000).  
 The qualitative research design was used to conduct inquiries in this study. A few 
researches have adopted the qualitative approach, such as narrative inquiry, to measure 
board impact on organizational performance. For instance, LeBlanc and Gillies (2010) 
combined the interview approach with the observation of board members at meetings and 
compared their findings with their perceptions drawn from observing board members at 
meetings. This is termed categorizing and labeling. Through this approach, it is possible 
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to determine effective board members by their behaviors (Jauncey & Moseley-Greatwich, 
2000). According to Leisner (2005), qualitative data collection methods, such as face-to-
face interviews or focus group interview, enable the researcher gather authentic 
information. Leisner further explained that through this means, the interviewer would be 
able to explain the purpose and nature of the study. According to him, the interviewer 
would also be able to obtain more information from participants’ tones and expression 
better than when the questions are written and impersonally administered. Creswell 
(2013) further corroborated this position.   
The Gap in Literature 
Public boards are very important to the strategic planning and growth of their 
organizations. These roles are becoming increasingly important given the importance of 
public organizations to societal and economic growth and boards. Consequently, boards 
are required to be more dynamic and strategic in their activities to improve their 
organization’s effectiveness and relevance.  
In spite of the consensus by most researchers on the importance of boards, little 
research exists to connect specific board roles to effectiveness of public RTOs. It is 
necessary to isolate board characteristics that are responsible for decisions in public 
organizations so that it would be easier to determine RTO boards’ effectiveness. This 
study, therefore, sought to understand board perceptions, through the use of qualitative 




In this chapter, the importance of good governance to organizational performance 
and national development was examined. The effectiveness of organizations can be 
measured, and this can help reveal governance effectiveness. Although there seems to be 
a consensus on the influence of boards on organizational effectiveness, there is a 
divergence of opinions on the actual role of public boards, which determine this impact. 
Board size, diversity, and commitments have been considered as central to public board 
effectiveness though these have been proven to have little effect on their own. It was 
assumed that public boards that engaged in best CG practices and openly complied with 
governance norms performed better than most organizations in other categories. Boards 
of RTOs are no exception as the organizations are expected to be at the forefront of 
technological development. Engaging in governance best practices is therefore critical for 
their performance and organizational competitiveness.  
In the face of global competition amongst organizations, the success and 
effectiveness of organizations depend largely on the performance of boards. There is thus 
a need to develop a measurement model that would advance knowledge about RTO 
boards’ impact and also offer performance improvement strategies for these boards. The 
perceptions of participants served as this model. In Chapter 3, the methods that were 
employed to explore the connection between good governance and Nigerian public 
RTOs’ performance were discussed. 
60 
 
Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The impact of public boards on organizational performance is not a new 
phenomenon. Board characteristics obviously determine their performance. The practice 
of good governance has also been shown to be influenced by culture and values, thereby 
determining the impact of governance on nations. The perceptions of public boards and 
MDs in Nigerian RTOs regarding what they believe to be their impact on these 
organizations is, however, necessary for information regarding the performance of public 
organizations in the Nigerian technological sector. This chapter outlines the qualitative 
method and design used to assist in understanding their experiences. It also provides 
profiles of participants and how they were recruited for this study. Additionally, a review 
of how ethical protection was ensured, procedures for collecting data, data analysis, and 
verification of findings is detailed.  
Population samples, research design, sampling processes, unit of analysis, data 
collection and analysis procedures, and data sources to measure the perceptions of board 
members in determining the impact of governing boards on public entities in Nigeria 
shall be discussed in this chapter. The rationale for the choice of these designs and 
methods, roles to be played by me, and ethical issues associated with this research are 
discussed here. This chapter concludes with credibility and trustworthiness of the study. 
Description of the Research Design 
The research questions in a study should influence the design. The interpretive 
qualitative case study method was used for this research. According to Merriam (2009), 
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research that is qualitative in nature is more likely to influence public policies or assist 
managers in making informed decisions about social phenomena that occur naturally than 
quantitative studies. The qualitative research method is often adopted to make inquiries, 
using techniques such as observation and interviews, which do not involve 
measurements, frequencies, and experiments. Qualitative research aids the development 
of new organizational theories and concepts and the assists with making inferences from 
participants’ stories, views, and perceptions. 
 I used the qualitative approach because this approach is excellent in discovering 
new or relatively unknown phenomena. Qualitative research methods are most suitable 
for eliciting information and meanings, especially when the exploration of the 
phenomena is carried out in the natural environment of respondents (Patton, 2002). This 
method provides insight into the world of the participant as they live in it. In addition to 
this, qualitative approaches are easier to use in real-life situations. The qualitative 
approach is easier because it grants researchers access to complex but pertinent 
information which will enhance broader understanding of the researchers and 
practitioners about a phenomenon without necessarily going through the process of 
quantitative measurements which produce data-driven facts.  
Qualitative designs include ethnography, phenomenology, case study, and 
grounded theory approaches. These approaches should be selected based on what the 
researcher intends to achieve. While ethnographic studies focus on behaviors of groups in 
a cultural setting, both grounded theory and case study approaches are best suited to 
inquiring into processes and structures. The reason for this suitability is because both case 
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study and ethnography approaches are concerned with processes, activities, and natural 
environment. While the ethnography method involves studying groups with the intent to 
understand their behavior and values and how these evolve or change over a given 
period, a case study involves interpreting actions and behaviors of individuals or groups 
in a given social context to understand a case or event.   
The case study approach is often used for research in social sciences because it is 
flexible and offers administrators practical insights into organizational and managerial 
behaviors. Its flexibility derives from its ability to explain single or multiple cases using 
data obtained from varied sources, thereby making available rich and vast information for 
the researcher to describe the phenomenon (Berg, 2009; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). Yin 
(1994) explained that case studies help the researcher answer how and why questions and 
manage situations beyond the control of the researcher. Case studies also assist the 
researcher to obtain enough data.  
The interpretive design was employed to understand the perceptions of 
respondents because the interpretive approach is more suited to analyzing small 
organizations than the positivist paradigm. The interpretive research design assists 
researchers to interpret social realities within their social settings. With this approach, the 
meanings that participants ascribe to phenomena are easy to understand. The interpretive-
case study approach enabled me to access enough data from the interviews and to 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the data that I obtained.  
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Population and Sample 
The FMST in Nigeria was the target population for this study. A population is a 
complete element or group which can be used to generalize research findings. The target 
population is expected to be made up of individuals who possess common characteristics 
and these common characteristics must be reflected in the sample. The FMST consists of 
RTOs with similar characteristics and mandates geared towards R&D and this made it a 
suitable population for this study.  Because of the unlikelihood of accessing and 
investigating an entire target population, a sample is necessary to simplify the inquiry 
while still offering sufficient data needed to make inferences about a phenomenon and 
generalize its findings to a population. FMST was selected as the population on the 
assumption that the sampling criteria would be met in all organizations that make up the 
Ministry and this would thus make the sample representative of the total population. 
Patton (2002) observed that there were no stringent rules to be obeyed in 
determining sample size. Britten (1995) however argued that the determinants of sample 
size should be the depth to be covered and the time available for the researcher while 
Murphy, Dingwall, Greatbatch, Parker, and Watson (1998) said that sample size is 
determined by the number of a sample that a single person can successfully cope with 
within the available time frame and the resources available. As such, most qualitative 
studies have small sample sizes. Dworkin (2012) said that data saturation could be 
obtained in qualitative research with a sample size not lower than five or exceeding 50. 
Six public RTOs were selected for this study, and these RTOs were selected from 
the FMST in Nigeria. There are 17 parastatals under the FMST, and all of them are 
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involved in research and development activities and have the same employer (FMST, 
2016).  This implies that they share similar characteristics and have common interests. 
The population sampled included six FBMs, and serving or former MDs (if the selected 
organization does not have a sitting MD at the time of data collection). These informants 
were selected based on the fact that they had served or are serving in these organizations 
before and have been involved in shaping policies and making strategic decisions for the 
organizations since their establishment. To further assure the quality of the data to be 
obtained, respondents that may not ordinarily have been included in the interview were 
considered. 
Consequently, I employed this strategy in purposefully selecting the participants 
in this study. In all, 16 participants were interviewed and this was intended to ensure that 
I reached data saturation in this study. According to O’Reilly and Parker (2012), adequate 
information must be obtained to make it easy to replicate a study. So, with this proposed 
sample, this study progressed until there was no new information to be obtained.  
Sampling Process 
This sample was selected through a purposive (purposeful) sampling method. 
According to Patton (2002), non-probability sampling techniques, such as purposive 
sampling, are ideal for qualitative case study research. Yin (2014) observed that the non-
probability sampling method yields rich data that will provide in-depth information on 
the phenomenon being studied. Patton (2002) said that in purposeful sampling, the 
researcher purposely selects a population that has the most adequate information for a 
detailed study of the central phenomenon. Through purposeful sampling, common 
65 
 
patterns are easily identified and serve as a lead-in understanding of meanings ascribed to 
the phenomenon being investigated (Suri, 2011). I selected participants who knew the 
area of my inquiry since this research was designed for trustworthiness. 
If the goal is to get in-depth knowledge from the sample, the number of 
respondents has to be restricted so that the researcher will not be hindered. According to 
Iszatt-White (2011), 10 respondents are an adequate sample size in case studies. I 
conducted face-to-face interviews with six MDs and the number of MDs was restricted to 
six to represent the RTOs selected for this study. Appointments were booked to ensure 
that I had access to interview the FBMs and MDs to adequately explore their opinions 
and the meanings they ascribed to the phenomenon under inquiry.  
The selection of the six organizations that made up the sample was done in line 
with the specific elements that I desired to explore. For instance, some of the RTOs are 
into production; some are into R&D while some are purely research-oriented. The focus 
of this study was on those RTOs who were involved in R&D. Special attention was thus 
paid to ensure inclusion of RTOs, which specialized in R&D and shared common 
governance and administrative structures, irrespective of size, location, specializations 
and other important considerations. Those who were readily accessible to the researcher 
were also included. This is important to credibility and validity. It will also improve data 
quality if the sample is representative of the general population. 
Since I intended using the purposive sampling approach, I used a survey 
instrument before the interviews so that I would be certain to include the appropriate 
board members who would be able to provide the needed information from their diverse 
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experiences or those who are willing to participate in the interview. A letter of 
introduction was sent to the MDs and FBMs to introduce the study and seek audience 
with them (See Appendices A and B). Once consent was obtained, I took steps to book 
appointments and set up the interviews. Because of the busy schedule of some members, 
the electronic media was considered in contacting respondents and confirming the 
appointments. I vigorously pursued the option of conducting the face-to-face interview 
outside of busy days to guarantee a high concentration of participants. 
Role of the Researcher 
 The researcher is fully involved in collecting data in a qualitative study. To be 
able to build the idea needed to understand the impact of governing boards in Nigerian 
RTOs, I needed to be able to leverage the rich information made available through the 
data collection process. The qualitative research process involves designing the data 
collection instrument, data gathering, transcribing data, data analysis, verifying, and 
making of inferences (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Kvale, 2006) and I was fully involved 
in all these stages. There was, therefore, a tendency for researcher bias to taint the 
outcome of these stages.  
To be able to draw useful conclusions from the study, I was objective in analyzing 
the data that was collected through the various sources earlier identified, such as 
interviews and other secondary data. Gathering the data for this study posed a problem 
for the objectivity and trustworthiness of the research findings because I am an employee 
of one of the public RTOs and could thus be considered an insider researcher. There was, 
therefore, the possibility of researcher bias owing to familiarity with the research 
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environment and drawing conclusions based on my previous knowledge. But, I 
specifically refrained from interfering with the data right from the point of constructing 
interview questions. I was also very committed to keeping records and journals so that 
the data collection and analysis process could be very transparent.  My being an insider 
researcher was an advantage to this research. According to Holliday (2007), 
interpretivism recognized that researchers’ involvement in data collection enhanced data 
quality because the researcher would be able to probe deep into meanings that 
participants ascribe to the phenomenon being studied. Being an insider researcher 
assisted me in gaining access to the study environment in a way that outsiders could not 
have. This status also assured me of the cooperation of participants, especially when they 
understood the benefits of the study to the wellbeing of the organization. I, however, 
recognized the possibility of ethical considerations that had to do with anonymity and 
sensitive information and I countered this by promising anonymity and just listening 
instead of agreeing with or proffering solutions to identified issues. 
According to Babbie (2010), researchers must avoid leading questions because 
the response of respondents would be influenced by the way the questions were posed. 
Therefore, from the point of drafting the questions, I eliminated the tendency to guide 
respondents’ responses towards the desired outcome. I also took a dispassionate stance 
while conducting the interview. I filtered the view of respondents through mine in order 
to understand meanings brought into the research environment and interpret these 
meanings as objectively as possible. According to Smyth and Holian (2008), researcher 
bias could be eliminated with evidence and themes in the data collected. Thus, I explored 
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multiple data sources, maintained a journal, sought respondents’ validation of the study’s 
initial results, and was dispassionate about the outcome of the survey. These hopefully 
eliminated some of the biases and ethical dilemmas. 
Data Collection Procedures 
According to Merriam (1998), case studies require vigorous data collection 
processes to get in-depth information from participants. I obtained data for this research 
from multiple sources such as personal interviews, government gazettes, annual reports, 
and other records such as my journal notes obtained from observations and interviews.  
Using multiple sources enhance the credibility of qualitative data (Yin, 2003). Board 
members were chosen using the Homogeneous Sampling method (a type of purposeful 
sampling technique) to ensure similarity in most of the situations faced by the sample. 
Other records, such as the gazettes, were obtained from the Office of the Head of Service 
of the Federation in Nigeria after due authorization was obtained. Annual reports were 
accessed from the library and websites of the RTOs that made up the sample. These are 
legal documents that were digitized at the time of the occurrence of the event they 
described. They are thus verifiable and dependable sources of data. 
Interview Technique 
According to Punch and Oancea (2014), interviewing participants enables the 
researcher more access to data than using any other tool. Creswell (2007) and Petty, 
Thomson, and Stew (2012) considered interviews as being most effective in qualitative 
research. To secure consent for the interview, I sent letters to the MDs and the board 
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members to be interviewed. This was a follow up to the letter of approval obtained from 
the Minister (FMST), giving background information about the research.  
To ensure that the techniques used for the interviews achieved their purpose, a 
mock interview schedule was conducted. This eliminated any possible extraneous factor 
that could have hindered the clarity of the interview and also ensured that the interview 
adequately answered the research questions. An interview guide, which was developed 
by the researcher, was used in the collection of data for this study. According to Patton 
(2002), an interview guide comprises possible questions and focal points that could be 
asked participants and which will ensure the interviewer stayed within the limit of the 
research. With this interview guide, I maintained control of the interview process (See 
Appendix C: Interview Guide). I, however, refrained from consulting this guide 
obtrusively during the interviews so that the session could flow naturally and not follow a 
preconceived order. 
The actual personal interviews of the six MDs selected were held in their offices 
while the interview of the board members was at a convenient time determined by the 
participants so that they would not be in haste to leave or be too tired to give valuable 
information. This timing made the respondents relaxed, being in their natural 
environment, and the office was free from unnecessary distractions. They were thus more 
responsive. An audio recorder, as well as the recording software on my phones, laptop, 
and iPad were used to record the interview sessions. These measures were taken to obtain 
verbatim report of the actual words used by participants, thereby aiding the development 
of themes needed for the data analysis. My journal was used to identify subtle nuances in 
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the tone or mood of the participants as well as my observations of the interview process, 
environment, attitude, posture, and answers of participants. 
The interviews lasted for an hour per participant and there was no repeat of the 
interview sessions for any MD. Given the cost implication and the time available to 
gather the needed data since the organizations were not located in the same area, the 
participants were well briefed about what to expect in the course of the interview. I 
explained to the participants the possibility of their remaining anonymous if they so 
desired, and that their information and participation would be held in strict confidence. 
As recommended by Corbin and Strauss (2008), I also assured participants of the 
replacement of their actual names with pseudonyms if their data were to be published so 
that their anonymity would be assured. The signed informed consent form was obtained 
from participants to seal this agreement. 
I commenced the interview sessions with questions, which put the participants in 
relaxed states before questions requiring confidentiality were asked. A qualitative 
researcher must be endowed with good skills that will elicit trust from the participants 
and make them more willing to part with information (Qu & Dumay, 2011). Therefore, I 
established a link with the MDs and board members interviewed and kept up with them 
through text messages, calls, and emails such that they were more relaxed and familiar 
with me by the time the interview commenced. Another skill that I employed was the art 
of listening and avoiding the use of leading questions. This enriched my journal entries 
and helped to achieve data saturation. A follow-up interview was required to enable data 
saturation, and one of the participants was contacted on the telephone to clarify some 
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points earlier raised. I used member checks by allowing participants to read the scripts of 
my interviews with them and the conclusions reached from my interview session with 
them. 
Interview Questions 
Interview questions must be well structured to obtain the appropriate responses, 
which would effectively answer the research questions. I used semi-structured, open-
ended questions for the interview so that respondents would be free with their opinions 
and comments and I was thus able to obtain rich data for my study. The semi-structured 
nature of the questions enabled me to design questions that were tailored towards the 
research questions and the ultimate goal of the study. The semi-structured questions also 
guided the interviews towards a consistent structure for uniformity purposes. However, in 
the course of the interview, some unplanned points cropped up which needed to be 
further explored because they were considered important to the participant and the study. 
Probing and follow-up questions were employed in this instance.  
Gaining the Confidence of the Participants 
Some participants were worried about remaining anonymous so that their 
participation and opinions would not count against them while some felt the interview 
may not be worth their time since similar studies had not had any impact on the observed 
phenomenon.  A lot of effort and patience were employed to gain the trust of participants 
because the absence of trust and confidence from participants could have marred the data 
quality as some people could have deliberately withheld vital information. I assured the 
participants of the confidentiality of their contributions and their anonymity as well as 
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their right to withdraw their participation whenever they ceased to feel comfortable with 
the proceeding, as prescribed by Qu and Dumay (2011). Additionally, the interviews 
were held in the participants’ offices, an environment over which they exercised absolute 
control. They were also allowed to determine the time and date for the interviews.  
Document Examination 
Documents are important evidence for inquiry in a case study (Yin, 2003). I 
examined some documents as a secondary data source to confirm or complement the data 
obtained from the interviews. I also reviewed the mandates of the RTOs as presented by 
the acts that established them, as well as annual reports that revealed their strategic goals, 
decisions and accomplishments. These documents were obtained from the organizations 
since they were public documents. A formal request was however made for them.  
Data Security and Storage 
Participants sometimes need assurance of anonymity. Apart from this, data 
obtained from interviews need to be well stored so that they would not be damaged, lost, 
or fall into the wrong hands. To assure the anonymity of participants, I assigned numeric 
numbers or pseudonyms to them. To secure the data, I paid serious attention to its storage 
and back up. I saved the raw data in my computer and external hard drive and I pass-
worded the files. These documents were also kept in my iCloud account in the event of a 
problem with the computer’s hard drive. The external drive was put away until and would 
be kept for at least five years after the study has been published. The copy with the 
researcher was stored away in a safe and these would be destroyed after a minimum of 
five years, in conformity with Walden University policy. In the unlikely event that a 
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participant reports a case of abuse or infringement of rights during the interview however, 
the researcher is obligated by law to release the interview data and transcripts to the 
necessary authorities for verification of claims.  
 The same procedure was followed after the data had been transcribed. My journal 
was securely locked away in my bedroom safe and would be consulted as needed. Since I 
do not intend to discuss my personal views and opinions on the interview with anyone, 
except if required by my chair and advisors, safety of the contents is assured.  
Strategy for Data Analysis and Interpretation 
The essence of gathering data is to obtain needed information that would shed 
light on current inquiries, and multiple data sources strengthen qualitative studies (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008).  However, the best use of the data can only be obtained when the data 
is analyzed correctly. Data analysis, when it is properly done, makes data to be orderly 
and easier to interpret, thereby enhancing the meaning derivable from the data (Fossey, 
Harvey, McDermott, & Davidson, 2002; McNabb, 2008). I first transcribed the 
interviews from the recorder and sorted them into some form of meaningful order. Yin 
(2003) recommended searching for patterns in qualitative data so I looked out for 
emerging trends that could suggest links to the research questions in the participants’ 
responses. According to Yin (2003), when similar patterns emerge in case studies, they 
confirm or refute researchers’ propositions. Once discovered, these patterns were 
categorized and compared to one another for deeper insight and to search for themes and 
important meanings. The identified themes were grouped and coded with nodes. Thereby, 
the data was reduced to a more manageable framework that answered the research 
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questions. Yin (2011) said that the five stages of data analysis should include 
compilation, dissection, reassembly, interpretation of data, and the drawing of 
conclusions.  
In view of the large volume of information available through multiple qualitative 
data, different techniques and software are available to sort, reduce, and group data 
(Hanson, Balmer, & Giardino, 2011). The NVivo 10 software is often used to analyze 
themes and patterns because the software makes the qualitative analysis more thorough 
and rewarding (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011). I could not however access the software. 
After transcribing the interview into the Microsoft word format, I manually coded it as 
appropriate under the nodes to analyze the interview extracts. The other process outlined 
by Yin (2011) was followed until the data interpretation was done. The constant 
comparative method (Merriam, 2009) was used to analyze the government gazettes and 
annual records of the RTOs. All data were triangulated at every point, as recommended 
by Yin (2009) and Yin (2011), in order to assure data validity. According to Patton 
(2002), when data is triangulated, it affords researchers the opportunity to confirm that 
the data used corroborates well and this validates research findings thereby making them 
trustworthy (Creswell, 2007). The method of triangulation, I used, was to compare the 
data obtained from interviewing the MDs with written documents and annual reports and 
also compare these with the perception of board members. Adegbite (2012) said that the 
use of triangulation of multiple data enhances the validity of studies on CG 
Researchers must be wary of using secondary data because they may be too many 
to sort and may not be relevant to the questions in focus by the study. Trochim and 
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Donnelly (2008) therefore recommended that these data may be broken into units and 
coded into themes that would make usable patterns recognizable. Leveraging on my 
position as an insider in the RTO sector, I only analyzed records that were of relevance to 
the inquiry, so that time wasted on sorting irrelevant data was minimized.  
Coding Strategy 
 Coding helps to group data into meaningful patterns (McNabb, 2008), which can 
then be categorized into themes according to their similarities and characteristics. The 
coding strategy which I used in this study was the thematic analysis strategy. This 
strategy is useful in analyzing qualitative data by grouping and categorizing them 
(Creswell, 2007). I listened to the audio recording of the interview repeatedly to confirm 
that I have the right and accurate themes needed for the development of initial codes, 
especially when they relate to the research questions, which I answered in this study. 
According to Creswell (2007), codes that occurred frequently indicated strong 
participants’ opinions. These commonly occurring ideas, words, or elements were 
organized according to their characteristics and were assigned codes for easy 
identification. These initial codes were then compared for similarities, merged or 
separated as main categories, and developed into themes that metamorphosed into 
coherent meanings. Discrepant cases are those elements, which seem to contradict 
emerging patterns during data analysis. I analyzed these discrepant cases thoroughly until 
I obtained an explanation for their emergence. This strengthened the trustworthiness of 




Qualitative data are often induced rather than deduced. The intent is to explore 
patterns that are predominant in the data, which can enhance understanding of the studied 
phenomenon. As soon as data is collected, Patton (2002) suggested that it should be 
grouped into storytelling, case study, or analytical framework. For this study, the case 
study framework was used to interpret the qualitative data obtained.  
The answers obtained from the interviews were different from one another in 
construction but usually, similar ideas and observations could be detected with diligent 
scrutiny. To achieve this, the content or thematic analysis approach was used to analyze 
the qualitative data obtained in this study. According to Patton (2002), the data content 
analysis enables access to speech and written content and also reduces data to sizable 
parts that make analysis easier. The texts used in the data were sorted and analyzed 
according to their syntax and semantic meanings but more attention was paid to the 
semantic expressions used by participants because these would show the realities and 
meanings that participants ascribed to public board impacts in Nigeria. Thereafter, codes 
were apportioned to the data as themes were identified. The a priori coding approach was 
applied to the emerging themes in the data. 
Quality Issue 
According to Christensen and Carlile (2009), qualitative case study data are 
mostly subjective. Their relevance and quality could however be determined by how well 
they brought meaning to our search and assisted in categorizing issues, thereby 
simplifying predictions and the building of theories. Research studies are adjudged to 
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have quality when they have internal validity and when their data and their findings are 
also reliable (Creswell, 2007). Interviews provide reliable information and when they are 
obtained and analyzed through rigorous and strategic procedures, they add to a study’s 
credibility (Patton, 2002). I listened to the interview over and over before transcribing the 
responses. After that, I listened again to the recorded audio, while checking my 
transcriptions to assure that the transcribed notes are consistent with what was heard in 
the audio recording. These steps enhanced the accuracy and dependability of the data. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2005) recommended the use of triangulation, feedback from 
colleagues, and validation by participants in qualitative studies to enhance its quality. 
According to Yin (2011), triangulation eliminates the tendency of qualitative researchers 
to use inaccurate data thereby reducing the inaccuracy of findings. I thus obtained data 
from multiple sources so that I could triangulate the data and enhance validity. The 
multiple sources also assisted me to develop rich and thick descriptions of the perception 
of respondents on public board impact. Rich data makes it easy to confirm similar 
perceptions (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and guarantees transferability.  I also checked back 
with interviewees to validate my findings and confirm that they adequately represent the 
perceptions of participants (Fossey et al., 2002; Tracy 2010). I presented the transcribed 
notes of interviews held to interviewees to obtain this validation and confirm the report’s 
accuracy (Creswell, 2009). Tong, Chapman, Israni, Gordon, and Craig (2013) called this 
member checking. Member checking will serve as a means of verifying the accuracy of 
data used, anonymity of participants, and according to Petty, Thomson, and Stew (2012), 
it helps to identify researcher bias. Yin (2003), recommended peer debriefing to 
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strengthen data quality. I, therefore, sought the input of colleagues and few notable 
scholars in the field of public governance in Nigeria to assess the data collected and their 
opinions were noted in the final analysis. 
IRB Approval 
Walden university has a board that must be convinced that the researcher is taking 
the ethical and globally acceptable steps in research that concern human subjects. This 
must be done so that the rights and wellbeing of these human projects are guaranteed in 
any study. According to Szanron, Taylor, and Terhaar (2013), IRB guarantees the 
protection of human participants from unethical practices. They thus needed to certify the 
data collection processes and give necessary approval before data collection could 
commence. I was patient to obtain IRB approval, which certified my proposed methods 
and protocol as safe for human participants before starting data collection and analysis. 
Obtaining this approval required convincing the IRB that the appropriate ethical 
practices, such as the principles of anonymity and benevolence, would be incorporated 
into the process of obtaining and reporting data. I adhered strictly to these ethical 
guidelines and ensured that participants were aware of the process, as well as their role 
and rights, throughout the data collection period.  
Ethical Issues 
In qualitative research, it is assumed that the researcher may have some biases, 
which could taint the outcome of the study. In order to obtain participants’ trust and 
assure of researchers’ integrity, ethical issues must be dealt with decisively before 
undertaking any research (Kisely & Kendall, 2011). This opinion informed the 
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suggestion by Lincoln and Guba (1985) that the researcher must openly discuss these 
“biases, motivations, interests or perspectives” (p. 290). Once these are discussed openly, 
they will assist the researcher in minimizing their effects at every level of the study, 
particularly during data collection and analysis. According to Babbie (2010), researchers 
must understand proper and improper conducts while researching. Ethical issues that 
were expected to be raised in the course of this study included (a) not respecting the 
space, rights, anonymity, and expectations of participants (b) withholding vital 
information from participants on what to expect from the study and the risks they may be 
exposed to, before contact, and (c) culture clashes.  
To ensure that I acted within strict ethical guidelines, I ensured that I signed 
informed consent forms with the participants.  According to Cook and Hoas (2011), this 
step will simplify the interview process. Qu and Dumay (2011) said that such forms will 
contain information that explained the purpose for the interview, the expected role to be 
played by participants, and their right to withdraw anytime they felt at risk in the course 
of the interview, since participation was voluntary. I also assured participants that no 
information given by them could be traced to or used against them because all 
characteristics or names that could reveal their identity would be removed before the 
study was published. The recorded audio would also be well kept from the public. These 
steps eliminated the fear of harm or risk of life/job by the participants. It also gave them 
ample time to decide whether to participate in the study or not. The informed consent 
form was left with the respondents to study and sign before the interview date was set. 
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Cultural consideration was not an issue with this research because I am an insider 
researcher and I am thus familiar with the culture and values of the RTO environment. 
Summary 
This chapter established the research design for this study and the rationale for its 
choice. The qualitative case study design enabled me to gain deeper insight into the 
impact of public boards in Nigerian RTOs by exploring the perceptions of board 
members and MDs of RTOs. My role in eliciting this information was also discussed here 
as well as the population and sampling techniques and size.  
The purposeful sampling method was used to select participants from Nigerian 
public RTOs. The data collection and analysis methods were highlighted in this section. 
Data were collected after obtaining IRB approval using the interview method and other 
sources such as questionnaires, public records, and my personal notes. Interviews were 
semi-structured with open-ended questions to allow for richer information from 
participants. The data were then analyzed and categorized into patterns. Issues involving 
data quality, data protection, and general strategy for conducting the investigation into the 
phenomenon in focus in this study were extensively discussed in this chapter.  The data 
collection and analysis processes were discussed in this chapter. Particular attention was 
paid to my role as a researcher, research ethics that pertained to participants, and the use 
of computer software in the analysis of data. 
In Chapter 4, findings of this research were logically outlined. The chapter was 
concluded with an analysis of themes that were obtained from the interview data. This 
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will lead to conclusions regarding what MDs and public boards perceive to be the actual 























Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
This qualitative interpretive case study was carried out to explore CG practices 
that will be best for public RTOs in Nigeria so that they can be more effective. This study 
became necessary due to the need of the Nigerian government to make public 
organizations more effective in the face of dwindling economic fortunes in the country. I 
tried to understand governance practices of FBMs and CEOs in terms of promoting the 
effectiveness of their organizations by interviewing relevant persons who had been 
involved in the governance of public RTOs. The conceptual framework was the agency 
theory and was appropriately selected to suit the governance practices of Nigerian public 
RTOs.   
This research answered the following questions: 
RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D 
sector? 
  RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in 
Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness?  
RQ3: How do these perceptions of board members and executive directors 
regarding the impact of boards on Nigeria’s R&D sector affect the performance of these 
organizations? 
This chapter discusses how data for the study were obtained and the process to 
generate themes and meanings from the data. Information was obtained from participants 
to support emerging themes and results. The chapter concludes with a summary of 
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emerging themes obtained from responses of participants. These themes will be further 
discussed and interpreted in specific terms in Chapter 5. 
Research Setting 
Participants were selected purposively because they were authorities in their fields 
of specialization. The research setting was free from government influence and 
interference because participants were contacted personally and not through 
organizations or political leaders. There were therefore no personal or organizational 
changes that could have affected the study’s results. Participants were not paid and most 
were not working for the government at the time of interviews. 
Ten open-ended questions were designed for the semistructured interviews. 
Consent for participation was obtained from eligible participants through phone calls and 
mails. Participants in this study were contacted personally so that they would not be 
under any influence that could distort their responses. I had the option of getting approval 
from FMST to contact the participants but this action could have compromised the 
anonymity of the participants. Contact with participants was established after the 
approval of the IRB of Walden University. The common characteristic shared by 
participants in this study was their experience in governing public RTOs in Nigeria. I 
determined the sample that shared this characteristic by grouping the 17 parastatals in the 
FMST according to their functions. Six parastatals which engaged in core R&D activities 
were identified from this population. Participants in this study were selected from these 
six parastatals so that it would be easy to determine their governance strategies and the 
effect of these on the performance of their organizations. Each of the six parastatals had 
84 
 
at least one participant and none had more than three. The research questions were 
designed to elicit adequate information regarding the governance practices of boards in 
public RTOs, and what these practices should be. Adequate care was thus taken to 
formulate questions that would probe the intellect and experiences of the participants. All 
participants understood that they were under no obligation to participate in the study.  
I expected that all eligible participants that were to be contacted would be willing 
to participate in the interview but a few eligible participants, who were mostly PCEOs 
opted not to participate after the purpose of the study was revealed. This refusal could 
have been out of fear of job loss. The decisions were respected. One of the FBMs and an 
FCEO had to be interviewed on the phone. Participants who were willing to contribute to 
the study were too busy to be confined to one location. 
The interview duration varied as some participants had more to say than others. 
The two interview methods employed were conducted face to face and on phone. These 
methods were determined by necessity because of the schedule of two of the participants. 
All interviews were recorded. Time spent on interviews was between 35 and 88 minutes.  
Demographics 
This study was conducted to explore the impact of good governance practices on 
RTOs’ effectiveness in the Nigerian public sector, and this information was obtained 
from interviews conducted with PCEOs/FCEOs of selected public RTOs as well as 
FBMs. The interviews were intended to help understand the motivations for board 
activities such as decision making and strategic planning, as well as perceptions of CEOs 
regarding board performance and impact. Participants in this study were purposively 
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selected from the FMST and were contacted based on their positions as PCEOs/ FCEOs 
or FBMs of RTOs involved purely in R&D to ensure data quality and generalizability of 
findings. As outlined in Table 1, 16 participants were interviewed from six RTOs in the 
FMST. This sample was made up of seven former CEOs who had worked with boards in 
their organizations, four present CEOs who had also worked with boards, and five FBMs. 
The FCEOs constituted 43.7% of the total participants, PCEOs represented 25%, and 
FBMs were 31.3%. 
Table 1 
Summary of Participants’ Demographic Characteristics 
 Frequency (%) 







46-50 2 (50) 1 (14.3) 
 
2 (40) 5 (31.2) 
 
51 & above 2 (50) 
 




4 (100) 7 (100) 5 (100) 16 (100) 
Note. PCEOs - Present CEOs, FCEOs - Former CEOs, FBMs - Former Board Members 
 
Participants in this study were 46 and above. While 68.8% of respondents were 51 
years and above, 31.2% were between 46 and 50 years. This result implies that there are 
more FCEOs, PCEOs, and FBMs in their late forties and fifties than in their early forties. 
This may have been due to the selection criteria for appointment into such positions. The 
average Nigerian obtains the first degree at 25 years of age and it may take another 15 
years to get a PhD. According to the selection process, all intending CEOs of public 
RTOs in Nigeria must have PhDs, be registered with appropriate professional bodies, 
have published papers in peer-reviewed journals, and also have work experience at 
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management levels. It was difficult getting any board chairman to participate in this study 
probably because of busy schedules. All participants had at least 2 years of working 
experience with or as board members and could thus securely comment on board 
activities.  
I had to traverse the northern and southwestern parts of the country to obtain data.  
Most of the prospective participants were living in various states across the country and 
this increased the period for data collection. Only 16 of the 22 persons that I contacted for 
the interview, were actually interviewed.  
Table 2 
Summary of Respondents’ Ethnic Characteristics 













Total        
PCEOs (0) 
 
1 (25) 1 (25) (0) (0) 2 (50) 4 (100) 
FCEOs (0) 
 
1 (14.3) 1 (14.3) 2 (28.5) (0) 3 (42.9) 7 (100) 
FBMs 1 (20) 
 
(0) 1 (20) 1 (20) 1 (20) 1 (20) 5 (100) 
Total 1 (6.25) 
 
2 (12.5) 3 (18.75) 3 (18.75) 1(6.25) 6 (37.5) 16 (100) 
Note. PCEOs - Present CEOs, FCEOs - Former CEOs, FBMs - Former Board Members, N.E. Z - North-
East Zone, N.W. Z - North-West Zone, N.C. Z - North-Central Zone, S.E.Z - South-East Zone, S.S.Z - 
South-South Zone, S.W.Z - South-West Zone. 
 
Table 2 indicates that the South West Zone had the highest number of respondents 
and this zone had representatives in all the three categories of respondents. Additionally, 
the North Central and the South West had representatives in all three categories while the 
North East Zone only had one participant each in the FBM category. Figure 1 shows the 
bar chart indicating the spread of respondents.  Of the 16 respondents who participated in 
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this study, 75% were Christians, 25% were Muslims, and there were no traditionalists 
represented.  
Table 3 









PCEOs 3 (75) 1 (25) 4 (100) 
FCEOs 6 (85.7) 1 (14.3) 7 (100) 
FBMs 3 (60) 2 (40) 5 (100) 











Figure 1. Ethnic spread of respondents. 
Table 4 shows disparities in gender distribution amongst the participants. While 
87.5% of respondents were male, 12.5% were female. The two female respondents fell 
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Summary of Participants’ Gender Distribution 
Participants  Male (%) Female (%) 
PCEOs 3 (18.75) 1 (6.25) 
FCEOs 7 (43.75) -  
FBMs 4 (25) 1 (6.25) 
Total 14 (87.5) 2 (12.5) 
 
The incidence of occurrence of fewer females in the distribution may have been 
attributable to the fact that in the whole of the 19 RTOs in FMST which formed the 
population from which samples were selected, there have been only 3 female CEOs since 
in the history of the FMST, and the females that were appointed into RTO boards were 
privileged to be there because of the political positions they occupied such as ministers of 
finance and other positions. Based on this gender disparity, it is presumed that there are 
fewer female CEOS in the RTOs of the FMST in Nigeria than males. 
Data Collection 
The data collection process commenced after obtaining approval from Walden’s 
IRB to commence data collection (see Appendix C). I then contacted all the participants 
by phone and also through the booking of appointments to determine the convenient time 
for the participants. I obtained the phone numbers of these contacted through phones 
from contacts (mostly present CEOs) who had already spoken to them and obtained their 
verbal consent to be interviewed. The participants were selected based on their positions 
or former positions as CEOs or board members in RTOs under the FMST.  The 
participants contacted were 22 in number but 16 showed interest in participating by 
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actually giving the researcher appointments. Individual interviews were collected from 
seven former CEOs, four serving CEOs, and five former board members to obtain deeper 
insight into what motivated board governance policies and activities in Nigerian public 
RTOs.  
The respondents were located in Abuja, Lagos, Ile-Ife, and Akure, which are 
major cities in Nigeria, and they were all interviewed in their offices, except for one 
former board member and one former CEO who could not be reached because of their 
busy schedule but the questions were sent to their email addresses and the interviews 
were conducted on the phone. Other interviews were contacted face to face. Before 
conducting the interviews, all participants were informed of the purpose of the study and 
they were also informed of their rights as participants, which included the right to 
withdraw their participation any time they wanted to. Thereafter, the participants signed 
the informed consent forms. Two of the participants wanted to know if it was necessary 
to put their names on the informed consent form, given the earlier assurance that their 
responses would be treated with the utmost confidentiality. I responded that they could 
choose not to write their names and these two participants just signed the form. I was 
quick to reassure the participant again of the confidentiality of the forms and other data 
obtained in the course of the study. Once the informed consent forms had been signed, 
the respondents all decided for privacy with their secretaries, since the interviews were 
held in the offices of 14 respondents, so that there would be no undue interruptions 
during the interviews. I then confirmed that none of the participants were under any 
influence or condition, such as the presence of other people, lack of time or interest, or 
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noise from the interview environment, which could have influenced their responses 
during the interview and interfered with the findings of this study. I thereafter sought and 
obtained permission to commence the interview and record the process with my mobile 
phone recording software, my MacBook Voice Recorder, and also my Apple iPad.  
Having obtained this permission, I began the interview by following the prepared 
questions in the interview protocol list.  I personally conducted the interviews face-to-
face in the offices of the participants to guarantee confidentiality and reduce unnecessary 
distractions and interruptions. Notes were taken as supporting documents during the 
interview, with the permission of the participants. Since there was no replacement of 
participants during the data collection process, there was no need to repeat any interview 
session for any respondent, although some of them offered to be available for any 
clarification or additional information, which may be needed. I, however, encountered 
some difficulties with the phone interviews because the calls kept dropping as a result of 
the poor network from the mobile service providers. This elongated the time spent on the 
interviews conducted by telephone by a few minutes. I was able to complete the 
interview after about three attempts per participant and there was no loss of data or 
information because of the truncated calls as we picked up from where we left off as soon 
as the connections were reestablished.  
The interviews conducted through the phone were also recorded on my phone and 
iPad. This was made possible because the participants were put on speaker and the 
recording software was able to record their voices with much clarity. During the breaks, I 
paused the recorder and continued as soon as connections were restored. After the data 
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had been analyzed, the voice data, transcripts, and other notes were taken during the 
interview were locked in a secure locker in my bedroom while a password known only by 
me protects the other documents on my personal computer. Table 5 and Figure 2 
summarizes the link between research questions and the interview questions. 
Table 5 
Summary of Research Questions and Associated Interview Questions 
Research Questions  
(RQ) 
 
Relevant Interview  
Questions (IQ) 
RQ1: What governance problems 
exist in public organizations in 
Nigeria’s Research and 
Development Sector? 
IQ 1:  What do you understand by Research and 
Technology Organization and do you think they are 
meeting up with the purpose for which they were set up in 
Nigeria? 
IQ 2: Are there structures in place to determine the 
effectiveness of public organizations in Nigeria? 
IQ 5: What, in your opinion, can hinder the effectiveness 
of public RTO boards? 
IQ 6: Was there a governance framework or corporate 
governance code that regulated the activities of your board 
or monitored their performance like we have the 
Companies Act 2006 in UK and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 in the USA? 
 
RQ2: What do Board members 
and Managing Directors of public 
organizations in Nigeria’s 
Research and Development Sector 
believe are the impact of boards on 
organizational effectiveness? 
 
IQ 3:  Do you subscribe to the claim that public governing 
boards are important in enhancing RTO performance in 
Nigeria? 
IQ 4: What do you believe are the impact of public boards 
on RTO effectiveness in Nigeria? 
IQ 5: What, in your opinion, can hinder the effectiveness 
of public RTO boards? 
IQ 6: Was there a governance framework or corporate 
governance code that regulated the activities of your board 
or monitored their performance like we have the 
Companies Act 2006 in UK and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 in the USA? 
IQ 7: What do you need from government to be effective 
as CEO in Nigerian RTO? 
 
RQ3: How do these perceptions of 
Board members and Executive 
Directors about impact of boards 
IQ 1:  What do you understand by Research and 
Technology Organization and do you think they are 
meeting up with the purpose for which they were set up in 
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of Nigeria’s Research and 
Development Sector affect the 
performance of these 
organizations? 
Nigeria? 
IQ 2: Are there structures in place to determine the 
effectiveness of public organizations in Nigeria? 
IQ 3: Do you subscribe to the claim that public governing 
boards are important in enhancing RTO performance in 
Nigeria? 
IQ 8: What, in your own opinion, can make public RTO 







Figure 2. Distribution of study’s research questions and associated interview questions 
Data Analysis 
I commenced the analysis of data obtained from the interviews after personally 
transcribing the interviews. This enabled me to know the data intimately and helped 
during the process of coding. According to Roulston and Choi (2018), when the 
qualitative researcher is conducting exploratory research, it is best to examine, transcribe, 
and code the data personally. By doing this, I become more familiar with the data and the 
viewpoints of participants and this helped the analysis process. I manually transcribed the 
data using the audio recording modifier on my phone, which slowed the voices and made 
it easier to follow the voices and pronunciations. After the initial transcriptions, I read 
through the transcripts while listening to the recording again to be sure that I did not omit 
anything. In view of the difficulty I encountered in accessing the QRS NVivo 10 
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software, which I had earlier proposed to use for the management, sorting, and analysis 
of my interview data, I had to resort to manual analysis. These data software only assists 
with sorting and categorization of data but the task of coding and identifying patterns and 
meanings from the data still rests with the researcher.  
Data analysis is a means of sorting through the information in the unstructured 
data obtained, with the view of reducing it into usable units by thoroughly examining the 
data and categorizing it into themes and patterns (Beaudry & Miller, 2016). I continued 
the data analysis process by grouping the respondents into three natural categories and 
assigning pseudonyms to the groups and respondents. The Former Board Members were 
identified as FBMs, Present CEOs as PCEOs and Former CEOs as FCEOs. All the five 
FBMs were thus identified as FBM 1, FBM 2, FBM 3 and so on as well as other 
categories. Having immersed myself in the data, I thereafter began searching for 
commonalities, relationships, and differences in the responses of participants and 
categorized them under codes, which were eventually grouped as themes.  
The most critical stage of qualitative data analysis is the coding stage and it is 
advisable to keep the research question in mind while coding (Stuckey, 2015).  I 
employed the deductive coding style which involves having preset codes a priori and also 
adopted the thematic content analysis method in analyzing this data (Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Stuckey, 2015). Having gone through the data several times, I was able to 
intuitively understand the relationship between the interview questions and the three 
research questions, which I initially set out to answer through the study. This step 
provided a direction for my data analysis. I had three sets of data obtained from former 
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CEOs, present CEOs, and former board members. I read through all the answers and 
highlighted relevant and striking comments with the use of my computer’s highlight pen, 
using the same highlight pen color for similar answers. I thereafter sorted the answers 
according to color and categorized them into themes that emerged as a central idea from 
the grouped codes. 
After the important responses had been categorized under themes, I commenced 
the next stage of the analysis by looking for relationships and similarities among the 
themes. The earlier classification simplified the process of comparing opinions and 
perceptions of participants about the theme and through the similarities in the responses, 
conceptual relationships were established, duplications were removed, and similar 
categories were merged in order to connect interrelated theoretical data and this led to the 
development of further themes. The next stage involved grouping the thematic categories 
according to colors. Since each category had color allocated to it, I went through the 
transcribed interviews again and extracted more data that fit the identified categories and 
they were colored accordingly. This helped me to organize the data for interpretation and 
ensured consistency in the coding process. The emergent themes were then grouped 
along with thematic constructions that answered the three research questions and 
addressed the framework for the study (Callary, Rathwell, & Young, 2015).  
The PCEOs’ interviews revealed 54 issues; the FCEOs’ interviews yielded 126 
issues, and the FBMs’ interviews revealed 73 issues. From these opinions, related and 
divergent themes were identified and this led to the formation of 81 categories. Because 
these categories were too many and too broad, I immersed myself in the data again to 
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understand what these data were saying and I discovered that some of the codes were 
related to one another and they were thus further reduced to nine. The nine categories 
were: Funding, Ability to Perform, Formal and Governance Structure, Supervision, 
Impact of Boards, Importance of Boards, RTO Boards’ Structure, Developing RTOs, and 
Monitoring RTOs. The categories were thereafter linked to the three research questions 
developed in this study. Figures 3, 4, and 5 are a spider representation of the nine 





















RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s Research and Development 
Sector? 
   






* Equipment          * Training                    * Operations          
* Advertisement                   * Agency Cost            * Innovations 
* Monitoring                        * Availability              * Duality                  
* Budgetary Challenges       * Infrastructure           * Board Funding                                   
* Remuneration 
 
* Incompetent Board           * Capacity     
*  S & T Innovation            * Assessing RTOs            
*  Proliferation            * Weak Technology Base          
* Infrastructure Development 
 
* Organization                          * Boards Characteristics 
* Bureaucracy and Patronage         * Informal Structure 
* Informal Selection Criteria           * Weak Regulatory Framework         
* Unclear Laws & Deliverables       * No Unitary System    
* Informal Evaluation Structure    * No Monitoring Structure 
* Wrong Appointments                    * Government Neglect 
* Ignorance of Government Codes 
 
* Checks     * Measurement                         * Supervising          
* Monitoring                 * Measuring Deliverables         * Visits 
* No Follow-up    * Reporting                  * Implementation   















RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D sector 
believe are the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness? 
   
























RQ3: How do these perceptions of Board members and Executive Directors about the impact of boards of 
Nigeria’s Research and Development Sector affect the performance of these organizations?   
 
Figure 5. Summary of linkage of RQ3 3 to coding categories. 
• Activate M & E 
• Annual Reports 
• Monitoring Mechanism 
• Board Oversight 
• Periodic Monitoring 
• Independent Assessment 
• Quick Decision                 * Oversight                      
• Linkages       * Redundant                
•  Strategic Plans      * No Impact 
• Influence                          * Non-
Performance 
• Political Connections     * Staff Welfare 
• Personnel Motivation    * Policy Direction 
• Checks 
• Intermediaries * Diversity 
• Value Addition * Liaison 





• Not Autonomous                       








• Relevant Affiliations 
 
• Funding                       
• Research Results               
• Capacity Development 
• Research Orientation 
• Remuneration 
• Grants  
• Attractive Salary Structure 
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After a further perusal of the categories, I established some additional links and 
the nine themes were finally condensed to six with new headings to capture the contents. 
The final six themes were: Working relationship with board, Importance, and Functions 
of boards, Arguments against boards, Hindrances of Public RTO effectiveness, 
Improving Board Performance, Improving RTO Effectiveness. Table 6 shows how the 
research questions produced the themes that were used to answer the three research 
questions in this study. 
Table 6 












problems exist in 
public organizations in 
Nigeria’s Research and 















*FCEO2 - Not particularly cordial.  
*FCEO 3 - Immediate hostility  
*FCEO5- I reported to the board on all activities 
*FCEO 7- the political powers are more concerned 
about constituency projects 
*PCEO1- Respect authority; attitude and approach 
matter.  
*FBM 5- Intuitively the CEO utilizes them  
 
*FCEO 1- Lack of monitoring mechanisms; agency 
issues; self-interest  
*FCEO 2- no enabling law; no formal selection 
criteria; political interference; lack of accountability 
*FCEO 3- faulty composition; political interference; 
unwieldy board size. 
*FCEO4- bureaucracy, political interference.  
*FCEO5- political interference; lopsided composition; 
absence of regulatory body.  
*FCEO6- inadequate monitoring of RTOs 
*FCEO 7- boards not empowered; political 
interference; unclear terms of reference; undefined 
reporting lines; unclear role; non-existent 





*PCEO 1- board size; unethical practices; 
bureaucracy.  
*PCEO 3- political interference; absence of board 
evaluation processes.  
*PCEO 4- political interference; improper 
composition; bureaucracy; absence of unified code of 
governance;  
*FBM 1- board composition; political interference; 
self- interests; unclear role; lack of proper monitoring 
system for RTOs; inappropriate board evaluation 
mechanisms; funding for board activities; 
bureaucracy.  
*FBM 3- incongruous composition; chairmanship 
position; inadequate funding. 
*FBM 4- improper board composition; unstructured 
monitoring process; political interference; vacuum in 
board leadership where President is chairman; 
bureaucracy. 
*FBM 5- compromises in evaluating CEOs; absence 
of code of governance for public boards; unclear role; 
lack of board evaluation. 
 
RQ 2 
What do Board 
members and 
Managing Directors of 
public organizations in 
Nigeria’s Research and 
Development Sector 
believe are the impact 

























4.  Hindrances of 
Public RTO 
effectiveness 
*FCEO1- policy direction, strategic plans  
*FCEO2- administration and governance; influence  
*FCEO3- monitor CEOs; influence 
*FCEO4- add value; administer and form policies  
*FCEO5- monitor CEOs and usage of funds  
*FCEO6- Monitor CEOs; enhance performance  
*FCEO 7- policy direction  
*PCEO1- help take quick decisions, monitor   
        activities, advocacy  
*PCEO 2- composition; monitor CEOs; intermediary; 
reduce bureaucracy of the Civil service; attract 
funding; advocacy;  
*PCEO 3- influence management; provide linkages; 
attract funding and goodwill; push proposals.  
*PCEO 4 - remove autocracy; composition  
*FBM 1- influence; promote partnership with private 
sector; policy direction; monitor policies 
*FBM 2- capital development; attract funds, advocacy  
*FBM 3- political influence; monitors CEO. 
*FBM 4- The bridge.  
*FBM 5- selecting CEOs; composition; policy making  
 
*FCEO 1- bureaucracy of the public service system. 
*FCEO2- improper oversight functions by relevant 




*FCEO3- absence of strong framework; there is no 
continuity in government; inconsistent government 
policies; personalization of projects. 
*FCEO4- absence of standard governance codes 
*FCEO5- political focus not social outcomes; 
haphazard funding of RTOs; inadequate funding;  
*FCEO6- lack of focus of government on outcomes; 
absence of assessment of RTOs technical 
performance. 
*FCEO 7- poor funding; absence of CEO evaluation; 
inconsistent policies. 
*PCEO 1- inadequate fund release and funds 
management. 
*PCEO 3- political interference; bureaucratic 
bottlenecks; lack of funds for operational matters. 
*PCEO 4- inadequate RTO advertisement; political 
interference; poor funding. 
*FBM 1- unfriendly government policies. 
*FBM 2- funding 
*FBM 3- poor funding; bureaucracy 
*FBM 4- political interference; absence of patronage 
of products; poor funding. 
 
RQ 3 
How do these 
perceptions of Board 
members and 
Executive Directors 
about impact of boards 
of Nigeria’s Research 
and Development 
Sector affect the 



























*FCEO 1- monitor; diversify composition; right 
appointments; good funding; improved Boards’ 
remuneration; establish formal structures and 
regulatory codes of conduct; establish performance-
based remuneration system  
*FCEO 2- right appointments; reduce political 
appointments; encourage oversight and evaluation of 
board members; give boards guidelines; organize 
retreats 
*FCEO 3- have clear separation of powers; appoint 
influential and brilliant board chairmen;   
*FCEO4- good remuneration; training; private sector 
partnership; use Technical Advisory Committees; give 
targets; demand for annual and aggregate reports; 
peer-review RTO boards; boards should review one 
another; standardize board practices across RTOs; 
enact specific guiding laws; RTOs shouldn’t have the 
same omnibus boards. 
*FCEO5- external oversight body; boards to set 
targets for themselves; develop scorecard for boards to 
monitor their own performance. 
*FCEO6- monitor process of delivering the outcome; 
develop an Act for board activities; use boards to 
monitor effective budgeting by the CEO and his 





















































*FCEO 7- monitor boards; appropriate composition; 
appoint influential Chairmen; develop governance 
impact assessments for all public boards in Nigeria; 
standardize board-monitoring mechanisms; 
standardize realistic codes of governance and 
operations for boards; set up regulatory committees in 
Ministries; give incentives to boards; appoint 
regulatory committees with professional members; 
empower the boards.  
*PCEO1- Appoint professionals; give boards power; 
don’t make one omnibus rule for all boards; boards 
should be professional in composition; don’t appoint 
on the basis of political affiliation; avoid lopsided 
composition. 
*PCEO 2- Have diverse boards; empower them; 
follow global standards; challenge boards and fund 
organizations;  
*PCEO 3- properly constitute boards; evaluate them; 
train boards;  
*PCEO 4- National assembly oversight functions; 
reduce bureaucracy; fund RTOs; remove political 
patronage;  
*FBM 1- well-composed boards; establish strict 
selection process for RTO boards; monitor and 
measure performance of boards; train boards; offer 
good remuneration; fund RTOs with clear-cut budgets 
for board operations; establish reporting mechanisms;  
*FBM 2- have diverse board; appoint influential 
chairmen; establish monitoring frameworks; funding; 
make government policies favorable; use committees; 
assess boards; spell out role of boards; train board 
members. 
*FBM 3- composition; use committees; train boards; 
assess boards’ performance and activities; remove 
bureaucracy in the governance system; fund RTOs for 
board functions. 
*FBM 4- right composition; train board members; 
supervise boards. 
*FBM 5- standard remuneration for boards; right 
composition; avoid political patronage; fund RTOs; 
train boards; develop a unified governance code for 
public boards; develop a formal structure of reporting 
and evaluation. 
 
*FCEO1- categorize RTOs; review public service 
bureaucracy for RTOs 




indicators; have M&E which would streamline 
governance practices; improve oversight function; 
make boards accountable; rank public RTOs;  
*FCEO3- training and retraining 
*FCEO4- have a National Perspective Plan; there 
should be orientation for all CEOs  
*FCEO5- fund the RTOs; boards should advocate 
acceptance and commercialization of RTO products. 
*FCEO6- monitor financial and technical outcomes; 
the CEO should be appointed on merit 
*FCEO 7- fund RTOs reasonably and consistently; 
appoint understanding and knowledgeable board; 
deploy monitoring mechanisms; ensure stability of the 
political structure; guarantee continuity of projects; 
have more flexible budgets and stable strategic plans. 
*PCEO 1- develop evaluation standards and enforce 
compliance with governance codes. 
*PCEO 2- remove bureaucracy; challenge CEOs; fund 
RTOs; develop technology foresight programme for 
the country. 
*PCEO 3- improve funding of RTOs; approve 
percentage of the earnings of government for RTOs as 
a statutory rule.  
*PCEO 4- patronize and advertise RTO products; 
reduce political interference; remove  
*FBM 1- enact laws meant for RTOs  
*FBM 2- combine RTOs efforts with institutions 
which have complementary competences, resources, 
and skills such as private sector actors and the 
universities 
*FBM 3- shorten bureaucracy 
*FBM 4- improve funding; improve stakeholder 
participation; improve interaction between the R&D 
institutes and the tertiary institutions. 
 
 
The six main thematic categories, which emerged in the analysis were applied to 
the established research questions to enable an understanding of the influence of public 
boards on RTO effectiveness in Nigeria. Table 7 summarizes the overview of how the 
themes were linked to the three research questions in this study. The research process was 
completely unaffected by discrepant cases but one event worthy of note is that in the 
process of analyzing the data obtained in this study, the government of Nigeria 
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inaugurated new public boards for RTOs and they have since resumed duties. This 
incident does not affect this research because the purpose of the study was to discover, 
from the opinion of leaders who have administered the RTOs at one point or the other, 
how public boards could be used to advantage in Nigerian RTOs. Therefore, the new 
boards are coming in at the right time as they will benefit from the findings of this 
research.  
Table 7 
Overview of Themes and their Links to the Study’s Research Questions 
Research Questions (RQ) Themes 
RQ 1 
What governance problems exist in public 




Arguments against Boards, 
Hindrances of Public RTO 
effectiveness 
RQ 2 
What do Board members and Managing 
Directors of public organizations in 
Nigeria’s Research and Development 




Working relationship with 
board, Importance and 
functions of boards 
RQ 3 
How do these perceptions of Board 
members and Executive Directors about 
impact of boards of Nigeria’s Research and 
Development Sector affect the performance 







Evidence of Trustworthiness 
According to Kornbluh (2015), having adequate knowledge of the population and 
utilizing appropriate procedures to guarantee that the research findings can be trusted 
assures the trustworthiness of a study. I carefully and rigorously applied the qualitative 
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elements of trustworthiness such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability to enhance the neutrality and reliability of the study (Cope, 2014). 
According to Lincoln and Guba (2007), these trustworthiness criteria guarantee rigor of 
studies that adopt the qualitative method. 
Credibility 
Though it is difficult to ascertain trustworthiness in a qualitative study because of 
researcher and other biases, internal validity can make such qualitative studies 
trustworthy. When the meanings supplied by participants are authentically engaged in the 
description of the research findings, such studies are adjudged trustworthy and credible 
(Morse, 2015). Based on this premise, I set about ensuring the trustworthiness of this 
study’s findings by employing member checks to guarantee that the data analyzed was 
free from researcher bias and were indeed the views and opinions of the participants. The 
words of some participants were sometimes unclear and I contacted the persons 
concerned to authenticate that what I had interpreted or transcribed was accurate. Besides 
this, member checking afforded me the opportunity of getting answers to some questions 
that arose from my transcriptions and those which I omitted to ask during the interview. 
Data saturation was thus satisfactorily reached. To further enhance the credibility of the 
data gathered in this study, I also conferred with peers in the governance field in Nigeria 
who went through the findings critically to ensure that my interpretations were free from 
biases. Despite the relatively small sample size, which ordinarily may hinder the 
generalization of the findings, the study’s strength and credibility lay in the rich and 
unhindered accounts of participants with multiple and diverse experiences and 
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perceptions about board impact. The use of triangulation of data further strengthened the 
validity of the data analyzed because of the multiple sources from which data were 
obtained (Yin, 2011).  
Transferability 
Transferability is achieved in a qualitative study if the findings and contexts of a 
particular study can fit into similar contexts using other participants (Morse, 2015). 
I ensured the transferability of this study’s findings by first selecting my participants 
purposively to guarantee that the key persons with needed data were reached, and I set 
out to obtain deep and thick descriptions from them. Through these thick descriptions, 
Guba (1981) opines that it is possible to compare the current research context to similar 
ones to which the findings could be transferred. Although the small sample size may limit 
the generalization of the findings of this research, the knowledge demonstrated by the 
participants was borne out of their experience while they served as CEOs or board 
members and this will remain unchanged even if they were questioned about it 
repeatedly. 
Dependability 
A dependable study assures that nothing is missed in the research conducted, 
which could compromise the accuracy of the findings. Achieving dependability requires 
guaranteeing that the data obtained from participants is consistent with the findings and 
recommendations given by a qualitative study such that time does not erode the truths in 
the results (Kornbluh, 2015). I set about establishing the dependability of this study by 
hiring a fellow researcher to trail and audit the data collection and analysis process to 
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assure that both processes were valid and consistent with laid-down procedures (De 
Massis & Kotlar, 2014). This was done by assessing the raw interview data, the coding 
process, my interview notes, and a few of the documents used to triangulate the data. 
Two researchers independently assessed these documents and their comments showed 
their satisfaction with the procedure employed. I equally engaged one of the researchers 
to recode the data I obtained and I discovered that the themes and codes generated agreed 
with my earlier codes. This discovery suggested that my earlier codes were supported by 
the data I collected. According to Ary et al. (2010), if the separate analysis of two or 
more researchers is consistent with one another, such a study is dependable.   
Confirmability 
Researcher bias is often one of the things that researchers have to address to 
convince and generate confidence in the study’s findings.  I, therefore, set out to establish 
that my personal biases or interests did not influence this study’s results. I also sought to 
establish that I arrived at the conclusions reached, in this study, from the information 
supplied by the participants during the interviews. This I did by declaring and isolating, 
from the onset, my biases which could raise neutrality concerns from the data or results 
(Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010). I equally employed the audit trail recommended by Guba 
and Lincoln (1982). The researchers, who conducted the audit, carefully analyzed the 
transcriptions and voice recordings. The researchers confirmed that the themes, which 
were generated, came from the data obtained. They also confirmed that the interpretations 
were not the fabrications of the researcher. According to Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007), 
the researcher’s prolonged engagement in the research sites will elicit trust from the 
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participants and they would be more trusting enough to release deep and sensitive 
information to the researcher. Being a participant researcher, I was able to enjoy rapport 
with the participants and thus had access to enough quality data to guarantee the 
trustworthiness of the findings.  
Study Results 
This interpretive case study set out to explore board activities and governance 
practices in Nigerian public RTOs, with a view to determining best practices for public 
RTO boards in Nigeria. The study, therefore, explored the opinion of relevant persons 
who had been involved in decision-making in public RTOs as CEOs or board members, 
in order to understand how good CG can promote effectiveness in these organizations. I 
purposively selected 20 participants who had served or were still serving in the six 
parastatals that had core R&D functions in the Nigerian FMST, for this study. Only16 
respondents participated in this study and data saturation was reached from the 
participants. There were three research questions for this study and the ten interview 
questions were tailored towards answering the research questions. I analyzed and coded 
the interview scripts according to the conceptual framework and other patterns that 
emerged from data and in all, six main themes emerged in the analysis of my interview 
data. 
Thematic Categories 
Thematic Category 1: Working Relationship with Public RTO Boards in Nigeria   
The respondents were able to describe their working relationship with the boards 
they served, through their responses, although no specific interview question addressed 
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this. However, in response to questions 2, 3, 4, and 5, respondents hinted at the 
importance of good working relationship and synergy between the board and the CEO as 
this could influence organizational effectiveness. While PCEO 2 observed that “if the 
boards do their jobs very well, and they monitor the RTOs very well, we should expect 
good results from RTOs,” FBM 5 said, “I reported to the board on all activities.” FBM 3 
mentioned that “The members were always willing to assist the agency in any way they 
could,” but according to PCEO 1, this willingness is dependent upon the disposition of 
CEOs. According to her, the attitude of the CEOs and how they treat board members will 
determine the support which they would receive from these boards.  This seems to 
corroborate the importance of mindfulness to a good and positive working relationship 
which, according to Hyland, Lee, and Mills (2015), aids the effective performance of 
organizations. 
FCEO 3 hinted that the frosty relationship between some boards and CEOs could 
be because of the lack of understanding of each other’s roles and competences. 
According to FCO 3, these roles were often mixed up because most boards chairs either 
did not understand their boundaries or they failed to respect them. FCEO 2 also observed 
that his relationship with the board he worked with was not cordial because he often 
refused to yield to their demands. To PCEO 1 however, her good name and integrity were 
important to her and as such, she was always careful about dealing with these boards, 
who were mostly politicians. She however cautioned that CEOs would enjoy better 
working relationship with boards if they considered the criticisms of board members as 
being necessary for improved performance. FCEO 7 however felt that most of the 
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criticisms and pressure received from board members were borne out of their concern for 
their personal and constituency projects.  
According to Goodman (2017), positive workplace culture will enhance the 
effectiveness of organizations. Out of the seven FCEOs interviewed in this study, three 
revealed tenseness in their relationships with their boards, while one saw the board’s 
activities as being complementary to the CEO’s efforts. Other FCEOs were silent on the 
working relationship. However, of the four PCEOs interviewed, the two who hinted at the 
relationship they had with boards revealed that it was cordial. These responses are 
significant in that 43% of FCEOs in this study believed that their working relationship 
with their boards was not smooth enough and this may have had some consequences on 
their performance while 50% of PCEOs in this study acknowledged that their working 
relationship with their boards was okay and rewarding.  
 A good working relationship between the boards and CEOs is a critical factor in 
considering the effectiveness of public RTOs. According to Okiro et al. (2015), there is a 
significant interaction between good CG and organizational performance because the 
internal structures of organizations are enhanced through good CG. Considerable 
empirical studies have also proven that agency conflicts between CEO’s and owners or 
shareholders have a direct influence on governance and organizational effectiveness. For 
instance, Odainkey and Simpson (2012) argued that agency issues are rare in 
organizations which are high performing while Tidor, Gelmereanu, Baru, and Morar 
(2012) said that a properly-structured governance system is very effective in eliminating 
agency problems in public organizations. Agency costs often increase in organizations as 
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a consequence of accumulated monitoring expenses and other residual costs, which arise 
from trying to resolve agency problems. But a well-formulated governance structure will 
eliminate or reduce agency issues and costs to the barest minimum. These suggest that a 
good working relationship between boards and managers will result in good CG decisions 
thereby making such organizations effective. 
Thematic Category 2: Importance of Public RTO Boards in Nigeria   
CG is the strategy employed by governments to guarantee the stability and 
profitability of their businesses (Sheifer & Vishny, 1997). The organ of governance of 
these government enterprises is the board (Harris et al., 2010) and they are often 
appointed to represent the interests of the owners (Bain & Band, 2016). Boards are 
important to firm performance (Okiro, 2015) and this may be the reason many owners 
favor their use as they are considered a vital part of organizational success. I designed 
interview questions three, four, and eight to discover the impression of FBMs, PCEOs 
and FCEOs about the role of public boards and also their importance to public 
organizations. This answers RQ2 which states: What do board members and managing 
directors of public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards 
on organizational effectiveness? From their responses, all participants perceived that 
boards are necessary to Public RTO effectiveness in Nigeria, although they differed on 
the extent of their impact. 
Except for FCEO4, who had what was called an advisory committee instead of a 
board, and was thus only able to speak from the perspective of what he had observed 
about board activities, all but one of the FCEOs and PCEOs agreed that public boards are 
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important to RTOs. This represents 68.75% of the respondents. The rest are FBMs, and 
they all supported the need for RTO boards. From the responses of participants, four 
codes were generated to answer research question two namely: board role, board impact, 
board influence, board composition and size, and these codes reveal more information 
about the perceived importance of public RTO boards in Nigeria. 
Board role. The role that boards play will determine their effectiveness 
(Nordberg & Booth, 2017). According to PCEO 1, boards make the decision making-
making process quicker and more effective because they understand the needs of 
organizations and help to reduce official bottlenecks that could hinder the implementation 
of those decisions. PEO 1 further explained that boards can give certain approvals 
pending the final approval so that the intended projects would not suffer costly delays.  
FCEO 2 said that board role is in administration and governance and unless they 
understood this role, it may be difficult to attain organizational effectiveness. FBM 5 also 
mentioned that boards ought to guide organizations towards mandate achievement. 
According to him, this role should help check the excesses of some CEOs. PCEO 4 
equally expressed his belief that boards were necessary to keep ambitious CEOs from 
taking decisions that could harm the organization.  PCEO 4’s opinion corroborated the 
position of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that managers’ interests may not always be 
aligned with that of owners and they thus needed to be monitored. FCEO 3 stated that 
because some CEOs tended to ignore the core mandates of their organizations and rather 
pursued personal goals, boards were needed to call them to order. These comments 
indicated the belief of participants that RTO boards are expected to oversee the activities 
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of the organization by monitoring the CEOs. According to Williamson (1988), a good 
and effective governance structure will prevent managers from pursuing their selfish 
agenda and interests. Boateng (2016) said that when good governance structures are in 
place in organizations, shareholders are assured that their interests and the objectives of 
the organizations would be protected. FCEO 5 commented that boards monitor execution 
of funded projects on behalf of government and if this was properly done, CEOs should 
have no excuse for sub-standard performance.  
PCEO 2 established another role of RTO boards as intermediaries working to 
eliminate the bureaucracy of the Civil service. FCEO 2, FBM 4, and FBM 5 also agreed 
that boards should serve as intermediaries because they will be able to help organizations 
overcome the cumbersome governance structure in place in Nigeria. According to FBM 
4,  “The management cannot be running to the presidency and the minister always. The 
board is the bridge.” FBM 5 also believed that public boards act as middlemen between 
organizations and the legislature. 
FCEO 1 further explained that public RTO boards ought to provide policy 
direction and also oversight functions in those organizations. According to him, when 
public governing boards are empowered, they will be able to develop and execute 
strategic plans which will ultimately lead to RTO effectiveness. FCEO 5 concurred by 
asserting that effective governing boards could be identified by their commitment to 
pursuing the delivery of government’s policies. Effective boards do this, according to 
FCEO 5, by monitoring the activities of organizations and ensuring that they are geared 
towards national goals. FCEO 7, agreed with this assertion and commented that the 
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effectiveness of any board would be determined by how effectively their organizations 
are able to deliver the promises of government to the citizenry.  
Board influence. The influence of boards can determine their impact. Influential 
boards get results. This code is explained in two parts. 
RTO Boards’ operational influence. Most public RTO boards in Nigeria are 
independent and even though they perform management duties, in the opinion of some of 
the participants, they are not expected to be involved in the day-to-day administration of 
their organizations. According to FCEO 3, boards must understand that their role is 
complementary to the efforts of the CEO and there should be separation of powers in 
order to avoid conflict. He further explained, “… if you go to one federal university of 
Petroleum Resources, the Pro Chancellor of that university has an office that is bigger 
than that of the Vice Chancellor and he is there on a daily basis.”  
In the opinion of other participants, RTO boards’ usefulness lies in their influence 
with external parties, and their ability to get things done for their organizations. A former 
board member, FBM 1, agreed that positive board influence was important to the 
operations of RTOs because they could liaise with higher authorities. FBM 3 equally 
observed that the political influence of some board members can give their organizations 
the financial boost required, thereby stimulating more inventions and competences., 
FCEO 3 said, “after the budgeting is the beginning of the real work. If we had had a 
properly constituted board, this would have been easier for me because there would have 
been some influential persons on board.” 
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PCEO3 submitted that if the board were active and well-constituted, they would 
move round to source for needed assistance for the organizations. This suggested that 
board members’ influence can affect organizational effectiveness. According to PCEO 1, 
boards can also influence their organizations through advocacy. Another important area 
of influence identified was through the personality of the Chairmen of RTO boards. 
PCEO1 confirmed that the chairman of the board he worked with greatly assisted to 
publicize the organization’s activities. PCEO 3 believed that advocacy was easier for 
board chairmen who had political and international connections. According to FBM 1, 
when board members belonged to the ruling party, they could easily influence budgetary 
appropriations so that their institutions could operate better.  
RTO Boards’ managerial influence. Another area of board influence, touched by 
participants, was their belief that boards influence management by monitoring their 
performance. According to the Public Sector Commission (2017), boards are expected to 
represent their owners by performing oversight functions on their behalf. With the 
exception of a few participants, most believed that by monitoring CEOs, boards can 
exercise influence. FCEO 6 said that “Government actually needs to monitor through the 
boards” while PCEO 1 confirmed that: “Boards are there to check you and if they try to 
do this, you should not feel threatened when they do because outsiders cannot check you. 
Every criticism should be taken as guidance towards better performance.” According to 
FBM 5, RTO boards should guide these organizations towards mandate achievement so 




 FCEO 6 commented that, “RTOs are on technology research and the boards are 
supposed to monitor what the outcome of the operations are and how they have 
transferred these results to private sector or public manufacturing sector.” FCEO 5 said 
that RTO boards can ensure delivery of demand-driven products to target communities if 
they are committed to their supervisory functions and are also periodically assessed.  
 The monitoring function of RTO boards was established by PCEO 3 who 
confirmed that the board supervised his organization’s activities. However, Rowley, 
Shipilov, & Greve (2017) suggested that although boards are supposed to manage 
performance in organizations, their impact is, at times, remote. This was further 
corroborated by some of the participants. FCEO 2 said that, “Within the period that I 
interfaced with the boards; I really didn’t see any productive impact they had on the 
system while I was still on that seat.” and PCEO 4 said that, “Some go there just to sleep; 
they don’t even contribute meaningfully to the running of the board. So, the impact of 
boards is not as it should be in RTOs”. 
According to FCEO 6, instead of monitoring performance, the boards only 
monitored financial operations and performed staff review. Some FCEOs also proffered 
reasons for the inability of RTO boards to perform their oversight functions. While FCEO 
4 identified bureaucracy and political considerations for the slow response of RTO boards 
to organizational needs, FCEO 5 believed that personal interests of political leaders, 
rather than the needs of the people, made public RTO boards unresponsive to the general 
goals of the organizations.  
CG is a tool for monitoring RTO performance outcomes but it has been 
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challenging to establish solid governance structures in RTOs (European Commission, 
2005). FCEO 7 confirmed that there was no formal code for public governing boards in 
Nigeria. Wilson (2006) concluded that organizational failures are an indication of poor 
governance structures. As a consequence, it may be challenging for ill-equipped boards to 
successfully monitor public RTOs, especially in view of the specialized nature of RTO 
functions. This is further exacerbated by the unstable nature of the Nigerian economy, 
which has worsened business culture in the country (Ujunwa, 2012).  
Board composition and size. Aina (2013) suggested that a diverse board would 
possess different skills and varying levels of experience, which Jhunjhunwala (2012) 
observed could be a consequence of their being drawn from different walks of life. FCEO 
4 concurred that public board diversity added value to their organizations and improved 
the quality of governance. According to PCEO 3, a diverse public board will be difficult 
for the CEO to manipulate. FBM 2 also believed that the right mix of professionals on 
public boards would promote free flow of relevant information. This, according to FBM 
2, would make it easy to reach consensus in real time, thereby reducing the time it would 
take to deliver organizational outcomes. Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) found that there 
was no relationship between organizational performance and board composition or board 
size. However, Lasisi (2017) commented that even though board size and composition 
may not have a direct influence on organizational effectiveness, large board sizes have 
their advantages, such as high skills and competencies that are needed for strategic 
decisions in organizations.  
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FBM 1 observed that if RTO boards are not well composed or in the right size, 
the organization would likely be negatively affected. FBM 1 further revealed that except 
public boards were well composed, lack of control over board members and power-play 
among powerful board members could make consensus difficult to attain during board 
meetings. FCEO 5, defined wrong composition in terms of having more of politicians 
than professionals on RTO boards. According to him, a public board that is composed of 
more politicians than technocrats would not be effective because the politicians would 
have pressure from their constituencies and parties. This could constitute serious 
challenges to good governance. 
Board impact. Participants in this study believed that the importance of public 
boards could be deciphered from the impact which these boards had on their 
organizations. According to PCEO 3, the impact of the boards assigned to his 
organization was measurable in terms of the linkages they provided for the organization. 
The PCEO 3 confirmed that the board secured approval for better conditions of service 
for staff and also successfully pushed their funding proposals through the National House 
of Assembly. According to FBM 2, the board’s impact was felt in their approval of a new 
management structure for his agency and its institutes, which made them more focused 
and autonomous. FBM 3, while speaking from the point of view of board members, 
believed that board impact could be measured by the influence they exert in getting 
things done for their organizations. PCEO 2 corroborated this point, saying that boards 
could obtain approvals faster than CEOs due to the influence they wield in government 
circles. FBM 5 however perceived that the impact of public RTO boards could best be 
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felt during the selection of candidates for the position of CEO. According to FBM 5, 
selection of the wrong candidates as CEOs could hinder the effectiveness of their 
organizations. 
Table 8 
Summary of Categorical Data on Respondents’ Responses Regarding the Importance of 
Public RTO Boards in Nigeria 
 Participants who commented 
Codes PCEOs 
N = 4 
FCEOs 
N = 7 
FBMs 
N = 5 
Total 
N = 16 
 
Boards Supervise and Assist 
CEOs  
 
3 (75%) 2 (28.5%) 2(40%) 7(43.7%) 
 
Boards Provide Policy Direction 
 
2 (50%) 3 (42.8%) 2(40%) 7 (43.7%) 
Boards Influence Organization’s 
Effectiveness 
 
3 (75%) 2 (28.5%) 4 (80%) 9 (56.2%) 
Boards Serve as 
Intermediary/Advocates 
 
4 (100%) 3 (42.8%) 3 (60%) 10 (62.5%) 
 
As can be deduced from Table 8, seven out of 16 respondents believe that RTO 
boards are supposed to supervise CEOs and assist them to be more effective. Out of these 
seven, there are three PCEOs, two FCEOs, and two FBMs.  One of the duties that 
respondents identified that makes boards important to public RTOs in Nigeria is that they 
provide policy direction. The word, policy, was used by 7 out of 16 respondents, which 
translated to 43.7% of the total respondents. 56.2% of the respondents also believe that 
public RTO boards do exercise some influence upon their organizations’ effectiveness. 
Perhaps the most significant opinion of respondents on the importance of public RTO 
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boards is what they perceive as a major role of boards, which is serving as advocates for 
the organizations by using their political and professional influence. 62.5% of the total 
respondents recognized the role of their boards in attracting funds, better working 
conditions, and patronage for the organizations. This overwhelming percentage indicates 
that this is one of the most important roles of public RTO boards in Nigeria. There were 
however respondents who did not agree that RTO boards were important or necessary but 
rather retrogressive. PCEO 4 said that boards are mere appendages and are used as 
compensation schemes for political loyalists in Nigeria. FCEO 2 added that over time, 
their role and relevance were becoming more retrogressive rather than progressive. FCEO 
6 also observed that public RTOs could fare better without boards.  
Table 9 
Summary of Categorical Data on Respondents’ Response Regarding the Importance of 
Public RTO Boards in Nigeria 
Participants Public Boards are 
Necessary for RTOs 
(%) 
Public Boards are 











3 (23) 1 (33.3) 4 (25) 
FBMs 
 
5 (38.5) (0) 5(31.2) 
Total 
 
13 (100) 3 (100) 16 (100) 
 
Thematic Category 3: Criticisms Against Boards’ Performance 
One of the purposes of boards is to monitor adherence to organizational objectives 
and ensure improved performance of organizations through the building of tested 
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performance-enabling structures such as CG (OECD, 2015). There should thus be codes 
and procedures that govern corporate decisions. The focus of this study was on RTO 
boards in Nigeria and it is imperative to understand the activities of these public boards 
and which aspects of their structures posed threats to RTO effectiveness. There are 
distinct expectations about how boards should act, but opinions about how they act in 
reality differ from the theories. I, therefore, designed interview questions two, five, six, 
and seven to elicit the opinions of FBMs, PCEOs and FCEOs about the activities of RTO 
boards in Nigeria and how they perceive their structures and performance. The responses 
obtained answered t RQ1.  Four natural codes emerged from the responses of participants 
and these provided answers to RQ1. The codes that emerged include the absence of 
evaluation structures for boards, political interference, board composition, board 
performance, operational hindrances, and executive compensation. 
Absence of evaluation structures for boards. CG assists policymakers in 
guaranteeing accountability by focusing on organizational goals and objectives so that 
conflicts of interest could be reduced amongst the principals and agents and organizations 
could be made to be more accountable to shareholders and stakeholders (Keasey & 
Wright, 1993; Keay & Loughrey, 2015). Following the global financial crisis of 2002, 
which resulted in numerous collapse of corporate companies, boards are being constantly 
monitored and most governments make it a priority to make them more accountable by 
insisting on the entrenchment of CG systems (Keay & Loughrey, 2015). According to 
Herman (2010), when boards are accountable, abuse of office is prevented, optimal 




In spite of the critical importance placed on CG and accountability (Keay & 
Loughrey, 2015; Moore, 2015); the majority of the participants in this study found the 
public boards in Nigeria to be lacking in accountability and ethical practices, and 
engaging in practices which promote agency issues. According to the agency theory, 
managers have their personal interests, which are often separate from the objectives of 
the organizations, and the pursuit of these often result in agency issues. Participants 
observed these incidences in the governance structure of Nigerian public RTOs. 
According to FCEO1, political appointees on boards come there to make money for 
themselves and CEOs find it difficult to keep them in check. FBM1 supported this claim 
by citing an example of how politicians on the board he served were always more 
inclined to push for constituency projects rather than pursuit of the organization’s 
mandate. According to FBM 1, CEOs who tried to resist such requests often suffered 
backlash from the politicians. PCEO1 remarked that the pursuit of personal interests was 
not limited to politicians alone but some professionals on the board sometimes acted 
unethically.  
Most of these issues of self-interests were traced to a lack of proper evaluation 
procedures. According to FCEO 2, boards do not seem to be accountable to anyone. 
FCEO 7 alluded to the fact that there did not seem to be any code of governance for 
public boards and that this seemed to suggest that the Nigerian government did not expect 
any serious impact from the boards. PCEO 3 corroborated this assertion by indicating that 
the activities of public boards were never monitored and as such, they could do whatever 
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they liked. FBM 4 also confirmed that there was no monitoring system for boards. FBM 
5 stated that though boards monitored CEOs perfectly, their activities were not 
monitored.   
 According to Koenig-Archibugi (2004), boards’ powers are derived from 
shareholders and the boards should be held accountable for how they deploy these 
powers. Accountability in CG is a requirement for accessing grants (Keay & Loughrey, 
2015). Some participants also observed that some of the RTO boards do not really have 
terms of reference or centralized governance codes and as such, they give personal 
interpretation to their roles. FCEO 4 said that “their deliverables are also not clearly spelt 
out and there are too many extant laws that public boards must adhere to.” FCEO 5, 
added that though there ought to be a regulatory body for public boards, nothing as such 
existed in Nigeria. FCEO 7 mentioned that board members often relied on the 
information obtained during their induction to guide them during their tenure. FBM 5 
confirmed that the board he served on relied on the manuals developed by the 
organization, and their interactions with the CEOs, to form governance codes for their 
activities.  
Political interference. According to the Cadbury report, the best practices of CG 
are hinged on the principles of openness, integrity, and accountability (Cadbury, 1992). 
This suggests a measure of independence and flexibility for public boards. Beqiraj and 
Bregasi (2015) said that board activities were characterized by nonspecific governance 
structures and constant state interference. Boards that were not composed of professionals 
are often susceptible to political interference and this affects their impact in their 
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organizations. While not suggesting that boards should be left to themselves without 
supervision such that they would be encouraged to pursue self-interests instead of 
shareholders’ interests, Keay and Loughrey (2015) suggested that the power and 
discretion given to boards should be balanced so that they are liable to account for the 
way they exercise the authority given them. This would encourage accountability, 
corporate stability, and innovation as well as give them some form of leverage and 
flexibility to perform their duties. 
At the core of this study’s participants’ concerns were their observations of the 
high degree of political interference in board activities and decisions, which, to them, 
made the role of boards unclear and unstable. This often resulted in conflicts of interest 
and setting aside of the principles of good governance. FCEO 5 stated that public boards 
in Nigeria are under ‘political control’ because their activities are being determined by 
the people in government with a political agenda. According to FCEO 2, boards were 
appointed for his organization despite the fact that the organization’s establishment was 
not enabled by any act of government. FCEO 2 further commented that this proved his 
observation that board appointments were just “job for the boys”. PCEO 4 added that 
boards were not intended as serious appointments but compensations for political allies. 
This, according to FCEO 3, accounted for the reason public board activities are not being 
monitored in Nigeria. FBM 5 also decried the fact that the board system was not a 
performance-based system.  
Board composition. Effective CG in public organizations is often determined by 
the composition of the boards of these organizations (Beqiraj & Bregasi, 2015). Beqiraj 
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and Bregasi (2015) said that where political interference is high, the incidences of having 
inexperienced and unqualified members of political groups on the boards would be high 
and this would weaken CG in public organizations. Some participants in this study 
queried the contributions of individuals on the boards, suggesting that the type of people 
offered appointments on RTO boards in the past had hindered their performance and 
effectiveness.  
According to FCEO 5 and PCEO 1, boards that are not well composed will be 
unethical and unappreciative of the needs of the organization. FBM 1 confirmed that 
public RTO boards that were chaired by politicians found it difficult to exert control over 
other members while FBM 3 observed that such boards were mostly ignorant of the 
operations of their organizations and needed to be enlightened about technical proposals.  
Often, according to FCEO 1, such situations increased agency costs. FBM 3 remarked 
from his experience that politicians had no business being on RTO boards because they 
often did not understand the direction the organizations should face and they were thus 
bound to make many mistakes. Although public boards are often made up of 
representatives from various constituencies of the ruling parties (Jhunjhunwala, 2012; 
Leisner, 2005), Aina (2013) suggested that a good board must embrace diversity in its 
composition. If such is done, Aina believed that the right skills, experience, and 
connections, which are needed to perform, would be available in the right mix and the 
pressures from those who appointed them would be minimized. 
Board performance. Public boards are expected to apply good CG in achieving 
organizational objectives (Aina, 2013). According to the SEC Code (SEC, 2016), public 
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boards in Nigeria are also responsible for the performance of their organizations and 
monitoring of the management of the organizations. To effectively play these roles, 
boards are supposed to fully understand their oversight responsibilities and adhere strictly 
to best governance practices.  
Public boards in Nigeria gained prominence with the transition into democratic 
governance in the country in 1999 (Adegbite, 2015). For 20 years, therefore, Nigeria has 
been experimenting with boards in its public organizations. According to Okiro et al. 
(2015), performance indicators are necessary to determine performance and they must 
meet certain criteria such as measurability, relevance, and contributions to the 
organization. Some of the participants were able to measure the contributions of RTO 
boards in their organizations.  PCEO 3 mentioned that the board of his organization 
attracted more funding for his organization and this empowered the organization to do 
more research and make more impact. FBM 2 added that the intervention of boards 
facilitated infrastructural development in RTOs.  
Critical assessments of RTO boards performance were also obtained. FCEO 6 
said that boards were more interested in the financial performance of their organizations 
than they were in their achievement of set goals and mandates. This observation, 
according to FCEO 6, was further strengthened by the fact that measurement of 
organizational impact on the citizenry was not covered by the Nigerian Companies Act 
(CAMA). This seemed to him like government was not really committed to meeting her 
citizens’ needs. The assessment of FCEO2 was also that boards had repeatedly failed to 
properly conduct oversight functions on RTOs. FCEO 2 specifically observed that his 
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performance was only assessed once in the almost 9 years he spent as a CEO. FCEO 6 
also said that the structure of public RTO boards in Nigeria did not encourage 
effectiveness. However, FBM 4 observed that the impact of public boards was not being 
felt because the government, which set them up, did not encourage their growth and 
survival. According to FBM 4, the government of Nigeria did not fund the RTOs or 
patronize their products and this led FCEO 7 to conclude that these public boards were 
not designed to have any significant impact.  
Operational hindrances. The most identified hindrance in this study was 
inadequate funding. PCEO 3 observed that operational matters hindered the performance 
of the board appointed for his organization. FBM 1 corroborated this and stated that 
despite the budgetary allocations to RTOs, the funds are rarely released and in the 
required amount. Consequently, FBM 1 observed that this situation often stalled 
innovation and board members could not hold CEOs responsible in such instances. The 
funding challenge also hindered remuneration for board members, servicing of board 
meetings, accommodating members and paying transportation costs (FBM 3). According 
to FCEO 1, an outstanding board could influence the performance of their organizations 
but their impact could also be hindered by unfavorable working conditions and lack of 
adequate funds to deliver expected results. FBM 1 shared the same opinion, and also 
noted that public boards did not administer the funds that were allocated to their 
organizations. FBM 1 further clarified the operational bottlenecks faced by public RTO 
boards. According to him, public boards could not take certain risks to assist their 
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organizations, like their counterparts in the private sector, without obtaining approval 
from authorities. Most often, FBM 1 observed, these approvals may be delayed or denied.  
The federal government funds R&D activities in the FMST through yearly 
budgetary allocations to the public institutions and because these funds have not been 
regular and sufficient, most Nigerian RTOs are limited in their activities (Onuoha, 2012). 
According to Porter (2009), the limited funding of the FMST reflects the lack of priority 
placed by government on R&D and the perceived lack of importance of RTOs to national 
development. This study’s participants expressed their concerns about the inadequate 
funding of the RTOs. Other codes generated included board size, bureaucracy, and 
executive compensation.  
Board size. According to PCEO 1, large boards are problematic and they increase 
agency issues. He recommended an average size of seven to nine members in a public 
RTO board. FBM 1 commented that over-sized boards were often out of control while 
PCEO 3 argued that large boards were usually too expensive to maintain in terms of 
remuneration, coverage of meetings, and gathering of board members from different parts 
of the country.  
Bureaucracy. According to PCEO 4, board impact is hindered by bureaucracy 
which elongates the process of decision making and implementation. Similarly, FMB 1 
observed that public sector rules made it impossible for public boards to act fast and take 
some urgent decisions because the laws did not permit them to operate beyond what it 
allowed. FCEO 4 believed that this situation slowed down board activities. This led FBM 
4 to conclude that placing public RTOs, and their boards, under the supervision of federal 
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ministries limited their impact because the RTOs had specialized operations and would 
not benefit from an omnibus administrative structure.  
Some participants also observed that the type of board leadership in place could 
constitute a hindrance to board performance. For example, FBM 3 mentioned that the 
Chairman of his board was the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that this 
posed some very fundamental challenges. For instance, FBM 4 noted that the President 
hardly had time to chair board meetings and the supervising ministries did not really 
understand the needs of the RTOs. FBM 4 further mentioned that the President’s 
performance could also not be monitored and thus, the boards he chaired were not really 
effective especially since FCEO 1 confirmed that the Vice Chairman of his board could 
not take decisions without recourse to the president. 
Not only are board chair roles very critical to success, leadership gaps could result 
in lackluster performance of RTO boards in Nigeria. Some other boards devised 
administrative solutions to the problems of bureaucracy and leadership which hinders 
board performance. For instance, FBM 3 noted that the board which he served on would 
break out into committees to increase response time and also reduce cost of calling for 
board meetings too frequently. FBM 2 confirmed that the strategy devised by his board 
then, in a similar situation, was to reach a consensus informally, when a matter was 
urgent, and then the Vice Chairman would present this to the President for ratification.  
Some other participants however believed that the personal abilities of board 
members could limit board impact. According to FCEO 2, his board was composed of 
persons without any tangible record of achievements and fields of specialization. This 
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limitation, according to FCEO 2, limited the profiling and technical engagement of the 
board members that were assigned to his organization. FCEO 3 however asserted that the 
dynamism or weaknesses of the CEOs determined the performance of board members. 
FBM 4 thus advised on the selection of professionals who would be technically at par 
with the CEO.  
Lack of governance structures. Major Nigerian public corporations have 
suffered significant setbacks, which resulted in the collapse of their structures or 
organizations as a consequence of agency issues and poor governance structures 
(Ogujiuba & Obiechina, 2011). As a consequence of this, the mandate for good 
governance is increasing in importance as the media, the public, local and state 
governments, the business community, consumers, and the federal government are 
closely scrutinizing boards across the country. The obvious place to focus on would 
obviously be the governance structures in place because without this, it would be difficult 
to determine how boards have fared.  
The participants in this study complained about structural defects in the 
governance of public RTOs in Nigeria. FBM 1 and FCEO 5 claimed ignorance of the 
existence of a code of governance for public boards while PCEO 3 confirmed that though 
there were some service codes, no specific codes guided public board operations in 
Nigeria. FCEO 6 however observed that the Acts of every RTO encapsulated the 
expected role of their boards although he also suggested that a separate Act should be 
enacted for public board activities. FCEO 7 added that most public RTO boards 
developed their own governance procedures. This remark was corroborated by PCEO 4 
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who observed that though not codified, the board he worked with was guided by some 
principles such as tenure, and functions, in line with the Act establishing the organization. 
FBM 3 observed that the governance practices in his organization had become so 
entrenched in the system that it had taken care of potential administrative bottlenecks. 
FCEO 4 therefore advised RTO boards to search for these codes, work with them, and 
also learn to govern from experience. Public boards must therefore clearly understand 
and embrace their vital governance responsibilities in order to avoid the type of high-
profile governance failures that have occurred in some R&D organizations. 
Executive compensation. Aduda and Musyoka (2011) said that the relationship 
between executive compensation and board performance was negative because the 
influence of principals reduced as the banks’ sizes increased. He arrived at this 
conclusion after examining the impact of executive compensation on the effectiveness of 
Kenyan banks between 2004 and 2008. This suggests that executive compensation has 
little or no effect on their performance. Eluyela et al. (2018) discovered a positive 
relationship between the frequent meetings of boards and improved performance of 
organizations because there was improved communication between boards and 
management and this eliminated agency issues. Creed et al. (2011) argued that 
institutional and cultural issues can influence the practice of good CG in developing 
countries.  
The immature state of the Nigerian public sector has been attributed to an obvious 
absence of governance standards and this has promoted corruption in most public 
organizations (Adegbite et al. (2012), weakened governance institutions, thereby 
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resulting in corporate failures (Kaufmann et al., 2008 in Adegbite, 2015). Participants in 
this study believe that executive compensation is necessary in the governance of Nigerian 
RTOs, to prevent failure. According to FBM 5, there are divergent views about serving 
on public boards. While government viewed appointment on boards as public service, 
most board members believed it was a means of being enriched and once the needs of 
board members were not met, their commitment to service would wane or they would 
begin to seek satisfaction through unethical means.  FBM 1, FBM 3, and FCEO 6 also 
implied that board members viewed their appointments as a means to an end and did not 
really offer value to their organizations. Another participant, FCEO 5 observed that 
public board remuneration was very poor and the costs which government was trying to 
cur would on the long run be unnoticeable because of rise in agency costs. FBM 5 then 
cautioned that poor remuneration could influence the effectiveness of public RTO boards. 
Another consequence of poor public board remuneration, according to FBM 5, was that 
sometimes, CEO evaluation was seldomly objective because the boards were oftentimes 
receiving unapproved favors from such CEOs.  
FBM 1 corroborated the point: 
Sometimes also, there have been situations where some board members 
mount pressures on the CEO on issues of employment of staff and even 
award of contracts, and where the CEO tries to resist, it causes some kind 
of conflicts between the CEOs and some board members. 
FCEO 2 also complained: 
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For all I know, these people are talking about appointments they have to 
make, how much money they want to be receiving per sitting, contracts to 
be awarded, and never talk about anything having to do with mandate of 
the Institute. Though they didn’t have powers to fix their remuneration, 
they want to do it anyway and they came up with a fake memo. I could not 
authenticate the document and so didn’t pay what they were requesting 
because we even didn’t have the money to pay. 
The implication, therefore, is that if the remuneration of board members were not 
met, this could affect their performance and prompt them to take bad risks (Cybinski & 
Windsor, 2013). Based on the responses, the challenges that hinder the effectiveness of 
public RTO boards are not imaginary and they could hinder their impact in RTO 
organizations. FBM 1 thus advised that the remuneration of public boards should be more 
attractive so that its members would not be tempted to continually seek unorthodox and 
unethical means of extracting money out of the system.  
Thematic Category 4: Improving Board Performance 
Governance is a means of controlling organizational output, and good governance 
is the strategy governments use to ensure the stability and profitability of their businesses 
(Bardach, 2012; Cooper & Edgett, 2012). Boards are assumed to be determinants of good 
governance in organizations (Tricker, 2015; Van Essen, Van Oosterhout, & Carney, 
2012). Many owners thus favor their use as they are considered a vital part of the good 
governance strategy which is needed to overcome agency issues. According to Okiro 
(2015), in order for governments to obtain the best results from organizations, boards 
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processes and governance practices must be improved. This prompted me to design 
interview questions 5, 7, and 8 to answer RQ3 and also enable respondents offer 
suggestions on how public RTO boards in Nigeria could be more effective. 
This thematic category answered RQ3. All the participants believed that Nigerian 
RTO boards could perform better than they presently did. The number of codes derived 
from this category was seven, and they included adherence to governance standards, 
goal-orientation, monitoring and evaluation, funding, training, composition, autonomy, 
and improved remuneration. 
Adherence to governance standards. PCEO 2 noted that since the world had 
now become linked through technology, public RTO boards must adhere to global 
governance standards in order to remain relevant. PCEO 2 however acknowledged that 
cultural differences could necessitate the modification of global governance best practices 
to suit Nigeria’s culture. In order to be more efficient and accountable, FBM 5 suggested 
a unified governance code for public boards with room for adjustment to suit individual 
sectors. FCEO 4 however suggested that training would solve governance problems in 
public RTOs in Nigeria.  
The principle of accountability is one of the globally-acceptable governance 
standards (Bovens, Schillemans & Goodin, 2014; Keay, 2015; OECD, 2001). FBM 1 
therefore suggested that the Nigerian government could make boards accountable by 
creating a feedback structure which managements could fall back on to report 
intimidation or infringements by board members without backlash. This step, according 
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to FBM 1, would help keep public boards on track instead of dissolving the boards 
whenever problems arose.  
Goal orientation. According to Bernstein et al. (2016), the governance 
perceptions of CEOs and boards (chairs) must overlap with that of the organization to 
achieve effectiveness. FCEO 5 said that public RTO boards ought to adequately monitor 
that their organizations are developing demand-driven products aimed at positively 
influencing their communities. PCEO 1 suggested that boards should conduct periodic 
needs assessment for the society and focus on what the society needed rather than what 
the boards thinks they need. The same opinion was echoed by PCEO 2 who observed that 
boards should drive organizations towards the eradication of national challenges instead 
of trying to solve every problem in the society. In order to achieve this, PCEO 3 
suggested that board members should have a change in their orientation and see their time 
on the boards as opportunities to serve their country. FCEO 3 recommended that public 
boards be indoctrinated into this mindset right from the time of their inauguration and 
induction. These perceptions indicate that good governance is achieved when board 
members pay due diligence to their processes and activities.  
Monitoring and evaluation. Since boards are the tools of good governance, and 
since good governance is the desired state at all levels of public business management 
systems, efforts should be made to increase the effectiveness of boards. Evaluation of 
boards is a critical public policy tool aimed at improving the performance of boards 
(Nordberg & Booth, 2017). This is ultimately geared towards overall improvement in the 
provision of government services. It would also encourage board accountability and 
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eliminate incidences of preventable failures (Bain & Band, 2017; Nordberg & Booth, 
2017). 
Boards in the Nigerian public sector do not undergo vigorous evaluation 
(Adegbite, 2015). The opinion of some of the respondents also corroborated the fact that 
boards in Nigerian RTOs had not been properly monitored. Participants also averred that 
evaluation of their activities and practices was almost non-existent. For instance, FCEO 2 
said that the National Assembly had failed in its oversight duties over public RTOs and 
their boards in Nigeria thus encouraging complacency. FCEO 7 also remarked that the 
interest being paid by government to board activities should be increased as this would 
challenge public boards to pay more attention to their assignments. FBM 1 thus suggested 
a form of standardized evaluation system to improve board impact. According to FBM 1, 
reinforcement of board supervision will restore ethical practices and help organizational 
growth. PCEO 3 suggested that board members should be made to fill APER like other 
public employees and this should be used to determine their re-appointment. PCEO 3 
remarked that boards would be more effective if they understood that they would be 
evaluated. FCEO 2 recommended that standardized measurement and evaluation 
processes should be activated for public RTO boards and it should be continuous in order 
to have the desired impact.  
According to Bain and Band (2017), boards performance evaluation standards 
should be measurable, achievable, and regular. FCEO 4 said that if boards were given 
targets for the period they were expected to serve, their impact would be easy to measure. 
He also suggested that public RTO boards should submit annual reports on their activities 
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and they should be peer-reviewed to evaluate impact made. According to FCEO 4, the 
peer review will teach other boards what they did not know thereby resulting in the 
development of governance best practices in public RTOs in Nigeria.  
Board evaluations are said to be more thorough when they are conducted using 
external and professional teams because their feedback would be objective (Bain & Band, 
2017). This recommendation was echoed by FCEO 5 who suggested that since there was 
no monitoring structure in place for public RTOs in Nigeria, boards should be structured 
to report to an external body of oversight which could hold the boards to account for the 
delivery of the public service for which they were set up. 
Funding. PCEO 3 confirmed that inadequate funding incapacitated the board 
assigned to his organization. FBM 1 corroborated the impact of dearth of funding on the 
performance of boards and its effect on the organization. According to him, lack of funds 
will stall activities in the organization and encourage conflicts between the CEOs and 
their boards. FCEO 4 also observed that organizations fared better when they could bring 
boards together but lack of sufficient funds made that impossible. FCEO 2 however 
suggested that beyond the call for proper funding, the use to which the released funds are 
put and their impact should be monitored also. 
 Training. According to Bain and Band (2017), boards are more likely to be more 
effective when they have formal training to strengthen CG practices. Some of the 
respondents agreed that board members needed the training in order to be equipped with 
the knowledge required to develop appropriate policies and processes. FBM 1 confirmed 
that he had received some form of training before taking up his position as a board 
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member. He then recommended that such trainings should be systematic; as soon as the 
boards are appointed, midway in their appointments, jointly, or together with the 
management of the organizations.  
PCEO 3 advised that induction training could be arranged for board members 
after their inauguration so that these codes of governance and their roles would be well 
spelt out to them. FCEO 2 also noted that the roles of boards should be well spelt out to 
them during their inauguration. FCEO 7 suggested that the training could be 
performance-related training to raise the competence of public boards and teach them 
what they needed to know in order to effectively deploy their knowledge and powers.  
Composition.  According to FCEO 2, boards must be well composed in order for 
them to record any meaningful impact. This position was supported by PCEO 1 who said 
that public boards should be small and professional. PCEO 3 pointed out that large 
boards consume much funds and hardly achieved anything. FBM 1 therefore pointed out 
that the selection process for public RTO boards in Nigeria ought to be stricter and based 
on merit rather than on political patronage. FBM 3 also cautioned on appointing the 
wrong people into public RTO boards as it could hinder the effectiveness of their 
organizations. FBM 4 suggested that institutional heads, such as presidents of 
professional bodies, would offer the best value if appointed on boards. 
FBM 1, FBM 5, and FCEO 4 suggested the ideal composition of RTO boards. 
While FBM 1 and PCEO 1 suggested that public RTO boards be limited to 10 members 
and should comprise of retired professionals who had either been in government or in the 
industries, FBM 5 recommended that politicians should not exceed 20% of the board 
137 
 
size. FCEO 4 also recommended that professionals from the private sector could be 
invited to serve on public RTO boards because of their wealth of experience.   
Autonomy. According to FBM 3, the lack of full autonomy for public RTOs in 
Nigeria made their governance behavior unpredictable and unstable thus hindering their 
performance. PCEO 1 confirmed that public RTO boards did not have sufficient powers 
to carry out their assignments. According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) however, when 
boards are too independent, it could reduce the performance of the organization.  
Improved remuneration. Adegbite (2015) said that Nigeria did not have a well-
established compensation culture for executives. According to Adegbite, this could 
hinder good governance practices because the poor remuneration could prompt 
executives to engage in sharp practices. Participants commented on the need for 
improved remuneration for public RTO boards in order to improve their performance. 
FBM 5 mentioned that improved remuneration for public RTO boards would also reduce 
conflicts in the work environment. Adegbite (2015) recommended that to achieve good 
governance in Nigerian public organizations, executives should be well compensated 
according to their performance. This reward system should be well defined enough to 
clarify what every board member should expect for their services.  
Thematic Category 5: Hindrances of Public RTO Effectiveness 
Berle and Means (1991) revealed that public enterprises offer the most plausible 
avenue to arrange for and distribute goods and services for the populace. According to 
FCEO 1, “RTOs are organizations of government created specifically for economic and 
developmental purposes”. They are different from the universities because they are 
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involved in research for the transformation of the way of life and infrastructural 
development of the country. PCEO 3 also observed that RTOs were very important to 
governments because they delivered governments’ promises of social and physical 
infrastructure to the people.  FBM 5 added that the research of Nigerian RTOs were of 
national importance because they represented government’s response mechanism to the 
failures of the nation in all spheres of life.  
Public RTO boards in Nigeria were appointed to increase the efficiency and 
performance of the organizations. However, responses from the participants in this study 
indicated that these RTOs were grappling with certain challenges which may be affecting 
their performance. Some of the identified challenges were discovered to be sometimes 
beyond the scope or intervention of boards. I designed RQ1 and RQ2 to elicit information 
on the challenges faced by RTOs, apart those that could be ascribed to boards’ activities. 
Four codes were generated from this category and they included: Lack of State Support 
for R&D, Weak Operational Framework, Inadequate Infrastructural Facilities, and 
Inadequate Funding.  
The effectiveness of RTOs is a key ingredient for sustainable national growth in 
developed economies (Giannopoulou, 2016). These advanced economies have placed a 
high premium upon supporting R&D activities in order to stimulate innovations and 
infrastructural development (Giannopoulou, 2016; Martínez-Vela, 2016). Some 
participants, however, asserted that public RTOs in Nigeria did not enjoy such support 
from their government. FBM 4 stated, for instance, that government did not properly fund 
the RTOs neither did she patronize their products. FCEO6 mentioned that when the 
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RTOs were eventually funded, they were given “envelopes”, arbitrarily calculated or 
estimated budgets, without really considering what the organizations needed.  
FCEO 5 and FCEO 6 added that the government was more particular about the 
revenue generated by the RTOs and how they could execute projects for their 
constituencies than they were about the impact of the RTOs on the society. These self-
interests, according to FCEO 5, caused leaders in government to fund some organizations 
more than others yet these organizations were not meeting the needs they were set up for. 
PCEO 4 also observed that the Nigerian government sometimes funded research but 
refused to acknowledge or advertise the products resulting from the research but rather 
preferred to import these products. The consequence of this posture by the government of 
Nigeria, according to PCEO 4, was the killing of innovation and development.  
  This lack of state support was also responsible for government’s lack of interest in 
monitoring the performance of CEOs and their impact, as long as budget performance 
was met. FCEO 7 observed that CEOs were rarely formally evaluated on their 
performance or achievements until the end of their tenure, and only if they were being 
considered for reappointments, or if there was a need for an inquiry. FCEO 6 recalled that 
his organization’s technical performance was only assessed twice while he was a CEO. 
FCEO 6 therefore hinted that R&D was not really a priority for the Nigerian government 
based on government’s posture towards R&D outcomes.  
Weak operational framework. In the opinion of FCEO 3, public RTOs in 
Nigeria lacked a strong operational framework. According to FCEO 4, many CEOs 
behaved as they deemed fit, especially since no one was really asking them questions. 
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The absence of a strong operational framework in Nigerian RTOs is possibly responsible 
for the lack of continuity of projects and processes, as observed by some participants. 
FCEO 7 stated that, “We have seen instances where all the achievements made during a 
certain tenure will be stalled because the present leader is more interested in agriculture 
and thus, we have a lot of abandoned projects and massive wastage of funds.” FCEO 3 
confirmed the lack of continuity in governance in Nigeria. He lamented the loss of a 
promising international partnership for his organization because of the issue of 
personalization of projects which made all his efforts to go to waste as soon as he left the 
seat.  
Bureaucracy was also identified as a major weakening force against the successful 
implementation of R& D activities in Nigeria. PCEO 1, FBM 3, and FBM 4 condemned 
the fact that government continues to foist the public service mentality on public RTOs. 
This, in the opinion of participants, was responsible for the non-performance and slow 
response of these organizations. 
Inadequate infrastructural facilities. Inadequate and obsolete infrastructure in 
Nigeria has escalated the cost of the transaction of businesses thereby weakening the 
competitiveness of the nation’s economy. According to Akintoye et al. (2015), the 
economic efficiency of any nation is boosted by the presence of some basic 
infrastructural facilities, which enhances their access and dominance in local, regional 
and foreign markets. Some of the participants however observed that RTOs in Nigeria 
were under-utilized and under-producing because of the myriad of infrastructural 
problems hindering research activities in the country. According to FBM 2, 
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infrastructural development for RTOs was costly to attain, but they were needed for the 
development and promotion of basic infrastructures, such as energy, water, good road 
network and technical and financial support services to industries and wider communities 
of users. FCEO 5 also observed that the cost of acquiring these infrastructural facilities 
were responsible for their limited number in Nigerian RTOs. This, according to FCEO 5, 
was one of the performance-related challenges being faced by public RTOs in Nigeria. 
Inadequate funding. FCEO 5 revealed that most public RTOs in Nigeria were 
underfunded and this situation hindered innovation, research, and developmental 
activities. According to PCEO 3, the release of funds to many public RTOs was 
haphazard and biased because the releases were dependent upon the whims and interests 
of the persons at the helms of affairs. According to FBM 2 noted that funding of public 
RTOs was largely dependent upon the decisions of relevant committees at the National 
Assembly and that most often, the approvals were unfavorable. FBM 3 added that past 
trends had revealed that government did not really understand the need to fund public 
RTOs and they thus allocated what was deemed fit for their operations. According to 
FBM 3, this was the major challenge confronting public RTOs in Nigeria.   
Thematic Category 6: Improving RTO Effectiveness 
RTOs are important to national development and this is the reason European 
nations and regions invest much in their development and sustenance (Giannopoulou, 
2016). From the earlier identified codes, we understood that though RTOs were very 
important to nations, they were not well developed in Nigeria. The global environment 
where RTOs operate today is rapidly changing and competitive, and to ensure that these 
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organizations effectively play their assigned role, careful thought must be given to 
positioning them well. Without this, boards may be unable to achieve much result. Four 
codes were generated from the responses of participants to interview question 7, which 
helped to explain their opinions on how public RTOs in Nigeria could be improved. The 
codes included Funding, Structural Re-alignment of RTOs, Enabling Environment, 
Periodic Monitoring and Evaluation, Strategic Plan and Government Patronage, 
Management of RTOs, and Stakeholder Engagement. 
Funding. FCEO 5 advised that public RTOs should be well funded in order to 
increase their efficiency and impact. According to PCEO 3, CEOs were well-equipped 
with sufficient knowledge and competences to achieve their organizations’ goals. 
Government must however demonstrate its sincerity to support the efforts of these CEOs 
by providing all that public RTOs required and also removing all bureaucratic structures 
that hindered public RTOs.  
Structural realignment of RTOs. According to FCEO 1, the operations of RTOs 
demands that they be treated different from other public organizations in the public 
service. FCEO 1 also suggested the categorization of RTOs according to their functions. 
FCEO 2 aligned with this suggestion and recommended that if public RTOs in Nigeria 
were grouped according to their mandates, it would be easier to determine their impact. 
FCEO 2 further suggested that the existing public RTOs in Nigeria could be grouped into 
three categories: Institutes which provided consumer goods, feeder research Institutes, 
and research regulatory/training Institutes.  
Enabling environment. According to PCEO 3, the creation of an enabling 
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operating environment would transform public RTOs in Nigeria. PCEO 4 expatiated on 
the right environment for public RTOs in Nigeria. According to PCEO 4, these 
organizations would thrive in an environment devoid of politicking scarcity of funds to 
carry out research. FCEO 7 submitted that the budgets for RTOs should be different from 
that of the typical Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) while PCEO 4 called 
for a shortening of the bureaucracies that hindered RTO operations. FBM 1 
recommended a review of the laws that established RTOs so that the challenges being 
currently faced could be taken care of.  
Periodic monitoring and evaluation. The opinion of FCEO 2 was that regular 
monitoring and evaluation of RTOs would make them more accountable.  FCEO 6 
insisted that the monitoring plan should be extended to technical performance of these 
organizations so that the funds being released annually would not be wasted.  
Strategic plan and government patronage. PCEO 2 demanded that the federal 
government should give challenges to MDAs and back these up with the resources 
needed to deliver as expected. He further recommended the establishment of a 
technology foresight programme that would encapsulate and codify the priorities and 
needs of everyone in the society, for successive governments to pursue.  
Management of RTOs. FBM 4 reiterated the importance of effective 
management strategies for public RTOs. According to FBM 4, the effectiveness of public 
RTOs could be determined by how outgoing the management of such organizations were.  
Stakeholder engagement. FBM 4 recommended stakeholder engagement to 
garner information and establish the collaborations that were needed to improve 
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organizational outcomes. FBM 4 further identified the stakeholders to the RTO sector to 
include other R&D institutes, relevant private sector industries, and tertiary institutions. 
He recommended the need to create public awareness of the services and activities of the 
RTOs through participation in fairs and exhibitions. and organize regular exhibitions and 
trade fairs. 
Summary of Findings 
With the aid of data obtained from semi-structured interviews, the journal entries, 
which were kept by me during the interviews, as well as public documents obtained from 
the organizations sampled, I was able to enact the governance process in Nigerian RTOs 
and the effect of RTO boards on the performance of public RTOs in Nigeria. The 
interview questions were focused on the perception of FBMs, PCEOs, and FCEOs about 
the relevance and performance of RTO boards in Nigeria.  The questions were designed 
to focus on: (a) the structure of RTOs in Nigeria, (b) the nature of governance of RTO 
Boards in Nigeria, and (c) impact of boards on the effectiveness of RTOs. The data 
obtained from the interviews reached saturation point and this simplified the process as 
enough data was made available to enable the presentation of different views and 
opinions about board impact and these ideas were grouped under six major themes, 
namely: Working relationship with Public RTO Boards in Nigeria, Importance of Public 
RTO Boards in Nigeria, Criticisms against Boards’ Performance, Improving Board 
Performance, Hindrances of Public RTO Effectiveness, and Improving RTO 
Effectiveness. The findings obtained from the answers provided by participants to the 
research questions revealed an overarching overview of multiple opinions and 
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perceptions about the phenomenon under inquiry. The many perspectives, obtained from 
the rich data, highlighted the importance of good governance structures and enabling the 
environment for boards and RTOs to achieve set goals.   
Summary 
The purpose of this research was to understand the impact of governance practices 
of FBMs and CEOs on the effectiveness of public RTOs, leaning upon the perceptions of 
interviewed participants who had experience governance of public RTOs. The interview 
questions were developed along with the conceptual framework of the agency theory. 
The insights provided by participants revealed the state of governance practices in 
Nigerian public RTOs. The findings of the research questions for this study are presented: 
RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D 
sector? 
I designed interview questions 1, 2, 5, and 6 to answer this research question. Two 
main themes were constructed from the participants’ responses namely working 
relationships and criticisms against board performance. Participants largely 
acknowledged that the effectiveness of boards would be largely dependent upon the 
cordiality between them and CEOs. Secondly, participants observed that bureaucracy, 
political intrusions, and unclear governance structures and systems hinder board 
performance and these essentially place effective governance beyond the reach of RTO 
boards. Specifically, participants established that conflicts of interest and systemic 
failures, which have economic and political causes, have exacerbated governance of 
public RTOs in Nigeria. 
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  RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in 
Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness?  
I designed interview questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to answer this research question. 
The data obtained from participants revealed their concerns about what the role of public 
RTO boards should be and what they are in reality. Of great concern were (a) the 
lopsided composition of RTO boards (b) the apparent lack of interest of government on 
board outcomes, and (c) inadequate funding; all of which, the data suggests, have greatly 
and negatively affected the impact of governing boards on Nigerian public RTOs.   
RQ3: How do these perceptions of board members and executive directors 
regarding the impact of boards on Nigeria’s R&D sector affect the performance of these 
organizations? 
I designed interview questions 1, 2, 3, and 8 to answer this research question. 
From the data, participants acknowledged that when deliberate actions that can improve 
RTO performance, such as (a) effective board selection and engagement (b) 
categorization and ranking of RTOs (c) adequate funding; and (d) unified governance 
codes; are pursued, RTO effectiveness would be achieved and become sustainable. 
Secondly, participants believed that RTO performance could be improved if CEOs and 
boards were sufficiently monitored and evaluated.  
In this chapter, I described the interview process, demographics of the participants 
involved in the study, how they were selected, and my role in the process. This chapter 
also described the data analysis process and how codes and patterns emerged. I discussed 
how I used codes and patterns which emerged from the data to generate themes that were 
147 
 
used to answer the research questions. I presented the evidence of research rigor to 
guarantee the trustworthiness of this study’s results and a summary of the findings. In 
Chapter 5, I discussed the research results, limitations of the study, recommendations that 
arise from the findings, as well as implications for social change. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
This study was conducted with the purpose of establishing the impact of good CG 
on RTOs in Nigeria. This study also sought to discover suitable governance codes and 
structures for public RTOs in Nigeria. Additionally, the study considered the ancillary 
impact of RTO structures on their performance and attainment of competitive edge in the 
economy. According to Díaz and Garrigós (2017), growth and economic advantage can 
be obtained by adhering to international best practices in CG.  
The study was conducted using the qualitative interpretive case study approach 
while the qualitative approach informed the interview procedure. The qualitative method 
of inquiry enables researchers to gain deep insight into the human experience (Erlingsson 
& Brysiewicz, 2017).  Data for this study were obtained from interviews, government 
records, and my journal notes. Participants were made up of former and present MDs and 
FBMs of these public RTOs. Participants were purposively selected from different 
research organs of the FMST to access their diverse experiences. The documents used for 
this study included annual reports of three RTOs and other secondary documents such as 
relevant web pages of organizations. This study adds to the body of knowledge regarding 
the governance of public RTOs, with special emphasis on Nigeria. In this chapter, I 
discuss the research findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, implications for 
social change, and conclusion. 
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Interpretation of Findings 
This study was focused on how to make public RTO boards in Nigeria more 
effective. Effective boards will produce effective organizations which will make goods 
and services available and accessible to citizens in the country. The findings were 
interpreted using data obtained from the interviews. Additional information was obtained 
from the mandates of these RTOs, as specified in the enabling laws that established the 
organizations.   
Findings from Data Obtained for RQ1 
RQ1: What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s R&D 
sector? 
Findings from the data gathered in this study revealed that governance in public 
RTOs in Nigeria was uncoordinated, lacked consistent patterns, and was decentralized in 
most organizations. It is thus safe to conclude that governance in public RTOs in Nigeria 
does not have a particular structure. According to Fudin and Rahayu (2019), CG is 
effective in balancing the interests of stakeholders in a corporation because it provides 
the platform for effective utilization of resources in the organization thereby promoting 
good outcomes. Any developing country which desires to attract foreign investments and 
achieve global relevance must create good governance structures (Robertson et al. 2013). 
Such developing countries also need to promote policies and practices that would 
enhance their global acceptance as competitive economies. This acceptance will help the 
countries to grow their economy. This understanding of the strategic importance of R&D 
to economic development and national growth, coupled with the acceptance of the need 
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to practice good CG, prompted the Nigerian government to establish the NCST in 1970. 
The NCST was specifically established to promote S&T and coordinate basic and applied 
research in the country. The NCST was further decentralized into manageable units with 
the establishment of the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) and the Industrial 
Research Council (IRC) in 1971 and between 1972 and 1973, the Medical Research 
Council and Natural Science Research Council. The NCST was later changed to the 
National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) in 1977 and given a 
specific mandate to initiate S&T policies and promote its development. However, in 
1980, the NSTDA transformed into the FMST and was rebranded in 1993 to promote 
science, research, and technology and develop policies to guide the activities of all RTOs 
in Nigeria. Over the period between 1970 and 1993, the regulatory body was changed 
three times and merged with other agencies twice before it finally achieved autonomous 
status in 1993. This inconsistency in operations of the main ministry charged with the 
coordination of RTOs in Nigeria may have partly contributed to perceptions of 
participants that not enough attention is being paid to the activities of RTOs.  
The FMST deployed boards to the public RTOs to supervise them, in line with 
extant acts and decrees of the federal government such as Decree 33. Decree 33 approved 
the establishment of the National Agency for Science and Engineering Infrastructure 
(NASENI) and also a governing board to conduct the agency’s business. Participants, 
however, identified some defects in the current governance structure of Nigeria’s public 
RTOs, and these included lack of formal codes of conduct and standardized best practices 
to regulate board activities, absence of constitutionally-entrenched evaluation processes 
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for boards, weak oversight functions, undue political interference, inadequate funding to 
support board activities and processes, and nonprofessional boards.   
Lack of Formal and Distinct Governance Codes for RTOs 
Public services are often inaccessible in developing countries (Hove, Ngwerume, 
& Muchemwa, 2013) and this situation could be linked to poor governance behaviors 
(Kwon & Kim, 2014). Participants in this study believed that a customized governance 
system, which would be suitable for the RTO environment in Nigeria, is required for 
RTOs for them to achieve desired results.  Abor (2007) said that the performance and 
growth of firms are relative to the existence of governance structures in those 
organizations. According to PCEO1, you have to find out some things for yourself”. The 
consequence of this type of situation is that board members in these RTOs act according 
to their personal interpretation of what CG should be.  
 Responses to RQ1 helped to identify restrictions faced by public RTOs in Nigeria 
as a result of bureaucracy in the public sector. Bureaucracy often slowed down 
operations. These restrictions also limited boards while performing their supervisory 
functions. The opinion of participants in this study was that since RTOs are parastatals of 
government, they should not be treated like ministries, which have to operate under the 
ambit of public service rules because this ranking hindered their effectiveness. The 
consensus was that CG structures should be different in public RTOs because of the 
nonstatic and unpredictable nature of their operations. According to Choi and Chandler 
(2015), public organizations undertake specialized activities. The structure of RTOs is 
different from other organizations in Nigeria. While other public organizations provide 
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services to the public as a means of delivering public programs and generating income for 
government, public RTOs undertake basic research which should result in products, 
processes, and systems. Consequently, participants believe there should not be one 
omnibus governance code for public organizations, but RTOs should have distinct 
governance codes that would aid their operations. Findings from this study revealed that 
such governance codes did not exist. The main regulatory act which governs corporate 
behavior in Nigeria is the CAMA of 1990. This act was directly formulated from the 
1948 UK Companies Act and covered public quoted firms and financial institutions 
(Guobadia, 2000). It is therefore limited in its ability to address and moderate issues that 
arise in the S&T sector. Other CG acts in Nigeria include the Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Act of 1991, the Investment and Securities Act of 2007, and the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria Act of 2011. According to Okike (2007), these CG 
structures, such as the CAC and the FRC are not empowered to monitor CG compliance. 
Other available CG codes include the Code of Best Practices for Public Companies in 
Nigeria, which was developed in 2003 by the SEC and was reviewed in 2011 to become 
the Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria; the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria which regulates CG of 
banks, microfinance institutions and bureau de changes, Codes of Business Ethics and 
Principles of Corporate Governance of 2019 for the Insurance Industry (NAICOM code), 
as well as the PENCOM Code of 2008 for licensed pensions operators. Other attempts at 
regulating governance in Nigeria include the establishment of the Center for Good 
Governance, which was championed by the Institute of Directors in Nigeria to improve 
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CG practices, and 2006 CG guidelines which were developed by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria for best practices in the banking sector. According to Ogbechie and Adeleye 
(2015), some other public agencies and ministries in Nigeria, like the Ministry of Trade 
and Investment, have developed codes to regulate CG practice in the sector. These codes 
were specifically designed to regulate public quoted companies. The public RTOs do not 
have regulatory codes specifically tailored towards CG in the sector. 
Lack of Standardized Best Practices to Regulate Board Activities 
Findings from this study revealed that no specified guidelines were regulating the 
activities of RTO boards in Nigeria. This was except one of the organizations sampled, 
which personally drafted a pamphlet to guide board-CEO interactions within its agency. 
As a consequence of this loophole, most RTOs pursued their mandates and operations as 
they interpreted it, and this action polarized operations of RTOs within the FMST as 
there were no standard best practices to which boards and CEOs could be pinned. 
Additionally, participants identified the fact that though boards monitored RTOs, there 
are no clear monitoring procedures in place for RTO boards in Nigeria. There are also no 
laws to guide the functions of RTO boards and review their performance after the 
expiration of their tenure. Findings revealed the belief of participants that the lack of 
defined reporting lines and impact assessment have negatively affected board 
effectiveness. Larker and Tayan (2015) said that clear and reliable reporting systems 
were important to good governance in corporations. CG principles are relatively new to 
Nigeria (Afolabi, 2015). There is, however, considerable pressure on developing 
economies by entities such as the IMF and OECD, to embrace internationally-acceptable 
154 
 
governance principles to attract the much-needed foreign investments for economic 
growth (Adegbite et al., 2013).  
The OECD governance codes state that compliance is required in six distinct 
areas (OECD, 2015). It is expected that full compliance by developing nations will attract 
much-needed foreign investments for their economic growth (Adegbite et al., 2013; 
Okike, 2007). Larcker and Tayan (2011) said that having regulatory governance codes in 
place does not translate to good governance, especially if leaders fail to adhere to them. 
Larcker and Tayan attributed the collapse of Enron to unethical handling of the 
organization’s accounts rather than the absence of governance codes. My findings in this 
study reveal that although public RTOs in Nigeria do not have standardized best 
governance practices, the problem of governance in Nigerian RTOs may not be the lack 
of the best governance strategy but the lack of will to adhere to best governance 
strategies. Despite the many codes of CG available for public and private companies in 
Nigeria, many of the codes only exist in theory and not in practice (Ogbechie & Adeleye, 
2015). The revised Code of Corporate Governance for Nigeria 2018, made a passing 
provision on board self-evaluation but was silent on external evaluation (FGN, 2018, 
p.20). This study found out that RTOs and boards were rarely evaluated. As the boards 
completed their tenures, they were thanked for their services or re-appointed, depending 
on their political connections. This structure was not designed for boards to have an 
impact and this situation makes organizational impact challenging to measure (Ford & 
Ihrke, 2016; Hassain & Abdo, 2016). 
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The role of monitoring board performance rests on the legislative arm of 
government in Nigeria (Arowolo, 2010). This function is, however, neglected. This 
neglected role has encouraged agency issues in many of the organizations sampled. My 
findings revealed that CEOs in Nigerian public RTOs desire a standardized board 
monitoring process which would be continuous and measurable.  According to Keehley, 
Medlin, Longmire, and MacBride (1997) and Bardach (2012), good governance best 
practices are achieved when the practice is effective over time and is measurable.  
Although Olubukunola (2013) posited that governance structures would reduce 
agency issues, Larcker and Tayan (2011) observed that having regulatory governance 
codes in place does not translate to good governance, especially if leaders failed to adhere 
to them. Larcker and Tayan (2011) further attributed the collapse of Enron to unethical 
handling of the organization’s accounts rather than the absence of governance codes. 
Findings from this study revealed the agitation of participants for regulatory bodies to 
monitor boards to prevent corporate recklessness and lukewarm performance. This 
finding corroborates Haxhi and Aguilera’s (2015) observation that although the SOX Act 
of 2002 did not totally avoid failures of governance, it checked the excesses of corporate 
leaders, through the imposition of penalties on unethical corporate leaders. 
Political Interference  
Findings from this research revealed that government policies are inconsistent and 
unfavorable to RTOs in Nigeria. I discovered from participants’ responses that there is a 
lack of continuity in government and this negatively affected governance and RTO 
effectiveness.  Findings from this study has revealed that the principals in Nigerian RTOs 
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sometimes pursued opportunistic paths by taking steps which would yield maximum 
benefits to a few elites, rather than the common good or stakeholders’ satisfaction. 
Participating CEOs confirmed that politicians are often more interested in their 
constituency projects than the performance of these RTOs. FCEO 3 explained this trend 
as “personalization of projects”. This study also confirmed that often, these self-interests 
affect innovation and performance because RTOs are funded according to the interests of 
the political class. Adegbite (2015) said that international governance best practices may 
not be applicable to the African context. 
Inadequate Funding to Support Board Activities and Processes  
The annual reports of the public RTOs in Nigeria that were sampled in this study 
revealed that they are funded from public resources to provide public services. This study 
also discovered that there was a form of operational autonomy in the Nigerian public 
RTOs. My findings in this study showed that despite their semi-autonomous positions, 
these public RTOs lacked the financial strength to execute their projects and adapt to the 
constantly-changing research environment. Because they were not governed as profit-
oriented businesses, they thus rely on the funds released from the federal government to 
operate. This study also discovered that these funds were often grossly inadequate for the 
operations of the RTOs and this affected their effectiveness and boards’ operations. 
FBM5 said government should fund these organizations adequately in order to be able to 
monitor and evaluate their activities. I discovered that some boards could not hold their 
statutory meetings because the government did not make financial provisions for such 
meetings and CEOs often covered the meeting expenses from their meager overhead 
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grants. When boards eventually met, they were poorly remunerated to an extent that some 
board members had to personally cater for their lodging expenses. As a consequence, 
board meetings were irregular. This study therefore discovered that effective governance 
of public RTO boards in Nigeria was greatly influenced by the ability of boards to meet 
regularly and take necessary decisions that affect their organizations. This finding aligns 
with the observations of Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016) that board powers are 
exercised through board meetings. Eluyela et al. (2018) discovered a positive link 
between frequent board meetings and organizational effectiveness while Mishra and 
Mohanty (2014) discovered that the frequency of board meetings, though positive, did 
not significantly influence organizational performance. My findings aligned with the 
positions of Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016), Jermias and Gani (2014), and Eluyela et 
al. (2018) regarding the fact that the inability of boards to meet frequently posed a threat 
to effective governance. This study discovered that the poor treatment of board members 
eventually reduced the commitment of some of them. This may have been because many 
board members in Nigerian public RTOs had viewed their appointments as a means to 
affluence and their experiences were far below expectations. Basory, Gleason and 
Kannan (2014) discovered that executive compensation affects board performance but the 
study conducted by Alves et al. (2016) revealed a negative relationship between 
executive compensation and governance effectiveness. I thus concluded that inadequate 





Though the impact of board size on performance emerged in the responses of 
participants, the findings from this research revealed that the size of the organization 
determines the size of a public board. Ch`en and Al-Najjar (2012) corroborated this 
finding in a study they conducted on Chinese firms between 1999 and 2003. They 
discovered that board size is determined by governance and organizational structure. 
Dabor et al. (2015) also discovered, through their study of the governance practice of 248 
companies quoted in the Nigerian stock exchange, that board size does not have any 
significant impact on organizational performance. The present study discovered that 
irrespective of size, board quality is desirable for high performance in public RTOs. This 
finding is consistent with the position of Aina (2013) that the diversity of boards should 
add value to their organizations. Oxelheim et al. (2013) said that well-constituted boards 
will be effective. I discovered from this study, however, that though the boards of some 
RTOs in Nigeria, during the period covered by this study, were professional and diverse 
in composition, many of them were not effective. PCEO4 said that “some go there to 
sleep; they don’t even contribute meaningfully to the running of the board. So, the impact 
of boards is not as it should be in RTOs. This finding suggests that factors, other than 
diverse composition, may be responsible for public board effectiveness. My results 
aligned with the conclusions of Aduda and Musyoka (2011) in a study which they 
conducted on the impact of executive compensation on the effectiveness of Kenyan banks 
between 2004 and 2008. They discovered that bank size determined the influence of 
principals because as the banks became bigger, principals’ influence diminished. The 
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diminishing influence of principals could often be ascribed to the skills and strong 
personalities of some CEOs (Busenbark et al., 2016). Intelligent CEOs greatly influence 
organizational effectiveness (Hermann & Nadkarni, 2014; Quigley & Hambrick, 2015). 
My findings in this research revealed that some of the RTOs were practically positioned 
by the CEOs to run by themselves either because there were no boards in place or they 
were not professional enough to make a difference.   
Findings from Data Obtained for RQ2 
RQ2: What do board members and managing directors of public organizations in 
Nigeria’s R&D sector believe is the impact of boards on organizational effectiveness? 
Agency board models are the most suitable governance model for RTOs (European 
Commission, 2005). Public RTO boards ensure that their organizations are responsible to 
the public when they adhere to governance best practices (Larker & Tayan, 2015). Since 
CG is relatively new to Nigeria, it is the responsibility of the government to strengthen 
the quality of good governance in Nigeria. Participants in this study identified some 
importance of boards and their impact. Some of the identified board roles included policy 
formulation and strategic planning, influence, monitoring and evaluation.  
Policy Formulation and Strategic Planning 
This study discovered that the appointment of RTO boards is necessary and 
should be continued. Participants in this study confirmed that public RTO boards are 
necessary to provide policy directions and develop strategic plans that would enable 
RTOs focus on their mandates and increase their effectiveness.   This position  aligns 
with the conclusion of Aina (2013) that effective boards can be identified by their 
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strategic way of thinking and their deliberate actions. The agency theory also supports 
that principals should take responsible actions that would result in long-term 
organizational progress and survival.  When governing boards act in the interest of 
shareholders, the organization’s responsibility to the society and individuals would be 
limited to that which is required for the long-term growth of the organization. Participants 
in this study did not believe that boards should be involved in the day-to-day 
administration of RTOs. Instances of board chairs who decidedly undertook such 
responsibilities, and the hostilities which resulted from these, were cited by participants. 
According to the Public Sector Commission (2014), boards should govern organizations 
and not run them. Unless boards understand their roles, they will continue to exhibit poor 
governance behaviors. The consequence of this is that agency issues will be unavoidable 
in public RTOs and the effectiveness of these organizations will be compromised. 
Influence 
Participants in this study acknowledged the importance of boards because of their 
capacity to influence favors for their organizations. Participants also revealed their 
perception that the educational and professional diversity of boards can add value to 
organizations. This position aligns with the conclusion of Oxelheim et al. (2013), who 
discovered from their study of 346 non-financial listed Nordic firms in 2001-2008, that 
boards that are composed of experts are generally effective. Ujunwa (2012) said that 
board quality is determined by the knowledge which members possess and how they 
employ these competencies in the discharge of their duties. Participants in this study 
agreed that influential board chairs are very important to RTOs because their political 
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weights and connections could attract funding to their organizations and encourage 
patronage of their services. This finding corroborates the assertion of Withers and Fitza 
(2017), who sampled 1,828 board chairs from 308 industries in the U.S. and discovered 
that the influential board chair can contribute to organizational effectiveness. This study 
also revealed that there is a separation of powers on RTOs boards and CEOs only 
represent their organizations on the boards and this arrangement has been working for 
RTOs. According to Krause and Semadeni (2013), the separation of the position of board 
chairs from that of CEOs will encourage effectiveness. Mishra and Mohanty (2014) 
examined the relationship between CG and financial performance in 141companies listed 
in the Mumbai stock exchange in India and discovered that separation of the powers of 
boards from the CEO will make CEOs more committed to outcomes since their priorities 
will be solely on implementation of policies.  
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Boards are the representatives of their principals in organizations. According to 
Verhoest et al. (2012), the role of the principals is performed by the parent ministries of 
such organizations. The oversight functions of the board include monitoring of the 
activities of their organizations and conducting periodic evaluations of their performances 
(Conyon & He, 2016). Participants acknowledged that the presence of boards in RTOs 
would push CEOs to pursue courses of action that will aid the delivery of the policies of 
the Nigerian government. Participants also believed that boards act as middle-men 
between organizations and the government and that this structure eliminates bureaucracy, 
thereby enabling organizations to respond in real-time to issues. Findings from this study 
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revealed that although boards ought to monitor the use of deployed resources in 
organizations to determine mandate achievement, this responsibility of boards sometimes 
resulted in controlling behaviors that stifled initiatives and encouraged agency issues. 
This study discovered that in instances where CEOs had governing boards, there was 
mistrust and frosty relationships between the boards and their CEOs. The consequence 
was that much time was spent on managing relationships than in pursuing organizational 
outcomes. This study, therefore, discovered that if boards performed their oversight 
functions properly without being controlling, the performance of organizations would be 
ultimately enhanced. This finding agrees with the position of the stewardship theory 
which affirms that managers can be trusted to act responsibly if they are not under 
control. According to Cornforth (2003), controlling boards will de-motivate CEOs. 
Cornforth (2003) said that boards should collaborate with CEOs and synergize efforts to 
achieve organizational goals.    
Findings from Data Obtained for RQ3 
RQ3: How do these perceptions of board members and executive directors 
regarding the impact of boards on Nigeria’s R&D sector affect the performance of these 
organizations? 
Findings from the data in this study revealed the beliefs of participants that RTOs 
could have been more effective if the public RTO boards had performed their statutory 
role. I also discovered from this study that though CEOs (former and present) and board 
members believed that public RTO boards in Nigeria were necessary and should add 
value to their organizations, the impact of these boards on organizational effectiveness 
163 
 
was not significant enough. This finding is based on issues raised by participants against 
boards’ activities, such as unclear roles, political interference, and lack of accountability.   
Unclear Roles of Boards  
Although CG involves regulation of the practices and activities of organizations, 
the organs of CG must also be regulated. Their powers and governing roles need to be 
well spelt out so that they do not overstep their boundaries and cause conflicts. According 
to Ogbechie and Adeleye (2015), boards should have governance procedures, backed by 
law. These rules and procedures should guide their behavior and become standards of 
operations. My findings from this research revealed that most of the boards developed 
their procedures because there was no formal code of governance for RTO boards in 
Nigeria. FBMs who participated in this study confessed that they only picked extant 
government laws and booklets about governance and thereon fashioned out ground rules 
for their boards. Some also relied on the expectations communicated to them by the 
government during their inauguration. Most often, these expectations were not well 
communicated. According to some of the participants, the retreats organized for some 
boards after their appointments were like jamborees and vacations. Governance of public 
RTO Boards, therefore, differed according to the interpretation of boards of the rules and 
Acts of their organizations. I discovered that there were extreme cases where the CEO 
was too powerful and the board too ignorant and the CEO ended up taking over the job of 
the board. That board recorded no meaningful achievement during its tenure. This study 
also discovered that most RTO boards were more interested in the financial performance 
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of their organizations rather than the fulfillment of their mandates to solve national 
challenges. This finding was repeatedly evident in the data obtained.  
Political Interference  
Public organizations were established by governments to deliver outcomes that 
would serve public interests (Verhoest et al., 2012). They are therefore indirectly 
accountable to the citizens. To make them more efficient and effective, governments 
appoint boards to run these public organizations but the boards are accountable to 
governments and not directly to the citizens. According to Ogbechie and Adeleye (2015), 
public organizations are only accountable to citizens through the politicians in power. 
Participants in this study believed that public boards have had an insignificant impact 
because their appointments were politically motivated and not done in the interest of the 
public. Many participants believed that many of the RTO boards were not designed to 
function because of the way they were structured. Oxelheim et al. (2013) said that when 
public boards are well constituted, they govern well. Participants in this study expressed 
their opinion that public organizations can not affect the lives of citizens as long as board 
selection continued to be politically motivated. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) said that 
independent boards are very effective in their activities. Sanda et al. (2011) said that 
countries without good business practices encourage their public boards to act with 
impunity and self-interests. My study discovered that self-interests are difficult to pursue 
in Nigerian RTOs because the enlightened and professional CEOs who were in charge, 
were only interested in outcomes. They thus boldly resisted self-seeking boards.  
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Board Accountability  
Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2016) asserted that accountable boards follow good 
governance principles. Tricker (2015) said that organizations controlled by boards which 
adhere to governance principles yield consistently positive outcomes over time. 
Participants in this study observed that the nonregulation of board activities was one of 
the problems of RTOs effectiveness in Nigeria. To corroborate this, my findings revealed 
the absence of clearly defined reporting lines for RTO boards in Nigeria. As a 
consequence of this, boards acted as determined during their meetings, and some board 
chairs acted with impunity and overstepped their boundaries.  
This study also discovered that the absence of supervision and control of board 
activities encouraged the emergence of super CEOs who become very powerful. Some of 
the boards left the whole job to some CEOs and they only reported their activities to the 
boards. The data obtained in this study also revealed that most boards rarely engaged in 
advocacy for their organizations. Consequently, CEOs had to lobby for funds for their 
organizations to operate. Since the funds were not usually adequate, some of the projects 
embarked upon became abandoned before completion while the completed research 
suffered from lack of patronage. These consequences are traceable to CG collapse. Poor 
governance practices have negatively impacted RTO effectiveness in Nigeria. One of the 
disadvantages of such a situation is that greedy CEOs can capitalize on the loopholes to 
obtain personal benefits and pursue self- interests (Nkundabanyanga, 2016). Another 
finding of this study was that lack of RTO board supervision and accountability promoted 
wastage of resources. Many board meetings were found to be unnecessary and where 
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they were held, participants observed that no concrete decisions were taken. Yet, the 
board meetings would have cost the organization millions of naira, which could have 
been put to better use by the organization. Muller (2009), after his investigation of the 
impact of governance approaches of project managers on project structures, explained 
that the absence of proper governance structures would promote avoidable mistakes. 
Muller said that these mistakes have costly consequences on organizational effectiveness.  
Limitations of the Study 
There are limitations associated with using opinions and perceptions in research 
studies as in all other studies and as such, I cannot ignore that there are certain issues that 
limit this study. This study examined the impact of public governing boards on public 
RTO effectiveness in Nigeria and so the findings in this study cannot be generalized to 
private RTOs in Nigeria. Some of the other limitations in this study include (a) issues of 
representativeness (b) use of secondary data, and (c) uncertainty about the genuineness of 
participants’ perceptions and their reasons for participating in the study. The criteria for 
selection of participants may have limited the data available for the study because the 
participants were purposefully selected based on their characteristics and availability. As 
such, the selected participants may not have been fully representative of the population 
sampled. Secondary data are effective for data triangulation (Rohrbeck & Gemünden, 
2011). However, if adequate information had been available to me, I would have been 
able to personally verify the performance of the sampled RTOs to determine their 
effectiveness. In the absence of this information, I had to make do with the annual reports 
of the organizations as presented. This study is also limited by my difficulty in knowing 
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if the positions of participants may have been borne out of their dissatisfaction with the 
treatment they had or were being given, their disenchantment with the whole system, or 
even fear of reprisal. Participants in this research may have therefore expressed opinions 
that were based on assumptions and since these perceptions could not be verified within 
the timeframe for this study, it may have inadvertently increased the probability of 
respondents’ bias. I addressed some of these concerns of the participants by assuring 
them of the confidentiality of their data during the interview and taking steps to secure 
these data. I addressed their fears of reprisals, which could have been felt by some of the 
participants by eliminating any way that responses could be identified through names and 
positions. I also explained the importance of the study to them so that they would be 
committed to saying things as they were.  
I was unable to interview serving board members because the present 
administration of President Muhammadu Buhari sacked former boards of public RTOs 
during his first term in office and the new boards that have been inaugurated are yet to 
settle down to their duties fully. The population’s characteristics could, therefore, be a 
limitation since there was no way of balancing the opinions of serving board members 
with that of FBMs. Although this did not affect the quality of the data obtained since the 
operating environment of public RTOs has not changed. Further research that considers 
the opinions of serving RTO boards may be required to understand governance and 
organizational effectiveness in Nigerian public RTOs fully. The research design and data 
collection methods are reliable and can be applied to research in the same sector in 
Nigeria with similar results. 
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Ethical biases that could have affected this study were personal especially because 
I work with a public RTO and of course, had some personal opinions about governance in 
the organizations. This possibility of personal bias however aided my reflexive thinking 
and extreme carefulness in observing standard and ethical research procedures in the data 
collection and analysis process. The member checking procedure also aided the validity 
of the study.  
Recommendations 
Nigeria has 17 organizations in the FMST, which are tasked with growing wealth 
for the country. However, good governance has always been an issue with Nigerian 
public organizations and the evidence is apparent in the decaying infrastructure in Nigeria 
and the many failed businesses. Although much of the causes are attributable to 
corruption and political interference (Barton & Wiseman, 2015), public boards also have 
a share in the blame for governance limitations in Nigeria (Ogbechie, 2016). Public 
boards, in theory, are expected to reduce incidences of governance failures in 
organizations but there is a gap between theory and practice in this regard (Verhoest et 
al., 2012).  Boards are an integral part of public organizations in Nigeria, as statutorily 
required by the Nigerian Constitution and laws that set up the organizations, but their 
impact does not seem to be so significant. Participants in this study have considered 
public RTO boards in Nigeria to be unwanted appendages and wasteful ventures. But 
over the years, successive research studies have recommended what boards should do to 
remain relevant. Through this study, we have been able to discover that public boards are 




Absence of structures weaken any system and if the government of Nigeria 
desires to meet its goals through public enterprises, good CG structures and codes must 
be established and sustained, irrespective of the party or individual in government. This 
study recommends that there should be a benchmark and procedures for measuring 
adherence to CG standards. There are current structures in public organizations such as 
the Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units (ACTU) in organizations. But these organs 
are ineffective to measure the adherence of CEOs and boards because these desks are 
manned by employees of the organizations who could easily be compromised or subdued 
for fear of reprisals or loss of their jobs.  
This study, therefore, recommends that independent assessors assess governance 
performance of organizations half yearly with technical bias. Organizations that score 
above the performance benchmark should be rewarded and promoted while under-
performers should be penalized as appropriate. Such assessments will motivate CEOs and 
boards to establish good CG policies in their organizations. This study also discovered 
that public RTOs, under the FMST in Nigeria, could be grouped into three; according to 
their mandates and ease of impact assessment. Some RTOs were established to provide 
consumer goods like NASENI, Federal Institute of Industrial Research, Oshodi (FIIRO), 
Project Development Institute (PRODA), Nigerian Building and Road Research Institute 
(NBBRI), and also the National Research Institute for Chemical Technology (NARICT). 
The second group includes feeder research institutes that learn to do certain things like 
RMRDC and NBTI (with about 33 incubators in the country aimed at tapping resources 
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or technology from states). The third category of public RTOs includes knowledge-
creating entities such as the National Centre For Technology Management (NACETEM), 
National Biotechnology Development Agency (NABDA), National Office for 
Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP), which exist to regulate the conduct of 
research in public RTOs. Clearly, within FMST itself, there are diverse operational 
structures. Adegbite (2015) recommended that developing countries may fashion out a 
workable governance structure. This study, therefore, recommends that governance codes 
should be developed by the Nigerian government, specifically for public RTOs. These 
codes should be adapted to public RTO operations and also address their governance 
problems. The CAMA should also be revised as it is outdated and irrelevant to public 
RTO operations. This study recommends the development of a Science, Engineering, and 
Allied Matters Act (SEAM) which would codify governance in Nigerian public RTOs.  
According to Barton and Wiseman (2015), the functions of boards in the 
management of organizations have not been clearly defined despite their overwhelming 
presence. Arnwine (2002) explained that boards have three main roles: policy making, 
decision making, and oversight functions. Boards that understand their roles and are built 
upon proper governance structures will behave appropriately and strategically. The 
organizations under the control of such boards will be focused and consistently impact 
their societies. Effective leaders must necessarily possess governance skills and a sense 
of direction that will make them focused. Findings from this study revealed that public 
RTO boards in Nigeria do not possess formal training on governance skills neither were 
they equipped with information about their employers’ expectations after their tenure. 
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The consequence of this is that the governance structure of public RTOs in Nigeria is not 
standardized and it is difficult to pinpoint a standard governance pattern across the 
organizations. This study, therefore, recommends training for boards of public RTOs as 
soon as they are inaugurated. During this training, board members should be equipped 
with measurable skills that would enable the government to regulate board activities. 
According to Bass (1999), training and educational improvements promote 
transformational leadership. Training is strategic for leaders. The need for training of 
boards can therefore not be overemphasized. This will help boards understand and 
internalize their roles so that they can be well positioned to improve their organizations’ 
effectiveness.  
This study recommends that board members should sign commitment letters after 
the retreat. This letter would contain expectations from them and clarify what boards are 
to expect from their employers. The letter would also specify the rights and 
responsibilities of board members, including when the president of the board can remove 
them from the board for non-compliance and non-performance. As a follow-up, this study 
recommends that M&E processes should be established to standardize best practices on 
public boards in Nigeria. M&E will surely stimulate innovation and healthy competition 




Figure 6. Proposed monitoring and evaluation/oversight structure for public RTOs in 
Nigeria (Developed from participants’ recommendations). 
My findings from this research suggest that public RTO boards must be well 
composed to be effective. Many of the sampled participants confirmed lopsided board 
appointments which favored politicians and made it difficult for technocrats to operate. 
This study, therefore, recommends a ratio of 50:30:20; that is, 50% of the board of public 
RTOs should be made up of persons with technical, academic, and professional 
qualifications so that they can act as the think-tank for the boards. They will easily 
understand proposals from CEOs and offer technical support to nurture such ideas to 
maturity. The other 30% should comprise of industrialists and professionals in private 
practice, and the remaining 20% should accommodate politicians and persons in positions 
of authority. These three groups have their roles defined on the board. Group A should 
bring up proposals and conduct technical foresight; Group B should link up the RTOs 
with the private sector for needed funds and collaborations, while Group C should be 
saddled with advocacy for the organization by pushing the proposals and policies of the 
• T.A.C.: Technical Advisory Committee 
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RTOs to the government for funding and patronage. Every group should be assessed 
yearly by the Special Advisory Council (SAC) which should be composed of technocrats 
and professionals. The role of the SAC would be to determine the progress and 
achievements of public RTO boards in line with the letter of commitment signed at the 
beginning of their tenure.  Members of different groups should also peer-review their 
colleagues. These reviews will be part of discussions at board meetings and would push 
boards to be more committed to their assignments. Regular M&E will stimulate positive 
governance practices in Nigerian RTOs. The performance of boards should, therefore, be 
regularly measured against the mandate and vision of their organizations towards meeting 
national challenges. I recommend that the effectiveness of public RTO boards on their 
organizations can be determined by a set of logical sequences that are shown in Figure 7.  
This study found that funding is critical to RTO and RTO boards’ performance. It 
is recommended that public boards’ remuneration be improved so that they would be 
motivated to serve their organizations. Remuneration should, however, be tied to 
performance so that appointments onto public boards would no longer be compensations 
but transactional contracts. The funding of RTOs also needs to be improved for them to 
have any measurable impact on their society. Low funding is indicative of little attention 
being paid to R&D in Nigeria. The support needed for R&D in Nigerian RTOs is 
obtained more from foreign grants, fellowships and investments than from the federal 
government of Nigeria. The funds allocated to the FMST to support research has 
dwindled over the years. Between 2007 and 2012, it plummeted from 1.04% of the 
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Figure 7. RTO impact assessment chart. 
The highest budgetary allocation to FMST since 2012 was in 2017 when the 
ministry receives 0.97% of the nation’s budget. The situation has not improved in 2019 as 
the FMST received N66,823,303,434 in the appropriated budget for 2019. This is less 
than 1% (0.757%) of the national budget. This allocation for the FMST is the least given 
to any ministry in the 2019 national budget. Sadly, the components in the allocation 
indicate that the funds were mainly distributed to run the organizations, not for basic 
R&D. 
For instance, out of the N66,823,303,434 appropriated budget for 2019, N35, 
020,953,172 was allocated for recurrent expenditure and for capital development, N31, 
802,350,262 was allocated. This apparent shortage of funds for R&D and deliberate 
neglect of R&D has hindered Nigeria’s Vision 2020 from crystallizing into reality 
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because science and technology are the catalysts for the economic transformation of any 
country. Although the federal government of Nigeria tried to intervene in the sector by 
establishing the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 2006 to manage the proposed 
$5billion endowment fund for R&D, the money was never released to the foundation 
(Muanya, 2019). Additionally, two other initiatives like the Education Tax Fund (ETF) 
and the Science and Technology Education Post-Basic (STEP-B) project, targeted at 
capacity building and infrastructural development in RTOs and higher institutions, made 









Figure 8. Percentage budgetary allocation for S&T Ministry in Nigeria budget between 
2007 and 2012 (Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, Nigeria). 
Political interests, as well as mismanagement of resources and projects, further 
sealed the fate of these initiatives (Muanya, 2019). Another initiative has been developed 
and is being championed by the FMST - the National Science, Technology Innovation 
Roadmap 2030 (NASTIR 2030). The goal of this initiative is to increase the 
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competitiveness of Nigeria’s economy. This study recommends therefore that public 
RTO boards in Nigeria should be empowered and tasked to achieve the FMST strategic 
roadmap plan. When due attention is paid to R&D by any nation, the infrastructural and 
growth challenges being faced by such nations would easily be overcome. This study also 
recommends that a minimum of 1% of the overall annual budget of Nigeria should be 
allocated to support R&D alone in the FMST, aside from allocations for recurrent and 
capital expenditures. RTOs should then be tasked to guide their organizations towards the 
eradication of these specific national challenges.  
This study also recommends the replication of this research by conducting 
interviews to elicit perceptions from research officers in the public sector regarding the 
impact of boards on their effectiveness as researchers. This will give other perspectives 
instead of relying on the opinion of board members and CEOs alone. Further research can 
also be conducted using a quantitative approach, to compare the impact of boards of 
public and private RTOs on the performance of these organizations. 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
A study that explores the perceptions of participants to discover the impact of 
good governance on organizational outcomes has potential benefits. These benefits can 
be felt by political leaders, chief executives of public organizations, the academic 
community, the nation, and the individual in the country. These benefits have been made 
possible through the insights obtained in this study.  
Nigeria needs an effective research sector to solve its problems with 
infrastructural development.  Until basic and essential infrastructure like power and good 
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roads network are available, Nigeria will continue to remain in the category of 
developing nations. Findings from this study revealed that the quality of public RTO 
boards in Nigeria and the adherence of the boards to good governance behaviors will 
have positive influence on the effectiveness of the RTOs. If the findings of this research 
are implemented, public RTOs in Nigeria will undergo regulatory reforms which will 
make them more effective and responsive to the needs of the citizens in the country. This 
will result in social changes in the RTOs and the lives of the citizens. 
The findings of this study will provide useful information to policymakers in 
Nigeria about the actual operations of public boards. Through these findings, 
policymakers in the country will understand how some extant laws, financial procedures, 
and bureaucratic processes hinder good governance in public RTOs. The findings in this 
study will also assist new public RTO boards in Nigeria to become aware of how they 
can embrace strong CG cultures and run their organizations more professionally. 
Generally speaking, the positive social changes that could arise from this study, if 
the recommendations are implemented, include reforms of the governance structure and 
institutional frameworks of all boards in the public sector in Nigeria. It is expected that 
this will improve good governance practices across all public RTOs in Nigeria and 
increase confidence in them. When there is a commitment to ethical and strategic 
behavior in organizations, organizational effectiveness and positive outcomes are to be 
expected. Such outcomes include cost-effectiveness and lowered risk of collapse.  
The importance of good governance is not only felt by the organization that 
practices it but by the society which that organization serves. When public boards engage 
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in good governance practices, organizational outcomes are easier to predict and sustain 
(Rowley, Shipilov, & Greve, 2017). With the involvement of participants in this study, 
the seed of social change has already been sown. For many of the participants, it was the 
first time they had such a platform to express their opinions on the topic. The fact that 
searchlight was being beamed on the issue made them hopeful that the government would 
discover their plights and take necessary actions to address the issue of good governance 
in Nigerian RTOs.    
If the recommendations of this study are imbibed, appropriate good governance 
principles would be established in public RTOs in Nigeria. This will improve the 
effectiveness of public organizations. The implication of good governance is a 
commitment to mandate achievement, and transparency in the conduct of business. This 
will foster mutual trust and cooperation. Improved governance of public RTOs will 
exponentially increase the competitiveness of these organizations and their propensity to 
meet public needs. Public RTOs will thus be positioned to be socially responsible to their 
communities. 
Specifically, if the recommendations of this study are implemented, positive 
organizational culture in public RTOs will emerge and grow strong. Good corporate 
culture instills confidence in the minds of potential investors because they assure the 
investors that their investments are protected from unwholesome practices, such as non-
disclosure and arbitrary risk-taking. Since R&D is very costly to implement, public RTOs 
in Nigeria will benefit from foreign investments, which can only be assured if the sector 
adheres to international governance best practices. Apart from investments, RTOs can 
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also access grants that would aid their research activities. The RTOs that are almost idle 
due to lack of funds will be able to return to their research to develop processes and 
machines that can help Nigeria to eliminate the infrastructural deficits in the country. 
When the researchers and scientists are fully engaged, the public RTOs will increase in 
efficiency and effectiveness thus making these organizations more profitable and well-
positioned to meet their mandates. Due to the potential profitability of these organizations 
as a consequence of good governance corporate culture, there will be job satisfaction, job 
security, and improved remunerations for the employees.   
Adherence to good governance practices also has social change implications for 
public RTO boards. In the first instance, the profitability and effectiveness of their 
organizations will strengthen the theory of good governance and serve as a reference 
point for other sectors to emulate. Since it has been established that strong corporate 
cultures enhance access to funds, public RTO boards will also benefit from the growth 
and successes of their organizations through improved emoluments. There will thus be 
less pressure from board members on the CEO. Consequently, the CEO will be able to 
perform his duties without undue interference and demands from boards.  
Another positive social change that can arise from this study is that the 
government of Nigeria will have less to worry about the survival of public RTOs. This is 
because the organizations will be self-sustaining and rely less on funding from their 
government. Findings from this study reveal that over 95% of public RTOs in the FMST 
currently rely on the government to run their organizations and perform their research 
activities. This puts a heavy burden upon the government, especially because these 
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organizations are unable to meet their mandates and open up new sources of income for 
the government. If the recommendations of this study are implemented, most public 
RTOs in Nigeria will become importers of technology and Nigeria can join the league of 
nations who earn foreign currencies through their competencies. This will reduce the 
nations over-dependence on crude oil as a major source of income for the nation.  
Another implication for social change that could be obtained from this study is in 
its addition to the body of knowledge. The approach of the investigation into the issue of 
governance has primarily been through the use of survey instruments and questionnaires, 
using a quantitative approach. Through the findings of this research, there is the 
possibility of adding another perspective through the perception of participants, using the 
qualitative approach. The findings of this study have implications for further studies. I 
discovered that some other factors, other than public boards, could influence public RTO 
performance in Nigeria. The issue of the impact of the use of Advisory Committees in 
RTOs also came up in the course of my findings. These issues are however questions for 
further research. More investigations could be carried out on other public organizations in 
Nigeria to determine the impact of their boards on organizational performance. The 
perception of participants could also be obtained through another data collection 
instrument, other than face to face interviews. The results of such studies could reveal 
further insight into how good governance practices could be diffused to assist public 




Legitimacy for public RTO boards in Nigeria was derived from the enabling laws 
and decrees which established the RTOs. This study relied on the experiences and 
opinions of participants to determine the impact of good governance on public RTO 
effectiveness in Nigeria. Major themes were derived from the examination of the problem 
identified in this study and these themes were analyzed using the research questions 
generated in the study. Findings from the qualitative data were majorly consistent with 
the findings of other literature on boards’ impact which stress the fundamental 
importance of good governance. This study found out that even though public RTO 
boards were necessary and could have a positive impact on their organizations, their 
influence was not felt. The findings suggest that the Nigerian government needs to reform 
the governance structure of Nigerian public RTO boards to make it more functional and 
accountable. This study also recommends that the focus of governance in public RTOs 
should be on strategic performance to strengthen the future of these RTOs and address 
critical national issues. Future research could focus on strengthening public board 
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Appendix A: Introductory Letter 1 
 
TO: (The Managing Director/CEO)  
Dear ________________, 
I am a member of staff of the Engineering Materials Development Institute, Akure (a 
parastatal of NASENI, which is under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Science 
and Technology) and I have been an employee of this Institute for the past 16 years. I am 
now a doctoral candidate in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Walden 
University and I am researching the role played by public governing boards in the 
effectiveness of public Research and Technological Organizations (RTOs) in Nigeria. In 
view of the current economic quagmire being faced by Nigeria, the current interest of 
most Nigerians is on how government will deliver their promises of infrastructural and 
economic development. Science and Technology is one of the backbones of any economy 
and I am thus interested in contributing to knowledge on how the public RTOs can 
become more efficient and effective, through a more effective governance system, so as 
to improve the fortunes of the country.  
Your organization is well noted for its giant strides in the field of research & technology 
and in a bid to accomplish the purpose of this research; your organization has been 
chosen, among others, to participate in this research. I therefore humbly request a private 
interview with you for 40-60 minutes in order to gain more insight into the governance 
structure of your organization.   Your participation is a very simple process and the 
opinions you shall offer during this interview shall be confidential and all the measures to 
be taken to guarantee your privacy are contained in the attached Informed Consent Form 
as required by Walden University. I request that you kindly fill the form and mail by 
(date), using the enclosed stamped envelope. A script of the interview shall be made 
available to you, as well as a copy of the study’s findings after the conclusion. 
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I therefore hope that you will feel comfortable with this request and provide useful and 
frank information that will be invaluable to this study. I will call to book an appointment 
for the interview but you can contact me should you be willing to get more clarifications 
about this study.  






Public Policy and Admin, Walden University 
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Appendix B: Introductory Letter 2 
 
 
TO: (Former Board Member’s Name)  
Dear ________________, 
I am a member of staff of the Engineering Materials Development Institute, Akure (a 
parastatal of NASENI, which is under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Science 
and Technology) and I have been an employee of this Institute for the past 16 years. I am 
now a doctoral candidate in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Walden 
University and I am researching the role played by public governing boards in the 
effectiveness of public Research and Technological Organizations (RTOs) in Nigeria. In 
view of the current economic quagmire being faced by Nigeria, the current interest of 
most Nigerians is on how government will deliver their promises of infrastructural and 
economic development. Science and Technology is one of the backbones of any economy 
and I am thus interested in contributing to knowledge on how the public RTOs can 
become more efficient and effective, through a more effective governance system, so as 
to improve the fortunes of the country.  
You have been selected, among others, to participate in this research by virtue of the fact 
that you were the chairman/a member of the governing board of (insert organization 
here); an organization that is noted for research and technology. In a bid to accomplish 
the purpose of this research, I therefore humbly request a private interview with you for 
40-60 minutes in order to gain more insight into your opinion and experience of the 
governance structure and performance of the board that could have influenced the 
effectiveness of your organization. Your participation is a very simple process and the 
opinions you shall offer during this interview shall be confidential and all the measures to 
be taken to guarantee your privacy are contained in the attached Informed Consent Form 
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as required by Walden University. I request that you kindly fill the form and mail by 
(date), using the enclosed stamped envelope if you decide to participate in this research. 
A script of the interview shall be made available to you, as well as a copy of the study’s 
findings after the conclusion. 
I therefore hope that you will feel comfortable with this request and provide useful and 
frank information that will be invaluable to this study. I will call to book an appointment 
for the interview but you can contact me should you be willing to get more clarifications 
about this study.  
























Appendix C: Interviewer Guide 
A. Interview Details 
Date:     Time:     Place: 
Interviewee:       
Position of interviewee: 
B. Protocol and Opening Statement 
• Thank participant 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interpretive qualitative study despite 
your busy schedule.  My name is Olayinka Komolafe and I am a doctoral student of 
Public Policy and administration in the Walden University, Baltimore, USA. I shall be 
moderating this interview session.  
• Describe how research will help effective governance of public organizations in 
Nigeria 
This study is focused on understanding the impact of public boards on the 
effectiveness of public Research and Technology Organizations (RTOs). The importance 
of this research can be seen in its contribution to the effectiveness of public 
organizations, especially in these days of recession where public organizations seem to be 
the major backbone of government to provide needed infrastructure and basic services, 
which will alleviate the suffering of the masses. This research is also a partial fulfillment 
of a doctoral degree (PhD) in Public Policy and Administration (Public Management & 
Leadership).  I will therefore appreciate your candid opinion on what you perceive to be 
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the effect of the presence of public boards in Nigerian RTOs, especially based on your 
experience as a board member/chair/ CEO.  
• Explain the Interview Process  
The questions are semi-structured in order to allow you to fully express your opinion 
on the subject of inquiry and I want you to know, before this interview commences, that 
whatever you say in the course of this interview shall be held in strict confidence and no 
one can have any unauthorized access to the scripts of this interview session. The only 
authorized access is that which is given to my dissertation Committee Chair in the event 
that he may desire to confirm some of the emerging themes from this interview. At this 
time, I will like to also inform you that this interview shall be recorded on a midget audio 
recorder for easy and accurate transcription. I will like to know if you object to this 
before we proceed further.  
• Other steps in the Interview Process  
o Remind participant of their right to withdraw their participation if they 
feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview. 
o Sign Informed Consent form (if not yet signed) 
 
C. Questions 
I will like to begin the interview now. But before then, do you have any questions 




1. What governance problems exist in public organizations in Nigeria’s Research 







2. What do Board members and Managing Directors of public organizations in 

















4. What governance strategies have worked for you in increasing your 


























D. Closing Remarks 
Thank you and please remember the member checking procedures. 
I wish to thank you for your participation and unrestrained comments during this 
interview. Please note that you can have a copy of this study if you so desire. Kindly 












Appendix D: Certificate of Completion of NIH Training  
 
Certificate of Completion
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural Research certifies that
Olayinka Komolafe successfully completed the NIH Web-based training course
"Protecting Human Research Participants".
Date of completion: 02/01/2017.
Certification Number: 2306511.
 
